In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful

IN THE NAME OF ALLAH, THE MERCIFUL AND THE

COMPASSIONATE

TELEGRAMS NO. STATE 13 7044, COLOMBO 2900, STATE 156210, TEHRAN 080 74, STATE 201137, STATE 223 45, STATE 23 0644, HAVANA 8582,USUN NEW YORK 04833 WERE THE LAST COPIES OF THEIR ORIGINAL TEXTS AND,THUS, VERY DULL IN COLOR,THEREFORE THEIR PRINTING AND PHOTOGRAPHING IN BOOKS WERE NOT FAVORABLY POSSIBLE. FOR THIS REASON,THE ABOVE-MENTIONED DOCUMENTS WERE RE-TYPED.

In the name of Allah, the most compassionate, the most mercifull

Following the release of documents from espionage den's documents in relation with Afghanistan and the exposure of joint American and Russian crimes in this muslim country, we are releasing esponage den's documents on a phenomenon which under the guise of an internationally independent organization has turned out to be the scene of confrontation and manipulation of Russian and American moves, an organization which as an anti—colonial movement, and lack of dependendence on existing blocks of the world came into being but gradually took shape by the policies of different blocks and now we dare say that it has become an smaller example of the united nations organization, the diffrence is that in the former, policies of the oppressive powers are exercised, indirectly and through different intermidiaries and their degree of dependence on their masters.Amongst these countries even those who were the prime founders of this organization are now directly supported by america, and the rest of them, inspite of claiming to be in support of non—alignment principles, carry on their demagoguery practices by being covertly sympathetic and in alliance with the Great Satan concerned with.

The present documents are substantially about the so—called diplomatic attempts of the Greats Satan in competition with the eastern supper power regarding the sixth non—aligned movement's summit conferrence in Cuba. Americans are worried about lefting the reins of this movement fall in the hand of their rival, lest a word should be said in opposition to the Great Satan's policies in this international arena. because these resolutions will never be materialized even if they contain the most radical and the harshest decisions, so as to solve the problems of the oppressed who carry the heaviest.

The criminal America, therefore, fully mobilizes her allies and her pupput regimes efforts vis—a—vis the conferece to prevent ti from

taking a hoshie a hitude towards the u.s. interests.

the criminal America, therefore directs her followers'full attempts to contront this conference so as to protect her own interests. In this regard one can easily find out the main points of the so—called American interests.

Zionist regime, America is concerned that lest her so—called camp dauid peace treaty between egypt and the Zionist regime should be attacked, Basically, America does everything to prevent the existence of the Zionist regime from being put to question after this summit, and worriedly states that the second draft prepared by Cuba can be counted on as a " call for the destruction of Israel". At this point we must ask this question of our muslim Arab brethren, that who do they think is behinde the aggressiue policies of the racist and Zionist regime and who renders au—support to it ? Who grants the billion—dillars assistance to the regime that has confiscated our beloved Quds, and who in the non—alignment conference attempts so seriously in the regime which has occupied Quds. then how can we believe that regimes who have very close relations with America are able to fight the Zionist regime. The foreign Minister of Bahrain, expressing his sorrow, told the American amba ssador that since America was recognized as the principle enemy of palestinians' rights, he and his other counterparts could not do a gung to support her. Could there be any better help given to the occupiers of Quds ?

Egypt: The corrupt rulers of egypt receive their rewards for being treacheroas to the palestiniaucause and the freedom of Quds, and thus under the support of America her expulsion from non—alignmeed movement is avoided. And it is important to note that African countries and other states claiming invependence such as India and yogoslavia have extended their support to the criminal America.

America is unwilling to allow the disclosure of her crimes in Latin—America, poerto—rico and Nicaragua, and apparently has succeeded to some extent. Her success was also the result of another non—allgned member's attempt, nameiy pera.

The Great Satan gains victory with regard to south—east Asia and

Kambodia, because vietnam is miidly criticised in the deckration. in regarding the Indian Ocean, the u.s. does not want anyone to crihcise her military presence there but the Non–aligned allies will attempt to omit the partial phrases condemning America will try to replace them with partial phrases condemning America and will try to replace them with general ambignous statements.

The Great Satan also tries to bring about the ultimate support for her subordinate racist regimes such as Rodesia and South Africa and...

In any event, there is a rivalry and competition between supporters of the east and those of the west, and non–alignement and independence is not at all taken into consideration, because the basic principles of this movement's founders do not even allow for a moment's independence from a great external power. Since their own survival is dependent on this same thing. By the way can anyone except for those who are humble and respect full to the eternal force and traditions of Allah remain independent from the colorful forces of the oppressors ? how is it that the Zoinist regime of jrao is still a member of the non–aligned movement and yet allied with all Satans, continues the war and aggression, and even one non–aligned member does not raise a finger in objection. And it is more interesting to note Afghanistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and... as members of the movement.

This collection is comprised of state deparment documents and those of the C.I.A.

May Islam and the Muslims be assisted, and the government of the oppressed, allied with Allah, and Non–allgned with appressors be established

Muslim students following Imam's line (policy).

1979 MAY -8 AM 7:25

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RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 911
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 5665
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA 4742
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 390
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 26
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1678
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5493
RUMJHT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 2723
RUSBTA/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 4472
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 NEW DELHI 7852

CINCPAC POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 4/7/85 (GIBNEY, JON M.) OR-P
TAGS: PORT, IN
SUBJECT: INDIA AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

REF: A/ STATE 41933; B/ BELGRADE 1967; C/ HAVANA 1861;
D/ USUN 1277 (ALL NOTAL)

1. C-ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: INDIA VIEWS THE NAM AS PASSING THROUGH A "CRITICAL PHASE" BUT HOPES, ACCORDING TO MEA JOINT SECRETARY (UN) M. DUBEY, THAT THE MODERATES IN THE MOVEMENT WILL BE ABLE TO CHECK CUBAN ADVENTURISM. THE GOI IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH YUGOSLAVIA AND OTHER LIKE-MINDED MEMBERS TO TIGHTEN NAM PROCEDURES IN AN EFFORT TO CIRCUMSCRIBE CUBA'S FREEDOM OF ACTION AS CHAIRMAN. INDIAN PM DESAI HAS WARNED THE CUBANS THAT THE NAM MUST RETAIN ITS INDEPENDENT CHARACTER. AS A RESULT OF THESE "EXTREMELY FRANK" TALKS, THE GOI BELIEVES THAT THE CUBANS HAVE BECOME "VERY CAUTIOUS" AND ARE BACKING AWAY FROM AN IDEOLOGICAL CONFRONTATION. INDIA IS URGING ALL NAM MEMBERS TO ATTEND THE HAVANA SUMMIT, BUT FEELS

THAT IT COULD BE SELF-DEFEATING TO START A "CAMPAIGN" AGAINST CUBA, A MATTER ON WHICH IT DIFFERS IN "NUANCE AND STYLE" FROM YUGOSLAVIA.

KEY ISSUES PRESENTLY CONFRONTING THE NAM INCLUDE THE EXPULSION OF EGYPT (INDIA WILL STRONGLY, AND IT BELIEVES, SUCCESSFULLY, OPPOSE); SEATING OF KAMPUCHEAN DELEGATION (GOI WILL NOT MAKE ANY DECISION UNTIL JUST BEFORE THE NACB MEETING IN COLOMBO); PAK MEMBERSHIP (INDIA WILL SUPPORT, BUT CUBA WILL OPPOSE ON BEHALF OF AFGHANISTAN); IRAN ENTRY (APPLICATION NOT YET RECEIVED, BUT IRANIANS ASSURED OF WODESPREAD SUPPORT). INDIA EXPECTS THAT CUBA WILL OPPOSE BOLIVIA'S ATTEMPT TO UPGRADE ITS STATUS IN THE NAM, BUT IS NOT SURE HOW CUBA PLANS TO HANDLE THE GUANTANAMO ISUE.

DUBEY ASSERTED THAT DESPITE THE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT IN 1977 INDIA'S COMMITMENT TO THE NAM HAS BEEN UNWAVERING. IF ANYTHING, AS HE PUT IT, INDIA HAS BECOME EVEN MORE EFFECTIVE IN NAM FORA BECAUSE OF THE JUANTA'S ADHERENCE TO "GENUINE" NON-ALIGNMENT. DUBEY OFFERED THE PERSONAL SUGGESTION THAT THE US TRY TO ALLAY THE SUSPICION THAT THE US AND CHINA ARE SUPPORTING THE NAM GROUP OPPOSED TO CUBA AND AVOID EXAGGERATING THE MODERATES' PROBLEMS IN DEALING WITH CUBA, WHICH MIGHT ONLY MAKE THE SITUATION WORSE. INDIA APPEARS CONFIDENT THAT IT CAN PLAY A BALANCING ROLE AND PREVENT CUBA FROM CARRYING THE NAM INTO THE SOCIALIST CAMP. END SUMMARY.

3. INDIAN CONCERNS. DUBEY, ONE OF THE GOI'S MOST EXPERIENCED DIPLOMATS IN DEALING WITH NON-ALIGNED AFFAIRS, PROVIDED EMBOFFS WITH A CANDID APPRAISAL OF THE NAM DURING CALL ON HIM MAY3. WE JUDGED IT ONE OF THE MOST USEFUL MEETINGS WE HAVE HAD WITH THE INDIANS ON THIS SUBJECT IN SOME TIME. THE NAM, DUBEY FLATLY STATED, IS PASSING THROUGH A "CRITICAL PHASE". THE PROBLEMS ARE NOT NEW, BUT THEY HAVE REAPPEARED IN AN ACUTE FORM. THEY ARE (A) THE DESIRE ON THE PART OF SOME COUNTRIES (CUBA AND ITS ALLIES) TO DEFLECT THE NAM IN A PARTICULAR DIRECTION AND (B) CONFLICTING NATIONAL INTERESTS AMONG NAM MEMBERS. CUBA, DUBEY NOTED, HAS OPENLY ADVOCATED ALIGNING THE NAM WITH THE SOCIALIST BLOC. THE SUPPORTERS OF "GENUINE" NON-ALIGNMENT (INDIA, YUGOSLAVIAND THEIR ALLIES) HAVE HAD A HARD TIME FIGHTING THIS OFF, BUT SO FAR, HAVE HELD THEIR OWN. DUBEY CITED INDIA'S SUCCESS IN "RESTORING THE BALANCE" AT THE BELGRADE MINISTERIAL MEETING AND, TO SOME EXTENT, AT MAPUTO. MUCH MORE NEEDS TO BE DONE, PARTICULARLY IN PREPARING FOR THE HAVANA SUMMIT, BUT THE EFFORT IS CONTINUING.

4. NACB: DUBEY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE IS CONCERN

AMONG NAM MODERATES THAT CUBA WILL USE ITS AUTHORITY AS CHAIRMAN AFTER THE SUMMIT TO DISREGARD THE INTERESTS OF OTHER MEMBERS AND ADVANCE ITS OWN POSITION THROUGH MANIPULATION OF THE NACB. INDIA AND YUGOSLAVIA, HE SAID, ARE COOPERATING TO MINIMIZE THIS. HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT SOME OF THE ITEM 15 PROPOSALS ADVOCATED BY INDIA AND OTHER MODERATES WILL BE APPROVED AT THE SUMMIT. CUBA, HE VENTURED, WILL ACCEPT THE EXPANSION OF THE BUREAU, ALTHOUGH PROBABLY NOT BEYOND 30 MEMBERS. THE CUBANS WILL ALSO FIND IT DIFFICULT TO RESIST THE PROPOSAL THAT ALL NACB MEETINGS BE OPEN-ENDED (I.E., THAT ANY MEMBER WHO WISHES TO CAN ATTEND). HOWEVER, DUBEY PREDICTED THAT CUBA WOULD STRONGLY OPPOSE EFFORTS TO LIMIT THE DECISION MAKING POWERS OF THE NACB (BY REFERRING MAJOR ISSUES TO NAM PLENARIES) OR ALLOW THE APPOINTMENT OF THREE REGIONAL VICE CHAIRMEN (A KEY GOI PROPOSAL). IN ADDITION, CUBA WILL FIGHT HARD AGAINST ANY ATTEMPTS TO REDEFINE AND STRENGTHEN THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSENSUS.

5. APART FROM THE EFFORTS TO LIMIT CUBA'S POWERS AS CHAIRMAN, INDIA, ACCORDING TO DUBEY, HAS MADE IT "VERY CLEAR" TO CUBA THAT MAINTAINING THE GENUINELY NON-ALIGNED POSTURE OF THE MOVEMENT IS FUNDAMENTAL. THE NAM MUST BE INDEPENDENT AND TRUE TO ITS BASIC PRINCIPLES. THE GOI HAS EMPHASIZED THAT THEIS IS CRUCIAL IF THE NAM IS TO HAVE ANY IMPACT ON SUCH KEY INTERNATIONAL ISSUES AS DISARMAMENT, WHICH CUT ACROSS IDEOLOGICAL LINES. DUBEY NOTED THAT INDIAN PM DESAI WAS "EXTREMELY FRANK" IN DISCUSSING THESE AND OTHER ISSUES WITH THE CUBAN DELEGATION WHICH VISITED NEW DELHI APRIL 4-5 TO INVITE INDIA FORMALLY TO THE SUMMIT. AS A RESULT OF THE PM'S "BLUNT, STRAIGHT TALK," THE CUBANS, HE SAID, HAVE BECOME "VERY CAUTIOUS". ACCORDING TO FEEDBACK THE GOI HAS RECEIVED FROM HAVANA, THE CUBANS ARE BACKING AWAY NOW FROM PROMOTING THE IDEA THAT THE SOCIALIST BLOC IS THE NATURAL ALLY OF THE NAM. AT DESAI'S INSISTENCE, THE CUBANS HAVE ALSO AGREED THAT THERE WILL BE NO DISCRIMINATION IN ISSUING INVITATIONS TO THE SUMMIT, A STANCE THE GOI TOOK PRIMARILY TO PROTECT EGYPT.

6. HAVANA SUMMIT. DUBEY REITERATED INDIA'S WELL-KNOWN POSITION THAT ALL NAM MEMBERS WHOULD ATTEND THE SUMMIT. IN A SURPRISINGLY STRONG STATEMENT, HE ASSERTED THAT "THE MOVEMENT DOES NOT BELONG TO CUBA, IT BELONGS
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RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 912
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 5666
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA 4743
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 391
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 27
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1679
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5494
RUMJHT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 2724
RUSBTA/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 4473
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2943
RUSBAS/AMCONSUL MADRAS 73
RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK 2576
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 NEW DELHI

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

TO US (MEANING INDIA, YUGOSLAVIA AND THE OTHER DEFENDERS OF "GENUINE" NON-ALIGNMENT). THE NAM MODERATES, THEREFORE, MUST RALLY TO DEFEND THE NAM AT HAVANA LEST CUBA COME TO DOMINATE IT BY DEFAULT. DUBEY ADDED THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WOULD ALSO SUFFER IF THIS WERE TO HAPPEN. WHILE THEY CURRENTLY GET A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF MILEAGE OUT OF HAVING THE NAM ESPOUSE SOME OF THEIR OWN CAUSES SUCH AS ANTI-IMPERIALISM, THIS WOULD NO LONGER BE THE CASE IF THE NAM WERE SEEN TO BE NOTHING MORE THAN A TOOL OF CUBA AND ITS RADICAL ALLIES. CUBAN BRINKMANSHIP MUST BE RESISTED, HE SAID, BUT IT COULD BE SELF-DEFEATING TO START A "CAMPAIGN" AGAINST CUBA. THERE IS A DIFFERENCE OF "NUANCE AND STYLE" IN THIS REGARD BETWEEN INDIA AND YUGOSLAVIA, BUT THE TWO ARE COMPLETELY UNITED IN PRINCIPLE. DUBEY ASCRIBED THIS DIFFERENCE, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS MINOR, TO YUGOSLAVIA'S SECURITY CONCERNS VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION AND THE BLOC COUNTRIES, OF WHICH THEY TEND TO VIEW CUBA AS A PART.

6. KEY ISSUES. DUBEY SAID THAT DIFFERENCES INEVITABLY ARISE AMONG NAM MEMBERS ON KEY POLITICAL ISSUES, WHICH INDIA HAS ALWAYS COUNSELED SHOULD BE TAKEN UP IN OTHER FORA SUCH AS THE UN, OAU, ARAB LEAGUE, ETC. INDIA WILL OFFER THE SAME ADVICE AGAIN AT COLOMBO AND THE NAM SUMMIT, BUT RECOGNIZES THAT NOT ALL PROBLEMS CAN BE AVOIDED. DOME OF THE MOST PRESSING WHICH NOW CONFRONT THE NAM INCLUDE:

--EXPULSION OF EGYPT: THE GOI POSITION IS THAT THERE IS NO PROVISION TO SUSPEND OR EXPEL ANY MEMBER FROM THE NAM. INDIA WILL DEFEND EGYPT'S RIGHT TO MEMBERSHIP AND HAS MADE AN APPEAL IN THIS REGARD TO THE ARAB NATIONS WHICH OPPOSE EGYPT. THE GOI IS ALSO OPPOSED TO ANY MOVE TO HAVE EGYPT CONDEMNED BY THE NAM. DUBEY OPINED THAT EGYPT WILL BE ALLOWED TO TAKE ITS SEAT, WHICH ~~THE ARABS WILL GRUDGINGLY ACCEPT, THE TREATY WILL THEN~~ BECOME THE MAIN ISSUE AND PROBABLY WILL BE CONDEMNED, A ROUNDABOUT WAY OF ATTACKING EGYPT. IN THIS INSTANCE, THE GOI "WILL TAKE THE USUAL POSITION" (GO ALONG WITH THE MAJORITY).

--KAMPUCHEA: ACCORDING TO DUBEY, BOTH REGIMES WANT TO SEND OBSERVERS TO THE NACB MEETING IN COLOMBO. SRI LANKA, WHICH IS ANXIOUS TO PUT THE BURDEN OF RESPONSIBILITY SQUARELY ON THE BUREAU, HAS TOLD INDIA THAT IT WILL GRANT ENTRY VISAS TO BOTH DELEGATIONS AND LET THE BUREAU DECIDE WHO WILL BE SEATED. THE GOI IS CLOSELY WATCHING THE "FLUID SITUATION" IN KAMPUCHEA AND WILL NOT MAKE ANY DECISION UNTIL JUST BEFORE THE COLOMBO MEETING. INDIA IS OPPOSED, THEREFORE, TO ANY PRIOR ACTION BEING TAKEN ON THIS ISSUE IN NEW YORK.

--PAK MEMBERSHIP: DUBEY SAID THAT THE GOI WILL TAKE A "PRINCIPLED" VIEW OF PAKISTAN'S APPLICATION FOR NAM MEMBERSHIP. IN THIS VIEW, PAKISTAN'S DEPARTURE FROM CENTO SHOULD FULFILL THE NECESSARY CRITERIA. INDIA WILL NOT MAKE AN ISSUE OF PAKISTAN'S 1959 AGREEMENT WITH THE US. CUBA, HOWEVER, HAS INFORMED INDIA THAT TIT WOULD OPPOSE PAKISTAN'S ENTRY BECAUSE OF ITS INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER COUNTRY (AFGHANISTAN), AN ARGUMENT WHICH THE GOI REJECTS. DUBEY CITED THIS AS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSENSUS, NORMALLY REGARDED AS A WEAPON IN THE HANDS OF THE MODERATES, CAN SERVE AS A DOUBLE-DEDGED SWORD.

--IRANIAN MEMBERSHIP: IRAN HAS SAID THAT IT WISHES TO APPLY, BUT, ACCORDING TO DUBEY, HAS NOT YET DONE SO. HE ASSUMED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD APPLY BEFORE THE SUMMIT IN HAVANA, IF NOT AT THE NACB MEETING IN COLOMBO. CUBA HAS TOLD INDIA THAT IT WOULD SUPPORT IRAN, AS WILL THE GOI.

--OTHER MEMBERSHIP APPLICATIONS: DUBEY SAID THAT BOLIVIA WANTS TP "UPGRADE" ITS POSITION IN THE NAM, BUT THAT CUBA, WHICH PREVIOUSLY OPPOSED SUCH A MOVE, WILL PROBABLY DO SO AGAIN. THE GOI WILL SUPPORT BOLIVIA. ASKED IF HE COULD CONFIRM INFORMATION EMBOFFS HAD PICKED UP IN DELHI DIPLOMATIC CIRECLES (CIRCULATED BY THE ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR) THAT COSTA RICA WOULD ALSO APPLY FOR MEMBERSHIP, DUBEY REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT HEARD ANYTHING ABOUT IT.

--GUANTANAMO BAY: ASKED IF HE KNEW IF CUBA WAS INTENT ON RAISING ISSUE OF US PRESENCE IN GUANTANANO (REFTEL D) AT THE SUMMIT, DUBEY SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SURE, BUT THOUGHT THEY MIGHT STICK IT IN THE SECTION ON LATIN AMERICA. HE DOUBTED, HOWEVER, THAT CUBA WOULD BRING IT UP AS A SEPARATE ISSUE.

--ECONOMIC ISSUES: DUBEY LAMENTED THE FACT THAT IMPORTANT ECONOMIC ISSUES WHICH INDIA HAD HOPED TO HAVE CONSIDERED AT THE SUMMIT--HE GAVE NO EXAMPLES--ARE BEING UNDERPLAYED BECAUSE OF THE FOCUS ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE NAM. INDIA REGARDED THIS AS UNFORTUNATE, BUT CONCLUDED THAT LITTLE CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

7. INDIAN COMMITMENT. DUBEY SAID THAT INDIA'S ADHERENCE TO THE NAM HAS BEEN UNWAVERING DESPITE THE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT THAT TOOK PLACE IN 1977. ALTHOUGH THE CHARGE IS SOMETIMES MADE THAT THIS IS NOT THE CASE, DUBEY ARGUED THAT THIS IS ONLY A REFLECTION OF DOMESTIC POLITICS. IF ANYTHING, HE SAID, INDIA HAS BECOME EVEN MORE EFFECTIVE IN NAM AFFAIRS UNDER THE JANATA. ISSUES ARE NOW CONSIDERED CAREFULLY ON THEIR MERITS (I.E., WITH A VIEW TOWARD "GENUINE" NON-ALIGNMENT), A PRACTICE, HE IMPLIED, THAT MRS. GANDHI DID NOT ALWAYS FOLLOW.

8. US ROLE. ASKED WHAT STANCE HE THOUGHT THE US SHOULD TAKE TOWARD THE NAM AT THE PRESENT CRITICAL JUNCTURE, DUBEY NOTED THAT THERE IS A FEELING AMONG SOME NAM MEMBERS THAT THE US AND CHINA ARE BEHIND THE GROUP OPPOSING CUBA. CUBAN FONMIN MALMIERCA, HE SAID, WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN SPREADING THIS STORY AT THE 1978 BELGRADE MINISTERIAL MEETING. THE GOI REGARDS THIS AS PURE PROPANGANDA, BUT NOT ALL NAM MEMBERS ARE PREPARED TO DISMISS IT. IF ANY OPPORTUNITY ARISES TO ALLAY THESE SUSPICIONS, THE US, HE ADVISED, SHOULD DO SO. SECONDLY, DUBEY CAUTIONED THAT THE US SHOULD NOT EXAGGERATE THE PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES THE NAM FACES IN DEALING WITH CUBA. THIS COULD ONLY MAKE THE SITUATION WORSE AND PLAY INTO CUBA'S HANDS. INDIA, HE SAID, DOES NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE CUBANS, NOT IS IT BEING COMPLACENT. THE MODERATES, HE ASSERTED, WILL KEEP THE PRESSURE ON. HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT A SPLIT IN THE MOVEMENT COULD BE AVAOIDED WITHOUT SACRIFICING BASIC NAM PRINCIPLES. INDIA, WHOSE FOREIGN POLICY IS ANCHORED IN THE NAM, IS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THIS AND KNOWS THAT MANY OTHER NAM MEMBERS FEEL THE SAME WAY.

9. COMMENT: DESPITE CONTINUING CONCERN ABOUT CUBAN INTENTIONS REGARDING THE NAM, INDIA APPEARS OPTIMISTIC THAT IT WILL BE ABLE TO CONTAIN CUBA'S IDEOLOGICAL OFFENSIVE. DUBEY'S TOUGHMINDED ASSERTION THAT "THE NAM BELONGS TO US" AND DESAI'S FORCEFUL WARNING ABOUT PRESERVING THE ORIGINAL CHARACTER OF THE MOVEMENT INDICATE THAT THE GOI WILL STRONGLY OPPOSE ANY CUBAN ATTEMPT TO DOMINATE THE NAM. AT THE SAME TIME, INDIA HAS NOT TAKEN ANY STEPS TO UPSET THE HAVANA SUMMIT. IMPLICIT IN THIS STANCE IS INDIA'S BELIEF THAT (A) A BOYCOTT STRATERGY WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND (B) THAT CUBA, IN ITS OWN INTEREST, WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO SPLIT THE MOVEMENT. RATHER THAN PROVOKE AN OPEN CONFRONTATION, INDIA IS PREPARED TO WORK WITHIN THE NAM WHILE SEEKING TO CHECK ANY DRIFT TOWARD THE SOCIALIST CAMP. THE GOI HAS PROBABLY CONCLUDED THAT THIS APPROACH WILL PUT IT IN A GOOD POSITION TO PLAY A BALANCING ROLE, WHICH AS A MODERATE WITH CLOSE TIES TO THE SOCIALIST BLOC, IT WOULD BE WELL PLACED TO DO. ALTHOUGH CUBA WILL HAVE THE ADVANTAGE AT THE SUMMIT, AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO EXPLOIT THIS OPPORTUNITY TO THE FULLEST, INDIA WILL BE IN A POSITION TO REDRESS THE BALANCE AT THE 1981 MINISTERIAL MEETING IN NEW DELHI. THIS FACT, PLUS THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE MODERATES HAVE CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT WITHIN THE MOVEMENT, PROBABLY ACCOUNTS FOR INDIA'S CONFIDENT ATTITUDE VIS-A-VIS THE CUBANS.

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RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1153
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7190
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 8063
RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 4787
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0192
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 6335
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 9584
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1217
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 7268
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3319
RUFHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 8553
RUQHM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 4706
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 1801
RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO PRIORITY 4898
PUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1649
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 7990
RUQMQC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 6650
RUFHOK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 7873
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3637
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 1988
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 2671
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 3712
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 6853
RUDKKP/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 3444
RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA PRIORITY 4073
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1041
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 137044/01

E.O. 12065 GDS 5/29/65 (OLLE, WILLIAM D.)

TAGS: EG, IS, PINR

SUBJECT: INTSUM 820- MAY 29, 1979

LONDON FOR GLASPIE
PARIS FOR NICHOLAS MURPHY
DOD/ISA FOR RANSOM
OTHER ADDRESSEES FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION
BEIJING FOR AMBASSADOR STRAUSS

(PARAGRAPHS 1-8 SECRET)

1. IN THE WAKE OF THEIR SUCCESS IN SUSPENDING EGYPT FROM THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, THE ARAB HARDLINERS ARE REDOUBLING THEIR EFFORTS TO TAKE SIMILAR ACT, ON AGAINST EGYPT IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM). THE FIRST ATTEMPT WILL COME AT THE EARLY JUNE MEETING OF THE NON-ALIGNED COORDINATING BUREAU (NACB) IN COLOMBO.

2. THE PROSPECTS FOR SIDETRACKING A SUSPENSION MOVE IN THE NAM HAVE-IMPROVED.

(A) MODERATE NON-ALIGNED LEADERS HAVE AGREED TO COORDINATE EFFORTS AGAINST SUCH ACTION.

(B) SUPPORT FROM NON-ARABS, PARTICULARLY SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, IS MINIMAL.

(C) IT APPEARS THAT CUBA HAS DECIDED TO TAKE A LOW-KEY POSTURE ON THE ISSUE.

3. EVEN BEFORE THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, THE PLO, IRAQ AND SYRIA HAD TURNED THEIR ATTENTION TO SUSPENDING EGYPT FROM THE NAM, SPECIFICALLY TO INSCRIBING AN ITEM ON THE AGENDA OF THE NACB MINISTERIAL IN COLOMBO. HOWEVER, THEIR INITIAL EFFORTS TO HAVE THE NACB CONSIDER EGYPT'S SUSPENSION FROM THE NAM DID NOT WORK. AT MEETINGS OF THE NACB IN APRIL, FOR EXAMPLE, EGYPT--SUPPORTED BY SRI LANKA, INDIA, AND YUGOSLAVIA--PREVENTED CIRCULATION OF T LETTER TO ALL NAM MEMBERS ASKING FOR EGYPT'S SUSPENSION.

4. THIS PROCEDURAL SETABACK HAS PROMPTED SOME ARAB AMBASSADORS TO QUESTION THE FEASIBILITY OF SUSPENDING EGYPT FROM THE NAM AND OAU.

5. THE YUGOSLAVS AND INDIANS ARE SENDING MINISTERIAL LEVEL DELEGATIONS TO LOBBY AGAINST EGYPT'S SUSPENSION

AMONG ASIAN AND ARAB MEMBERS OF THE NAM. TITO PLANS TO VISIT LIBYA ON MAY 31 TO URGE RESTRAINT ON QADHAFI.

6. IN ADDITION TO ITS OBJECTION ON PRINCIPLE TO EGYPT'S SUSPENSION, YUGOSLAVIA IS CONCERNED THAT THEINTENSITY OF ANTI-EGYPTIAN SENTIMENT AMONG THE OTHER ARAB STATES MAY FORCE BELGRADE TO TAKE SIDES.

7. THE YUGOSLAVS BELIEVE THAT THE KEY TO PREVENTING THE OUSTER OF EGYPT FROM THE NAM IS THE OPPOSITION OF THE AFRICAN STATES--36 OF THE NAM'S 38 MEMBERS. INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE AFRICANS WILLNOT BE STAMPEDED BY THE ARABS INTO SUSPENDING EGYPT. ALTHOUGH DEPENDENT ON ARAB ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL, AND OTHER AID, THE AFRICANS TEND TO REACT NEGATIVELY TO PRESSURE ON MIDDLE EAST ISSUES.

8. AS AN INFLUENTIAL MEMBER OF THE NAM AND THE HOST OF THE NEXT SUBMIT, CUBA'S POSITION IS ESPECIALLY PORTANT. ORDINARILY CUBA WOULD SUPPORT THE SUSPENSION MOVE OUT OF SYMPATHY WITH THE ARAB HARDLINERS AND A DESIRE TO RETALIATE FOR EGYPT'S PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO "EXPEL" CUBA

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TO RUQMZN/USMISSION SINAI PRIORITY 9205
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 4097
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0894
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 9427
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 2604
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1154
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7191
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 8064
RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 4788
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0193
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 6336
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 9585
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1218
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 7269
RU[redacted]MBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3320
RU[redacted]AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 8554
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 4707
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 1802
RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO PRIORITY 4899
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1560
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 7991
RUQMQG/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 6651
RUFHOK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 7874
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3638
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 1989
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 2672
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 3713
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 8654
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 3445
RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA PRIORITY 4074
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1042
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 2206
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FROM THE NAM AND TO CHANGE THE VENUE OF THE HAVANA SUMMIT. THE CUBANS, HOWEVER, WANT TO AVOID TOO CLOSE AN IDENTIFICATION WITH THE SUSPENSION MOVE BECAUSE OF THEIR OVERRIDING INTEREST IN A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT--I.E., ONE THAT IS ATTENDED BY THE GREATES POSSIBLE NUMBER OF HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT AND UNENCUMBERED BY CONTENTIOUS ISSUES.

9. (C) EGYPT: EMBASSYCAIRO REPORTS THAT THE JUNE 7 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS HAVE GENERATED LITTLE SUBSTANCE, BUT THERE IS AN ABUNDANCE OF CANDIDATES (1,857 CANDIDATES FOR 382 SEATS.) THE INTERIOR MINISTRY'S RESTRICTIONS ON CAMPAIGNING, INCLUDING UNREALISTIC FINANCIAL LIMITATIONS, ARE HINDERING THE CANDIDATES' ABILITYTOADDRESS THE MASSES. SADAT'S NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NDP) HAS "CLEANED HOUSE," REPLACING 103 MEMBERS WITH CANDIDATES WHO ARE GENERALLY MORE ATTRACTIVE AND BETTER EDUCATED. HOWEVER, WITH THE LARGE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES RUNNING: THE NDP MIGHT NOT DO AS WELL AS EXPECTED IN THE FIRST ROUND, ESPECIALLY SINCE IT HAS NOT BEEN PARTICUALARLY EFFECTIVE IN BUILDING UP A GRASS ROOTS ORGANIZATION. OUR EMBASSY NOTES THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S PLEDGE TO ALLOW THE OPPOSITION ACCESS TO THE MEDIA HAS NOT MATERIALIZED, AND RECNT SEIZURES OF LEFTIST PARTY PROPAGANDA MAY INDICATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO TAKE LEGAL STEPS AGAINST THE NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE GROUP PRIOR TO THE ELECTION.

10. (U) ARAB SANCTIONS: THE FEDERATION OF ARAB NEWS AGENCIES HAS RECOMMENDED A TOTAL BOYCOTT OF EGYPT'S OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY, MENA. THE MAY 26 RECOMMENDATION CAME AT THE END OF A TWO-DAY MEETING IN BEIRUT.

11. (U) EGYPT-ISRAEL: SADAT, IN A RECENT INTERVIEW WITH THE BRITISH " JEWISH CHRONICLE" DELCARED THAT THE PROBLEM OF JERUSALEM CAN BE SOLVED. HE SAID THAT THE CITY SHOULD NOT BE DIVIDED AGAIN, THAT PEOPLE OF ALL FAITHS MUST BE ALLOWED TO ENTER THE CITY AND THAT THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE ARAB SECTOR MUST BE "MAINTAINED."

12. (U) AL-AHRAM HAS SUGGESTED THAT SECRETARY VANCE'S MAY 25 STATEMENT SERVE AS A BASIS FOR THE TRIPARTITE TALKS. THE PAPER NOTES THAT THE STATEMENT CONTAINS THE

MOST IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND THE "COMPLEMENTARY LETTER" ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, WHILE THE PLAN APPROVED BY THE ISRAELI CABINET CONTRADICTS

THESE DOCUMENTS. THE ISRAELI PRESS, FOR ITS PART, GENERALLY DESCRIBED THE SECRETARY'S REMARKS AS TILTING IN FAVOR OF THE ARABS. EMBASSY TEL AVIV REPORTS THAT THE PRESS CLAIMED THAT HE GAVE "SHORT SHRIFT" TO ISRAEL'S CONTENTIONS ON MANY KEY ISSUES.

13. (U) THE EGYPTIAN PRESS, DRAWING ON STATEMENTS BY GHALI AND GENERAL ALI, PREDICTED ON MAY 28 THAT THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI BORDER WILL BE LESS OPEN THAN BEGIN'S DECLARATION WOULD SUGGEST. THE PRESS CLAIMS THE BORDER WILL BE OPEN FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY AND THAT GHALI WILL DISCUSS THE ISSUE WITH DAYAN ON JUNE 4.

14. (U) AL AKHBAR REPORT"D ON MAY 28 THAT BUTRUS GHALI WILL BE EGYPT'S FIRST AMBASSADOR TO ISRAEL.

15. (U) ISRAEL: JERUSALEM RADIO REPORTED THAT A SMALL BOMB EXPLODED IN HAIFA ON MAY 28. ONE WOMAN WAS SLIGHTLY INJURED. A PLO OFFICIAL, ACCORDING TO AP, CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BOMBING.

16. (U) ISRAEL HAS RELEASED 16 ARAB PRISONERS HELD IN

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RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0895
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 9428
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 2605
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1155
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7192
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 8065
RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 4789
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0194
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 6337
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 9586
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1219
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 7270
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3321
RUFHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 8555
RUQMAN/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 4708
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 1803
RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO PRIORITY 4900
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1651
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 7992
RUQMQG/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 6652
RUFHOK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 7875
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3639
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 1990
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 2673
RUENTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 3714
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 8855
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 3446
RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA PRIORITY 4075
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RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 2207
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ISRAELI JAILS AS A GOOD-WILL GESTURE TOWARDS EGYPT, JERUSALEM RADIO REPORTED ON MAY 28. THOSE RELEASED INCLUDED 10 "ADMINISTRATIVE" DETAINEES AND 6 WHO HAD BEEN SENTENCED BY MILITARY COURTS FOR MINOR SECURITY OFFENSES.

17. (LOU) ISRAELI MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE DECIDED TO CLOSE BIR ZEIT UNIVERSITY "INDEFINITELY," ACCORDING TO JERUSALEM MEDIA. THE UNIVERSITY HAS BEEN CLOSED SINCE MAY 3. THE AUTHORITIES SAID THEIR DECISION CAME AFTER THE UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION AND THE STUDENT SENATE REFUSED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO MAINTAIN ORDER. OUR CONSULATE GENERAL IN JERUSALEM SAID THAT NEITHER STUDENTS NOR ADMINISTRATORS WILL ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY TO "POLICE" BIR ZEIT FOR FEAR OF BEING CAST AS COLLABORATORS. A BIR ZEIT PROFESSOR, WHO IS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN, HAS ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION TO RETURN TO THE US AND MOBILIZE PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST ISRAELI " INTIMIDATION."

18. (U) KNESSET MEMBER MOSHE SHAHAL HAS SAID THAT HE REJECTED A SUGGESTION FROM CONGRESSMAN FINDLEY THAT HE MEET WITH ARAFAT, ACCORDING TO A JERUSALEM RADIO REPORT. SHAHAL REPORTEDLY SAID THE CONGRESSMAN CLAIMED THE PLO WOULD BE PREPARED TO GIVE DE FACTO RECOGNITION TO ISRAEL. SHAHAL ALSO SAID THE US WAS PREPARING TO RECOGNIZE THE PLO WITHIN A FEW MONTHS, ESPECIALLY IF THE NEGOTIATIONS DO NOT PROGRESS WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF PALESTINIAN LEADERS.

19. (U) PALESTINIANS: IN AN INTERVIEW PUBLISHED MAY 25, ARAFAT DECLARED THAT THE PALESTINIANS' ALTERNATIVE TO THE PEACE TREATY IS A RETURN TO THE UNITED NATIONS. HE DID NOT ELABORATE, BUT HE DID MENTION THE JOINT SOVIET-US STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 1977.

20. (U) CONSULATE GENERAL JERUSALEM REPORTS THAT AL QUDS ON MAY 28 FEATURED GAZA MAYOR SHAWWA'S DECLARATION FOLLOWING HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH PLO LEADERS IN AMMAN, DAMASCUS, AND BEIRUT . SHAWWA EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR SOLIDARITY BETWEEN "OUR: PEOPLE AND THE PLO, WHICH MUST PARTICIPATE AS AN ESSENTIAL PARTY IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS SEEKING A JUST AND LASTING SOLUTION. SHAWWA ALSO DESCRIBED THE PROPOSED AUTONOMY PLAN AS ONLY A CONTINUA-

TION OF OCCUPATION, SINCE THE LAND AND WATER REMAIN IN ISRAELI HANDS, SETTLEMENTS CONTINUE, A PERMANENT ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE IS-PRESERVED, AND ISLAMIC JERUSALEM IS CONTINUED AS THE "ETERNAL CAPITAL" OF ISRAEL. HE NEVERTHELESS AFFIRMED HIS INTENTION TO CONTINUE UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH ALL PARTIES AT ALL LEVELS IN ORDER TO CLARIFY PALESTINIAN DEMANDS.

21. (U) LEBANON: LEBANON'S UN REPRESENTATIVE ON MAY 24 SENT A LETTER TO WALDHEIM ACCUSING ISRAEL OF " VERY SERIOUS ACTS OF AGGRESSION" IN THE RECENT AIR AND ARTILLERY STRIK"S IN LEBANON BY ISRAELI FORCES. THE LEBANESE AMBASSADOR SAID GUERRILLA ATTACKS IN ISRAEL DID NOT JUSTIFY AGGRESSION ACROSS THE BORDER, ACCORDING TO REUTER. THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO THE UN ALSO WROTE TO WALDHELM. HIS LETTER SAID THAT SO FAR DURING THE INTERNATIONAL YEAR OF THE CHILD, 27 CHILDREN HAVE BEEN KILLED OR WOUNDED IN GUERRILLA ATTACKS IN ISRAEL. ON MAY 28 BEIRUT RADIO SAID LEBANESE UN AMBASSADOR TUENI WOULD SUBMIT A NEW NOTE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON "REPEATED ISRAELI AGGRESSION AGAINST THE SOUTH."

22. (LOU) EMBASSY BEIRUT REPORTS THAT PRESIDENT SARKIS CONTINUED HIS CONSULTATION ON THE FORMATION OF A NEW LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IN A MAY 24 MEETING WITH A PHALANGE DELEGATION HEADED BY PIERRE GENAYEL. SARKIS ALSO MET WITH MEMBERS OF THE INDEPENDENT MARONITE BLOC AND WITH ARMENIAN PARLIAMENT DEPUTIES.

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RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0896
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 9429
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 2606
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1156
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7193
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 8066
RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 4790
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0195
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 6338
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 9587
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1220
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 7271
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3322
RUFHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 8556
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 4709
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 1804
RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO PRIORITY 4901
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1632
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 7993
RUQMQG/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 6633
RUFHOK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 7876
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3646
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 1991
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 2674
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 3715
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 8856
RUDKHR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 3447
RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA PRIORITY 4076
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RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 2208
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23. (U) ISRAEL-SYRIA: WALDHEIM HAS PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED SYRIAN AND ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO A SIX-MONTH RENEWAL OF THE UN FORCE IN THE GOLAN. THE UNDOF MANDATE EXPIRES AT THE END OF THIS MONTH.

24. (U) THE KUWAITI NEWS AGENCY, CITING "WELL-INFORMED SOURCES IN DAMASCUS ," REPORTS THAT SYRIA AGREED TO THE RENEWAL ONLY AFTER RECEIVING A SOVIET PLEDGE NOT TO AGREE TO THE RENEWAL OF THE UN FORCES IN THE SINAI.

25. (C) SAUDI ARABIA, KING KHALID'S HEALTH: EMBASSY RABAT REPORTS THAT MOROCCAN OBSERVERS HAVE MENTIONED THE POOR APPEARANCE OF KING KHALID DURING HIS VISIT TO MOROCCO WHICH BEGAN MAY 19. ONE MOROCCAN SAID KHALID APPEARED VERY FATIGUED AND DISORIENTED. A MOROCCAN OFFICIAL SAID KHALID'S APPEARANCE WAS SO POOR IT CAUSED KING HASSAN TO SUFFER A RARE LOSS OF PUBLIC COMPOSURE WHEN HE FIRST SAW THE SAUDI KING AT THE AIRPORT. CHRISTOPHER
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3867
INFO NACB COLLECTIVE
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 053
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 1357
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RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 027
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1439
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 105
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 087
RUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 483ZF
RUESLZ/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 004
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA 813
RUEHOR/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 0002
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 323
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 1209
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0030
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 176
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 462
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 046
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 044
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E.O. 12065: GDS 6/6/85 (LEVIN, HERBERT) OR-M
TAGS: PORG, XF, XC
SUBJ: NON-ALIGNED COORDINATING BUREAU (NACB) COLOMBO MEETING: EGYPT SUSPENSION, KAMPUCHEAN ISSUES DOMINATE PROCEEDINGS JUNE 5
REF: (A) COLOMBO 2878 (NOTAL) (B) COLOMBO 2881 (NOTAL)

1. C-ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY, THE ISSUE OF SUSPENDING EGYPT'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE NAM HAS BEEN KEPT OFF THE COLOMBO

AGENDA AT THE OFFICIALS LEVEL-- BUT COULD BE RESURRECTED AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL. THE "MAPUTO FORMULA" OF GRANTING THE POL POT REGIME EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO REPRESENT KAMPUCHEA -- BUT WITHOUT THE RIGHT TO SPEAK -- HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AD REFERENDUM TO THAT REGIME'S HEADQUARTERS IN KAMPUCHEA. COLOMBO MEETING IS EXPECTED TO RECOMMEND THAT NAM APPROVE NAM MEMBERSHIP FOR IRAN, PAKISTAN, GRENADA AND SURINAM. BOLIVIA MAY ALSO JOIN THAT LIST. END SUMMARY.1

3. SUSPENSION ISSUE: NO KNOCK-OUT, BUT FIRST ROUND TO EGYPT.

TOUGH EGYPTIAN EFFORTS AND A UNITED AFRICAN POSITION AGAINST SUSPENSION SUCCEEDED JUNE 5 IN KEEPING ISSUE OF EGYPT'S SUSPENSION FROM THE NAM OFF THE COLOMBO AGEND

AT THE OFFICIALS LEVEL, BUT LEFT THE DOOR OPEN FOR MINISTERS TO RESURRECT THE ISSUE. THE COMPROMISE REACHED IN THE COLOMBO MEETING'S PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (PC) STIPXLATED THAT WHILE, THE AGENDA BEING SENT FORWARD AO MINISTERS JUNE 6 WOULD NOT INCLUDE THE SUSPENSION ITEM, THE PC'S REPORT TO MINISTERS WOULD NOTE THAT ALGERIA, IRAQ, SYRIA AND PLO HAD PROPOSED SKH AN ITEM BUT THAT "NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN" AT OFFICIALS LEVEL AS TO WHETHER IT SHOULD BE PLACERSON THE COLOMBO AGENDA. THE ORLIONS THAT COULD UNFOLD FROM HERE ON, AS DESCRIBED BY WELL-INFORMED DELEGATION SOURCES, ARE AS FOLLOWS: ROUND TWO: ALGERIA IRAQ, SYRIA AND PLO MUST NOW ASSESS THEIR POSITIONS AGAINST THE CONTINUING STRENGTH OF,048,:80-)6, AFRICAN OPPOSITION, UNDERSTANDING ZYAT IF THEY TRY AGAIN TO INSCRIBE SUSPENSION ITEM, THIS TIME AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL, AND FAIL, THEY WOULD BE IN A WORSE POSITION THAT IF THEY DROPPED THEIR EFFORT AT COLOMBO. (COMMENT: EGYPT'S MOUSSA TOLD USUN OFFICE M

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DAY JUNE 6 THAT HE WAS SURE REJECTIONIST ARAN MINISTERS WOULD RENEW THE INSCRIPTION ATTEMPT. END COMMENT.) IF, HOWEVER,ALGERIA,ETC., GAMBLE ON A REVERSAL OF THEIR CURRENT FORTUTUS ON THE SUSPENSION ISSUE AND SUCCEED IN INSCRIBING THE ITEM ON THE COLOMBO AGENDA AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL, THIS WILL LEAD TO ROUND THREE. ROUND THREE (SHOULD IT TAKE PLACE) WILL MEAN THAT MINISTERS WILL HAVE TO REACH A DECISION ON A COLOMBO RECOMMENDATION ON THE SUSPENSION ISSUE. AS OF

NOW, THERE ARE THREE ICNTIFIABLE OPTIONS FOR SUCH A RECOM-MENDATION, WHICH ARE: (A) THAT THE SUSPENSION ISSUE BE CONSIDERED BY THE OAU MONROVIA SUMMIT IN JULY: (B) THAT THE ISSUE BE PLACED ON THE AGENDA FOR THE HAVANA NAM SUMMIT IN SEPTEMBER: AND (C) THAT THE HAVANA SUMMIT SUSPEND EGYPT'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE NAM. THIS LAST OPTION STILL REMAINS THE LEAST LIKELY OF THE THREE.

4. KAMPUCHEA: A COMPROMISE, PENDIND WORD FROM THE JUNGLE.

A VARIATION OF THE "MAPUTO FORMULA" HAS NOW BEEN ACCEPTED AT THE OFFICIALS LEVEL, PENDING INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE POL POT REGIME TO ITS DELEGATION IN COLOMBO. THE COMPROMISE FORMULA IS THAT (A) THE POL POT REGIME WILL RETAIN ITS SEAT: (B) THE HENG SAMRIN REGIME WILL REMAIN EXCLUDED; (C) THERE WILL BE AN ANNUOUNCEMENT FROM THE CHAIR THAT THIS DECISION IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY POSITIONS AT COLOMBO OR HAVANA OR, INDEED, TO OPE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE; (D) THERE WILL BE A GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT THAT THE POL POT REGIME WILL NOT SPEAK, BUT THAT NEITHER WILL ANY OTHER DELEGATION RAISE KAMPUCHEAN ISSUES IN PLENARY OR IN COMMITTEES. NO ONE IS SATISFIED WITH THIS COMPROMISE, WHICH LENDS SOME STRENGTH TO THE CHANCE THAT IT MIGHT SURVIVE, ASSUMING POL POT HEAD-QUARTERS (AND BEIJING) ACCEPTS IT.

5. NEW MEMBERS.

THIRTY-SIX DELEGATIONSCIPOKE IN FAVOR OFHWSMBERSHIP APPLICATIONS TO THE NAM BY IRAN, PAKISTAN, GRENADA AND SURINAM. NO OFFICIAL OPPOSITION TO PAKISTAN WAS EXPRESSED, BUT AFGHANISTAN MADE REFERENCE TO THE NEED TO RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NEIGHBORS AND THERE WERE REPORTEDLY SOME RESERVATIONS EXPRESSED ABOUT "LINGERING CONTACTS" WITH MILITARY PACTS. IT IS EXPECTED THAT COLOMBO WILL RECOMMEND THAT ALL FOUR BE ADMITTED. DISCOMFITED CUBANS TOLD USUN OFFICER MID-DAY JUNE 6 THAT BOLIVIA HAD FORMALLY APLLIED FOR FULL NAM MEMBERSHIP BY CABLE AT LAST MINUTE AND THAT APPLICATION WAS BEING "STEAMROLLERED" THROUGH PC WITHOUT DEBATE. THIS IS TRADITIONALLY THE TIME FOR RUMORS, BEFORE HARD DRAFTING STARTS, AND ONE WHICH HAS AT LEAST CUBA'S ALARCON FRETTING IS THAT SOUTH KOREA HAS APPLIED FOR NAM MEMBERSHIP. EMBASSY WILL RAISE RUMOR WITH SOUTH KOREAN TDY OFFICERS AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY.

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3868
IHFO NACB COLLECTIVE
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY ASPMAN 054
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 1358
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 139
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 028
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1440
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 106
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 088
RUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 484
RUESLZ/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 005
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA 814
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 0003
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 324
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 1210
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0031
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 177
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 463
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 047
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 045
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6. FOLLOWING UP IN ITS APPLICATION, IRAN IS SENDING A TWO-MEMBER DELEGATION TO THE CONFERENCE; ALI SADEGHI TEHRAIN, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFIRS, ANDTBOHSIN S. ESFANDEYARI, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

7. COMMITTEES BEGIN WORK ON COMMUNIQUE.

THE COLOMBO MEETINGS ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF JAMAICA'S L.M.H. BARNETT, HAS BEGUN WORK ON THE ECONOMIC SECTION OF THE COMMUNIQUE, WITH ITS PRIMARY ENDEAVORS BEING TO BRING THE ORIGINAL SRI LANKAN DRAFT INTO LINE WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE G-77 AT, AND

WITH THE RESULTS OF, UNCTAD V. MEANWHILE THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE, UNDER ZAMBIA'S PAUL LUSAKA, AS OF 4:00 P.M. JUNE 6 HAD ONLY HEARD STATEMENTS AND HAD NOT YET BEGUN DRAFTING. DELEGATES WERE PREPARING FOR A DRAFTING SESSION WHICH WILL LAST LONG INTO THE NIGHT. ROMANIAN "735" DELEGATE PETER VLEASCU COMMENTED TO USUN OFFICER AND EMBOFF JUNE 5 THAT NAMBIA SECTION OF COMMUNIQUE WOULD FOLLOW RECENT RESOLUTION OF RESUMED UNGA SESSION. IN GENERAL, TYE CONFIRMED WIDESPREAD AFRICAN VIEW HERE THAT COMMUNIQUE SECTIONS ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES IN GENERAL WOULD CONTAIN TOUGH CRITICISMS WAS THAT SUCH CRITICISMS (AND BY IMPLICATION THE WESTERN POSITIONS WHICH PROMPTED THEM) WOULD ONLY HELP THE CUBANS IN THEIR EFFORTS TO TURN THE NAM TOWARD THE SOVIETS. CUBANS TOLD USUN OFFICER JUNE 5 THAT PUERTO RICO SECTION WOULD END UP "ABOUT AS IT HAD AT BELGRADE."

8. POLITICAL COMMITTEE HAS RECEIVED FLOOD OF AMENDMENTS TO ORIGINAL SRI LANKAN DRAFT, MOST OF THEM REFLECAUNG NATIONAL CONCERNS. ONE OF THEM (AUTHORSUNKNOWN) CALLS FOR THE POST-PONEMENT OF THE HAVANA SUMMIT. ANOTHER, BY MOROCCO, REQUESTS THAT A NAM MEETING IN THE NEAR FUTURE BE HELD IN RABAT. OUTCOME OF "ITEM 15" RECOMMENDATIONS ON NAM STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURES IS STILL VERY MUCH IN DOUBT, EXCEPT FOR PROPOSAL TO EXPAND NACB TO 30 MEMBERS, WHICH HAS BROAD SUPPORT. ENTIRE PARAGRAPH ON SOUTHEAST ASIA MAY BE DROPPED, IN ORDER TO SAVE THE TENUOUS "MAPUTO FORMULATION" ON KAMPUCHEA. AFRICAN SECTION WILL PROBABLY NOT MENTION UGANDA.

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RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 1293
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RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0075
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 5496
RUTAAM/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 8370
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE 8146
RUESON/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 5449
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 7517
RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 4162
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 8890
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 3487
RUESKN/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 8447
RUTAVC/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 5017
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS 7611
RUESLM/AMEMBASSY LIMA 0031
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4254
RUTAOH/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 8294
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 2284
RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 0717
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 9187
RUFHYC/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 7506
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 6071
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 5021
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4886

RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DEHLI 9187
RUFHYC/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 7506
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 6071
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 5021
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4886
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 1629
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 7557
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5716
INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
ZEN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE BY POUCH
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 156210/01

E.O. 12065 GDS 6/15/79 (HELMAN, GERALD B.)

TAGS: PORG

SUBJECT: NON-ALIGNED COORDINATING BUREAU (NACB) MINISTERIAL MEETING AT COLOMBO: ASSESSMENT

REF: (A) STATE 136508 (NOTAL)
(B) USNATO 4243 (NOTAL)
(C) STATE 147050 (NOTAL)

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. INTRODUCTION: THE JUNE 4-9 MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NACB PROVED TO BE OF UNUSUAL INTEREST BOTH TO THE NON-ALIGNED AND THE US. IT WILL BE HELPFUL TO HAVE VIEWS FROM THE NON-ALIGNED AND OUR ALLIES ONISSUESRAISED AT THE MEETING AND ON THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS IN THE OFFING, ESPECIALLY THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) SUMMIT-AT MONROVIA IN JULY, THE HAVANA NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT IN SEPTEMBER-AND THE 34THUN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, ALSO OPENING IN SEPTEMBER.-ACTION POSTS, UNLESS-THEY PERCEIVE OBJECTION, SHOULD SEEK EARLY MEETINGS WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS TO EXCHANGE ASSESSMENTS, DRAWING ON REFTEL (A) AND THIS MESSAGE FOR BACKGROUND AND, WHERE INDICATED, TALKING POINTS. INFO POSTS ARE ALSOENCOURAGED TO SEEK HOST GOVERNMENT VIEWS ON THE MEETING, IF APPROPRIATE, IN ALL CASES, IT IS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN POSITION THAT US IS ONLOOKER, BUT WITH VALID INTEREST IN MANY NAM ISSUES.

,. ACTION REQUES:ED:

A. FOR USNATO: SUGGEST YOU DR;W ON THIS BACKGROUND AND REFTEL (A), WHICH IS B:ING REPEATED TO YOU, AT THE JUNE 18 POLADS MEETING. PARA 4A-N MAY BE CIRCULATED AS A CLASSIFIED BRIEFING PAPER.

B. FOR LONDON, PARIS,BONN, TOKYO: WE WISH TO SUPPLEMENT THE INTER-ALLIED EXCHANGES AT THE POLADS MEETING WITH SEPARATE EXCHANGES ON NON-ALIGNED POSITIONS. SEPTEL TO LONDON AND BONN RAISES THE POSSIBILITY, SUBJECT TO EGYPTIAN VIEWS, OF ENCOURAGING WRITTEN RESERVATIONS BY NACB MEMBERS ON THE CONDEMNATION OF THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY IN THE COLOMBO COMMUNIQUE. (NACB MEMBERS MAY CONVEY RESERVATIONS TO THE BUREAU WITHIN APPROXIMATELY TWO WE WEEKS FOR INCLUSION IN THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS OF THE

MEETING.) SEPTEL REPEATED INFO PARIS AND TOKYO.

C. FOR BELIGRADE NEW DELHI: WE HAVE MIXED REPORTS ON EXTENT OF HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT OF EGYPT ON SUSPENSION ISSUE. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HOST GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS OF THIS ISSUE. BELGRADE MIGHT ALSO RAISE THE FORMULATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS PORTION OF THE COMMUNIQUE, WHICH HAS UNDERGONE MAJOR C:ANGE SINCE BELGRADE WHERE ALL H'MAN RIGHTS WERE GIVEN EQUAL STATUS.

D. FOR COLOMBO: DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES REPORT OF CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HAMEED (COLOMBO 3046), WHICH PROVIDED EARLY VIEW OF THE COLOMBO MEETING. WE UNDERSTAND THAT SRI LANKAN PRESIDENT JAYAWARDENE'S PERCEPTIONS OF NON-ALIGNED ISSUES ARE SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT THAN HIS FOREIGN MINISTER'S. IF OPPORTHNITY PRESENTS ITSELF HE MIGHT BE WILLING TO GIVE HIS OWN VIEWS ON

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RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 1294
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 8704
RUESUS/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 8424
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN 5538
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 6630
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0945
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0076
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 5497
RUTAAM/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 8371
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE 8147
RUESGM/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 5450
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 7518
RUEOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 4163
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 8891
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 3488
RUESKN/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 8448
RUTAVC/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 5018
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS 7612
RUESLN/AMEMBASSY LIMA 0032
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4255
RUTAOH/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 8295
RUEHMC/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 2285
RUTMNA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 0718
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 9188
RUFHYC/AMEMBASSY NIMEY 7507
RUEHIP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 6072
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 5022
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RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 1630
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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5717
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MEETING. WE CONCUR IN LINE YOU TOOK IN REPLY TO HAMEED, AND YOU MAY WISH TO MAKE SAME POINTS TO JAYAWARDENE.

E. FOR DAR ES SALAAM, GABORONE, KHARTOUM, KINSHASA, LAGOS, LUSAKA, MONROVIA, NAIMEY: IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS, EMBASSIES SHOULD-STATE THAT USG WELCOMED STRONG S PPORT -HATAFRICAN GOVERNMENTS GAVEEGYPT-ON-THE SUSPENSION ISSUE AT COLOMBO. THIS WAS MOST IMPORTANT SOURCE OF

STRENGTH TO EGYPT AND DECISIVE FACTOR IN DEFEATING ARAB INITIATIVE. - WE WOULD LIKE HOST GOVERNMENTS' ASSESSMENTS OF WHETHER ARABS ARE LIKELY TO PRESS THE SUSPENSION ISSUE AT THE OAU SUMMIT AFTER THE COLOMBO RESULT AND, IF THEY DO, WHAT THE OUTCOME IS LIKELY TO BE. FYI. AS MOTED IN PARA 3B, DEPARTMENT IS CONSIDERING REPRESENTATIONS IN SELECTED CAPITALS TO ENCOURAGE WRITTEN RESERVATIONS TO THE LANGUAGE CONDEMNING THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY. WITHOUT AP,ROACHING HOST GOVERNMENTS AT THIS TIME, WE WOULD LIKE YOUR ASSESSMENT OF WHETHER SUCH AN APPROACH IN YOUR CAPITAL WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE END FY-.

F. FOR CAIRO. WITH THE COLOMBO RESULTS NOW IN, WE WOULD LIKE A GOE ASSESSOENT OF WHAT IS LIKELY TO HAPPEN ON MIDDLE EAST ISSUES AT TH" MONROVIA AND HAVANA SUMMITS. THIS SHOULD COVER EGYPTIAN PLANNING FOR THESE MEETINGS. INCLUDING THEIR VIEWS ON HOW WE CAN BE HELPFUL IN SUPPORT-ING THEIR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. SEPTEL ON RESERVATIONS (PARAS 3B AND 3E) COULD BE FOCUS OF DISCUSSIONS.

G. FOR GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON, LIMA, PANAMA: DEPARTMENT WILL BE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN HOST GOVERNMENT DESCRIPTION OF DYNAMICS WITHIN LATIN CAUCUS WHICH PRODUCED COLOMBO LANGUAGE ON PUERTO RICO. YOU SHOULD INFORM HOST GOVERNMENT THAT REAFFIRMATION OF BELGRADE LANGUAGE ON PUERTO RICO IS UNACCEPTABLE TO US EVEN THOUGH ACTUAL WORDING WAS NOT REPEATED VERBATIM. OUR VIEWS ON PUERTO RICO ARE WELL-KNOWN TO THESE GOVERNMENTS AND UNCHANGED.

H. FOR KABUL,HAVNA, DAMASCUS, BAGHDAD: POSTS HAVE DISCRETION ON WHETHER TO MAKE APPROACHES. IF YOU DO SO, APPROACHES SHOULD BE LOW-KEY AND PURPOSE SHOULD PRIMARILY BE TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON HOST GOVERNMENT VIEWS/PLANS. IN DAMASCUS' CASE, WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ANY INDICATION THAT DEFEAT OF EGYPTIAN SUSPENSION IS CAUSING ARABS TO RE-ASSESS THEIR TACTICS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

1. FOR ALGIERS: WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN AN INDICATION THAT ALGERIANS PLACED SOME DISTANCE BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND ARAB BITTER-ENDERS AT COLOMBO.

J. FOR BRASILIA , BOGOTA, BRIDGETOWN, CARACAS, LA PAZ, MEXICO, PORT OF SPAIN, SAN JOSE, PARAMARIBO: WE WOULDBE INTERESTED IN ASSESSMENTS OF HOST GOVERNMENTS WHICH SENT OBSERVERS TO COLOMBO.

K. FOR BEIJING: WE WOULD BE INTERESTEDIF EMBASSY, IN COURSE OF ORDINARY BUSINESS, CAN LEARN CHINESE VIEWS ON OMISSION OF KOREAN SECTION FROM THE COLOMBO COMMUNIQUE, AS WELL AS NORTH KOREA'S CURRENT DIPLOMATIC OBJECTIVES AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED.

L. FOR ALL NON-ALIGNED ACTION ADDRESSEES: UNLESS EMBASSY BELIEVES IT INADVISABLE TO DO SO, REQUEST YOU EXPRESS REGRETS-IN COURSE OF CONSULTATIONSTHATBUREAU
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RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 2510
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 1295
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 8705
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 8425
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN 5539
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 6631
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0946
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0077
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 5498
RUTAAM/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 8372
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE 8148
RUESON/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 5451
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 7519
RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 4164
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 8892
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 3489
RUESKN/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 8449
RUTAVC/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 5019
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS 7613
RUESLM/AMEMBASSY LIMA 0033
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4256
RUTAOH/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 8296
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 2286
RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 0719
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 9189
RUFHYC/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 7508
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 6073
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 5023
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RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 7559

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EXPLICITLY CONDEMNED BOTH EGYPT/ISRAEL PEACE TREATY AND US POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, PARTICULARLY SINCE THAT LANGUAGE DOES NOT REFLECT THE VIEWS WHICH MANY MEMBERS HAVE STATED TO US.

4. SUMMARY OF COLOMBO DEVELOPMENTS. FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ENCAPSULATE MAIN DEVELOPMENTS AT COLOMBO, INSOFAR AS WE KNOW THEM. MAIN GAP IN OUR INFORMATION REMAINS THE ECONOMIC PORTION OF THE COLOMBO COMMUNIQUE. SHOULD NEW INFORMATION BE RECEIVED WHICH IS OF INTEREST TO POSTS, WE WILL DISSEMINATE IT SEPTELS. ACTION POSTS MAY DRAW ON FOLLOWING PARAS AS APPROPRIATE BUT EXCEPT FORSPECIAL CASE OF USNATO, POSTS ARE PRIMARILY SEEKING HOST GOVERNMENT VIEWS RATHER THAN PRESENTING US VIEWS.

A. THE MEETING, ATTENDED BY 23 FULL MEMBERS, 51 NON-ALIGNED OBSERVER DELEGATIONS AND MORE THAN 20 OTHER INVITED GUESTS, PROVED TO BE ONE OF THE MOST CHAOTIC AND UNPREDICTABLE NON-ALIGNED MEETINGSIN YEARS. THE RESULTS, FROM OUR STANDPOINT, WERE MIXED. THE EGYPTIAN SUSPENSION ISSUE SUFFERED A REAL SETBACK, BUT IS NOT DEAD. THE US ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY WERE ROUNDLY CRITICIZED. THE NACB LEFT THE DOOR OPEN TO WESTERN INITIATIVES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.PUERTO RICO REMAINS ON THE AGENDA AND THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES HAVE REAPPEARED. US ACTIVITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN CAME IN FOR INTENSIFIED CRITICISM AND SCRUTINY.

B. IDEOLOGY. REGIONAL ISSUES COMPLETELY OVERSHADOWED THE IDEOLOGICAL SPARRING MATCH BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND CUBA. THE TWO HAVE REACHED AN INFORMAL MODUS VIVENDI ON THE POLITICAL DIRECTION OF THE NAM, AT LEAST FOR NOW,ANDTHEY SEEMED TO HAVE MAINTAINED A LOW PROFILE AT COLOMBO. CUBA ACCEPTED THE " NON-BLOC"-DEFINITION OF NON-ALIGNMENT, THEREBY EXCLUDING IDEA OF A-"NATURAL ALLIANCE" BETWEEN THE NON-ALIGNED AND COMMUNIST STATES. YUGOSLAVIA DID NOT PRESS EFFORTS TO CURTAIL CUBA'S FUNCTIONS AS PRESIDENT OF THE NAM.

C. SUSPENSION OF EGYPT. IN CONTRAST TO ITS INDECISION PRIOR TO THE ISLAMIC FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE IN MAY,

EGYPT'S EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATIONS IN CAPITALSANDTENACIOUS LEADERSHIP IN THE CORRIDORS DEFEATED ARAB ATTEMPTS TO GET A SUSPENSION RECOMMENDATION. IT WAS DECIDED TO LEAVE THE ISSUE OF EGYPT'S MEMBERSHIP TO THE SUMMIT. EGYPT COULD NOT HAVE SUCCEEDED WITHOUT THE MASSIVE SUPPORT OF THE AFRICANS. THAT SUPPORT PROBABLY MEANS THE END OF ANY ARAB HOPES OF SUSPENDING EGYPT FROM THE OAU OR THE NAM. BOTH INDIA AND EGYPT HAD PREVIOUSLY PLEDGED SUPPORT FOR EGYPT'S POSITION BUT WE ARE UNABLE TO JUDGE HOW ACTIVE THEY ACTUALLY WERE ON THIS ISSUE.

D. EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY. A SPLIT IN AFRICAN RANKS AND THE ARABS' ARGUMENT THAT THEY COULD NOT LEAVE THE MEETING EMPTY-HANDED HELPED TO PRODUCE A TEXT WHICH (A) HARSHLY CONDEMNED THE US ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. (B) ALLUDING TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT UNEF MAY NOT BE RENEWED, SEEMED TO REJECT THE USE OF TROOPSIN THESINAI THAT ARE NOT MANDATED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND (C) DECLARED "NULL AND VOID" ANY AGREEMENTS WHICHIGNORED THE RIGHTS-OF THE-PALESTINIANS. THIS WAS THE FIRST DIRECT CRITICISM OF THE TREATY IN THE NON-ALIGNED CONTEXT. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE MANY DOUBTS ABOUT AND CONSIDERABLE OPPOSITION TO THE TREATY AMONG NACB MEMBERS,WE BELIEVE
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THE COLOMBO CONSENSUS IS THE PRODUCTOF FACTORS, INCLUDING SOME SHARP PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICES, WHICH MAKE IT LESS THAN A THUS REFLECTION OF OPINION IN THE NACB AND, EVEN LESS, IN THE NAM.

E. KAMPUCHEA. DESPITE STRENUOUS VIETNAMESEOBJECTIONS, THE MEETING PRODUCED AN INFORMAL ARRANGEMENT WHICH ALLOWED THE POL POT REPRESENTATIVES TO REMAIN IN THE KAMPUCHEAN OBSERVER SEAT, ON CONDITION THAT THEY NOT SPEAK, AND EXCLUDED THE HENG SAMRIN PEOPLE. NEITHER KAMPUCHEAN A TRUE REFLECTION OF OPINION IN THE NACB AND, EVEN LESS, IN THE NAM.

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F. KOREA, NORTH KOREA AGREED TO DROP THE KOREAN QUESTION FROM THE COLOMBO COMMUNIQUE, APPARENTLY IN HOPES OF PARLAYING SUCH EXAMPLES OF REASONABLENESS INTO A SEAT ON THE NACB. THE ITEM ISON THE HAVANA AGENDA, HOWEVER.

G. INDIAN OCEAN. THE US NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WAS DEPLORED BY THE-NACB, WHICH SAL IT AS A THREAT TO THE OIL-PRODUCING STATES. THE SOVIETS WERE TREATED LESS HARSHLY. BOTH POWERS WERE ASKED TO RESUME THEIR INDIAN OCEAN ARMS LIMITATIONS TALKS. WE REGRET THE UNEQUAL TREATMENT AND DISTORTED DESCRIPTION OF THE US PRESENCE, WHICH DO NOT FOSTER PROGRESS IN THIS AREA.

H. SOUTHERN AFRICA. AS EXPECTED, THE COMMUNIQUE CASTIGATES WESTERN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND

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G. INDIAN OCEAN. THE US NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WAS DEPLORED BY THE NACB, WHICH SAL IT AS A THREAT TO THE OIL-PRODUCING STATES. THE SOVIETS WERE TREATED LESS HARSHLY. BOTH POWERS WERE ASKED TO RESUME THEIR INDIAN OCEAN ARMS LIMITATIONS TALKS. WE REGRET THE UNEQUAL TREATMENT AND DISTORTED DESCRIPTION OF THE US PRESENCE, WHICH DO NOT FOSTER PROGRESS IN THIS AREA.

H. SOUTHERN AFRICA. AS EXPECTED, THE COMMUNIQUE CASTIGATES WESTERN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND

MILITARY-LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA. NEW ELEMENTS IN IT ARE EXPRESSIONS OF SERIOUS CONCERN OVER BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND USSENATE INITIATIVES AIMED ATRECOGNIZING THE "SMITH-MUZOREWA" GOVERNMENT AND LIFTING SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA. THE TEXT CAREFULLY OMITS ANY DIRECT MENTION OF WESTERN INITIATIVES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA,AND THUS LEAVES THE DOOR OPEN TO POSSIBLE FUTURE WESTERNMOVES IN THE REGION. OUR POLICY ON SOUTHERN AFRICA IS WELL-KNOWN AND REMAINS ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED;PRESIDENT CARTER'S DEEP COMMITMENT TO MAJORITY RULE IN PHODESIA WAS MANIFESTED CLEARLY BY HIS DECISION TO REAFFIRM US ADHERENCE TO RHODESIAN SANCTIONS ON JUNE 7, 1979.

1. HUMAN RIGHTS. THERE IS A SECTION ONHUMAN RIGHTS IN THE COMMUNIQ , ONLY THE SECOND TIME (AFTER BELGRADE) THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ARE MENTIONED IN A NON-ALIGNED DOCUMENT. WE WELCOME THIS ATTENTION BUT ARE CONCERNED BY THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE. THE COMMUNIQUE STATES THAT INDIVIDUALRIGHTS ARE INSEPARABLE FORM THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE AND THAT PRIORITY ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO RIGHTS VIOLATIONS RESULTING FROM "APARTHEID, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, COLONIAL-ISM, FOREIGN DOMINATION AND AGGRESSIONAND THREATS AGAINST NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY". THIS SEEMS TO US A BACKSLIDING FROM THE BELGRADE POSITION THAT NO GROUP OF HUMAN RIGHTS HAS HIGHER PRIORITY THAN ANY OTHER. OUR POSITION REMAINS THAT POLITICAL, CIVIL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS ARE ALL EQUALLY IMPORTANT.

J. MASS MEDIA. THE COMMUNIQUE REITREATED THE IMPORTANCE OF " DECOLONIZATION" IN THE FIELD OF INFORMATION WITHOUT, HOWEVER,BREAKING ANY NEW GROUMD.

K. DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR ISSUES. STANDARD NON-ALIGNED POSITIONS ON DISARMAMENT AND MUCLEAR ISSUES WERE REITERATED. THE COMMUNIQUE EMPHASIZED, AMONG
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RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 2512
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 1297
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 8707
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RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0079
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 5500
RUTAAM/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 8374
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE 8150
RUESON/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 5453
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 7521
RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 4166
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 8894
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 3491
RUESKN/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 8451
RUTAVC/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 5021
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS 7615
RUESLM/AMEMBASSY LIMA 0035
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4258
RUTAOH/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 8298
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 2288
RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 0721
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 9191
RUFHYC/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 7510
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 6075
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 5025
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4890
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 1633
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 7561

RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5720
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OTHER THINGS, THE RIGHT OF ALL COUNTRIES TO EQUAL PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS AND THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO ACQUIRE AND DEVELOP NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. THE COMMUNIQUE TOOK NOTE OF THE PROGRESS IN THE

SALT TALKS AND HOPED THAT AN AGREEMENT WOULD NOTSTOP THERE BUT WOULD LEAD TO GENUINE DISARMAMENT MEASURES. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS MILD CRITICISM OF "SOME NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS" FOR ALLEGED MONOPOLISTIC PRACTISES, WE CAME OFF ---ABOUT AS EXPECTED IN THIS PORTION OF THE COMMUNIQUE.

L. PUERTO RICO. THE COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE IS DECEPTIVELY BLAND, CALLING FOR SELF-DETERMINATION AND IHDEPENDENCE UNDER UN RESOLUTION 1514,BUT IT AFFIRMS ALLTHE UNACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE OF EARLIER PRONOUNCEMENTS. IT IGNORES THE PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION OF JULY 25, 1978, AS DID LAST YEAR'S BELGRADE DECLARATION. THE TEXT WAS DRAFTED BY CUBA AND ADOPTED WITH APPARENTLY LITTLE CHANGE OR ARGUMENT BY THE LATIN CAUCUS. IT IS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE US, DESPITE ITS APPARENT BLANDNESS.

M. PANAMA. THE PANAMA ISSUE, WHICH HAD DISAPPEARED FROM THE NON-ALIGNED AGENDA AFTER THE SENATE'S RATIFICATION OF THE TREATIES, IS BACK. PANAMANIAM LANGUAGE CALLING ON THE USTO IMPLEMENT THE TREATIES WITHOUT FURTHER CHANGE SIGNALS A POSSIBLY DIFFICULT ITEM FOR US AT THE HAVANA SUMMIT, DEPENDING-ON HOW CONGRESS DEALS WITH TREATY LEGISLATION.

N. NEW MEMBERS. IRAN, PAKISTAN, GRENADA, S-RINAME, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT OF ZIMBABWE AND SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION WERE RECOMMENDED AS FULL MEMBERS OF THE NAM. BOLIVIA ALSO APPLIED, BUT THE STATUS OF ITS APPLICATION IS UNCLEAR. NEW MEMBERS WILL BE FORMALLY ADMITTED AT HAVANA.

5. OBSERVATIONS:

A. DESPITE THE ATTENTION GIVEN TO IDEOLOGICAL CODE WORDS BY YUGOSLAVIA AND OTHERS, AND A HEAVY OV-RLAY OF HARSH RHETORIC FROM THE NAM'S COLONIAL AND COLD WAR PAST, THE COLOMBO COMMUNIQUE-IS MORE ISSUE THAN IDEOLOGY ORIENTED. WHAT HAPPENS IN RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA AND IN THE WEST BANK NEGOTIATIONS, AS WELL AS DEVELOPMENTS IN ASIA,-WILL GO A-LONG WAY TO SHAPE THE HAVANA SUMMIT LANGUAGE.

B. THE CUBANS FACE REAL DILEMMAS AT HAVANA. THEY WILL OFFEND EGYPT AND ITS FRIENDS IF THEY DO NOT INVITE SADAT, WHICH WOULD BE THEIR INCLINATION, AND THEY COULD PROVOKE AN ARAB BOYCOTT IF THEY DO. SIMILARLY, AS HOST COUNTRY THEY WILL HAVE TO ADMIT THE POL POT REPRESE; TATIVES, ALTHOUGH THEY RECOGNIZE THE HENG SAMRIN GOVERN-MENT, UNLESS SOME NEW DEVELOPMENT INTRVE'ES.

C. THE COLOMBO COMMUNIQUE IS NO MORE THAN A GUIDE FOR THE HAVANA DECLARATION BUT DOES PROVIDE THE CUBANS A GAUGE AS TO THE TEMPER OF THE NON-ALIGNED. THIS MOOD IS QUERULOUS AND THE CUBANS CAN TAKE NOTHING FOR GRANTED WHEN THEY UNDERTAKE THE INITIAL DRAFTING OF THE HAVANA COMMUNIQUE . DEPARTMENT WILL PREPARE INSTRUCTIONS ON
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RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 2513
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 1298
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 8708
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 8428
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN 5542
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 6634
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0949
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0080
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 5501
RUTAAM/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 8375
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE 8151
RUESON/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 5454
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 7522
RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 4167
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 8895
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 3492
RUESKN/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 8452
RUTAVC/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 5022
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS 7616
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RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4259
RUTAOH/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 8299
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 2289
RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 0722
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 9192
RUFHYC/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 7511
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 6076
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO 5026
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4891
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INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
ZEN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE BY POUCH
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C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF 06 STATE 156210/06

ISSUES COMING UP AT HAVANA FOLLOWING REPORTS FROM POSTS.
CHRISTOPHER

VV ESA566BRA538
RR RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #6729 1791316
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R 281230Z JUN 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA 4614
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 7613
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 8214
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 9864
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0038
RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 4404
INFO RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 8361
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 9803
RUSBGD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 5917
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 9006
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4510
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 3212
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 1467
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2389
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0675
RUMJRV/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 2316
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6116
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2979
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 2563
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 3975
RUQMNI/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4270
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 3639
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 9448
RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 4466
RUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 8903
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 1938
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0144
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2106
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 166729

E.O. 12065 GDS

TAGS: PORG, XO

SUBJECT: NON-ALIGNED COORDINATING BUREAU (NACB) COLOMBO MEETING: INDIAN OCEAN

REF: A. COLOMBO 2979, B. COLOMBO 3041 C. STATE 156210

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AS INDICATED REFTEL C, THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE ADOPTED AT THE NACB COLOMBO MEETING CONTAINS HARSH AND UNBALANCED LANGUAGE REFERRING TO US MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. THE KEY PASSAGE IS:

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,THE BUREAU DEPLORED THE REPORTED DECISION BY THE UNITED STATES TO ESTABLISH A FIFTH FLEET AND THE STRENGTHENING OF EXISTING MILITARY BASES SUCH AS DIEGO GARCIA IN THEINDIAN OCEAN. IT ALSO NOTED WITH DEEP CONCERN THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES NAVAL UNITS IN THE ARABIAN SEA IN CONNECTION WITH T;E RECENT DEVEOPMENTS IN THEAREA THOSE AND OTHER SIMILAR-ACTS-OF COERCION AND PROVOCATION AND MANUEVERS CONSTITUTE A DIRECT THREAT TO THE INDEPENDENCE, SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE LITTORAL AND HINTERLAND STATES AS WELL AS THE ESCALATION OF THE ,EPEATED UNITED STATES THREATS AGAINST OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES ESPECIALLY IN THE ARAB GULF."

3. THE COMMUNIQUE ALSO REGRETS THE INTENSIFICATION OF GREAT POWER RIVALRY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND THE FAILURE OF THE GREAT POWERS TO COOPERATE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE DECLARATION. IT DOES NOT, HOWEVER, REFER TO SPECIFIC SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE REGION.

4. WE REGRET THE COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE CITED ABOVE AND ARE DISAPPOINTED THAT FRIENDLY STATES PRESENT AT COLOMBO MEETINGS ACQUIESCED TO IT. WHILE WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE WAS UNDOUBTEDLY PRESSURE AT COLOMBO ON FRIENDLY STATES TO JOIN IN CONSENSUS ADOPTION OF FINAL TEXT, WE THINK IT IMPORTANT THAT FRIENDLY STATES BE AWARE OF-OUR CONCERN.

5. FOR: JIDDA, SANA, MUSCAT, DOHA, KUWAIT, ABU DHABI: YOU SHOULD MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS TO APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS OF HOST GOVERNMENT:

-- THE US IS CONCERNED ABOUT T E INACCURACIES AND LACK OF BALANCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN SECTION OF THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE NACB AT ITS RECENT MEETING IN COLOMBO.

-- WE ESPECIALLY REGRET THE ASSERTIONS THAT RECENT US NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE ARABIAN SEA CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO THE OIL-PRODUCTING COUNTRIES.

-- WE ARE EQUALLY CONCERNED BY THE LACK OF BALANCE IN THE TREATMENT OF US AND SOVIET NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

-- US NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS UERE IN REACTION TO THE PDRY ATTACK ON NORTH YEMEN. OUR PRESENCE WAS AN EXPRESSION OF OUR OPPOSITION TO ACTIONS WHICH THREATEN THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF REGIONAL STATES.

-- WE HOPE THAT HOST GOVERNMENT WILL BE HELPFUL IN AVOIDING ADOPTION OF SIMILAR LANGUAGE AT THE HAVANA SUMMIT.

6. FOR COLOMBO, -JAKARTA, KHARTOUM, NEW DELHI:EMBASSIES WERE ACTION ADDRESSES FOR REFTEL C AND MAY HAVE ALREADY INDICATED TO HOST GOVERNMENTS OUR DISAPPOINTMENT AT-THE HARS; AND UNBALANCED-NATURE OF THE COLOMBO LANGUAGE ON THIS ISSUE. WE ARE INTERESTED IN ANY HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSE.

7. FOR SANA: IN VIEW OF CURRENT SITUATION EMBASSY SHOULD USE DISCRETION IN DECIDING WHEN TO RAISE THIS ISSUE WITH YARG. CHRISTOPHER
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INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 187420/01

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/18/85 NEWSOM, D)

TAGS: PORG

SUBJECT: NE SOM-BELOVSKI MEETING: CUBANDRAFT
NEWSOM-BELOVSKI MEETING: CUBAN DRAFT
COMMUNIQUE FOR HAVANA NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY. UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM CALLED IN YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR BELOVSKI JULY 18 FOR DISCUSSION OF CUBAN DRAFT COMMUNIQUE FOR HAVANA NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT. NEWSOM EXPRESSED US CONCERN WITH EXTREME CHARACTER OF CUBAN DRAFT, WHICH CONSTITUTED AN INDICTMENT OF US AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES ACROSS THE ENTIRE RANGE OF WORLD AFFAIRS. NEWSOM'S DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF US CONCERNS IS REPORTED BELOW. BELOVSKI SAID BELGRADE SHARED US CONCERNS AND WAS ESPECIALLY TROUBLED BY CUBAN EFFORT TO MOVE NAM AWAY FROM GENUINE NON-ALIGNMENT AND TOWARD ASSOCIATION WITH SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY LINE. BELOVSKI SAID YUGOSLAVS AND NAM MAJORITY WERE WORKING HARD TO AFFECT SIGNIFICANT REVISIONS OF CUBAN DRAFT. GUIDANCE FOLLOWS BY SEPTEL. END SUMMARY.

3. UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM BEGAN BY RECALLING HIS SPRING DISCUSSIONS IN BELGRADE ON NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM). US WAS NOT A PART OF THE NAM AND DID NOT WANT TO GET INTO ITS IDEOOGICAL DISPUTES BUT HOPED OUR FRIENDS WOULD UNDERSTAND WHEN WE EXPRESS SOME CONCERNS.GIVEN

GROWING US UNDERSTANDING OF NON-ALIGNMENT AND YUGOSLAV INTERESTS, WE ARE TROUBLED BY THE EXTREME CHARACTER OF THE PRELIMINARY POSITIONS THAT APPEAR IN THE DRAFT CUBAN COMMUNIQUE FOR THE HAVANA NAM SUMMIT. OUR PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS POINTS TO SOME OF THE FOLLOWING KEY PROBLEMS.

A. MIDDLE EAST. THE CUBAN DOCUMENT IS HARSHER THAN THE COLOMBO NACB TEXT. IT DENOUNCES THE

PEACE TREATY. IT COMES CLOSE TO CALLING FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO APPLY CHAPTER VII SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL OVER THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE AND CALLS FOR ISRAELI EXCLUSION FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE MORE RADICAL ARAB STATES HAVE BEEN PURSUING THIS OVERALL APPROACH FOR SOME TIME. WE ARE AWARE OF YUGOSLAVIA'S CONCERNS BUT WANT TO REGISTER OUR DISSATISFACTION WITH THESE EXTREME POSITIONS.

B. AFRICA. THE CUBANS JUST BARELY AVOID DIRECT CONDEMNATION OF WESTERN DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ON RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA AND HOLD THE US, UK, FRANCE AND FRG CHIEFLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SYSTEM OF APARTHEID, WHILE PRAISING THE ROLE OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. THE DRAFT CALLS FOR THE 34TH UNGA TO ISSUE A DECLARATION OF SOLIDARITY WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN PEOPLE AND ENHANCES THE ROLE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AS THE "SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE". IT ATTACKS THE US CONGRESS FOR SUPPORT OF THE MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT.

C- NEWSOM STRESSED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD MADE VERY STRONG EFFORTS, WHICH THE FRONT LINE STATES HAVE RECOGNIZED, TO TRY TO RESOLVE THE RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA PROBLEMS. -IT WAS NOT EASY TO SUSTAIN OUR POSITION ON SOME OF THESE AFRICAN ISSUES AND THE CUBAN DRAFT WAS NOT A FAIR REFLECTION ON OUR DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES. SUCH A TOTALLY UNBALANCED ATTACK ON US POLICY, COMING FROM THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT, WOULD BE MOST UNHELPFUL IN TERMS OF SUSTAINING THESE US EFFORTS.

D. LATIN AMERICA. AGAIN, A LONG LIST OF PROBLEMS WERE LAID AT THE US DOORSTEP, WITHOUT ANY RECOGNITION OF US EFFORTS WITH DEMOCRATIC STATES SUCH AS MEXICO, COSTA RICO AND THE ANDEAN NATIONS TO BRING ABOUT A DEMOCRATIC REGIME IN NICARAGUA. THE CUBAN DRAFT DEMANDED THE IMMEDIATE TURNOVER OF POWER TO THE PUERTO RICAN PEOPLE, CONDEMNED US RESPONSIBILITY FOR - - NICARAGUAN TYRANNY AND CALLED FOR THE DISMANTLING OF THE RIO PACT AND ASSOCIATED DEFENSE ORGANS.

E. INDIAN OCEAN. THE CUBAN DRAFT DEPLORES US NAVAL ACTIVITY, INCLUDING FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE ARABIAN SEA. IT WHOLLY FAILS TO MENTION SOVIET - ACTIVITIES.

F. ZIONISM AS RACISM. THIS LINKAGE WAS STRONGLY REAFFIRMED, IN CONTRAST TO THE BELGRADE NAM MEETING LAST YEAR WHICH HAD DOWNPLAYED IT.

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977 - 225-321

G. KOREA. THE CUBAN DRAFT CONTAINS A BLAND RESTATEMENT OF THE NORTH KOREAN POSITION ON SECURITY AND REUNIFICATION, WHILE TOTALLY IGNORING THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT INITIATIVE IN THIS IMPORTANT AREA.

H. DISARMAMENT. AS A LONELY CONSTRUCTIVE STATEMENT, SALT II IS STRONGLY ENDORSED.

4. NEWSOM SAID THAT THE ABOVE POINTS WERE SIMPLY DESIGNED TO ILLUSTRATE SOME OF THE PROBLEMS IN THE CUBAN DRAFT. HE SAID THIS APPROACH DID NOT REPRESENT THE KIND OF GENUINE NON-ALIGNMENT WHICH THE US WOULD LIKE TO SEE.
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5. AMBASSADOR BELOVSKI REPLIED THAT HE STRONGLY AGREED WITH THE THRUST OF THE UNDER SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION, SAYING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS BUT WAS CONFIDENT THAT WHAT HE WOULD CONVEY REPRESENTED AN AUTHORITATIVE POINT OF VIEW. AMBASSADOR BELOVSKI UNDERTOOK TO BRIEF ON YUGOSLAVIA'S VIEWS OF THE CUBAN DRAFT, USING POINTS CONVEYED TO HIS EMBASSY FOR INFORMATION FROM BELGRADE.

A. THE COLOMBO NACB MINISTERIAL MEETING HAD REASSURED BELGRADE THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES REMAINED FAITHFUL TO THE FUNDAMENTAL NON-BLOC AND INDEPENDENT ORIENTATION OF THE NAM. THE CUBANS HAD ADJUSTED THEIR TACTICS AT COLOMBO AND THE RESULTING DOCUMENT WOULD PLAY A KEY ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING-UP TO HAVANA. THE CUBAN DRAFT, HOWEVER, TOOK A VERY DIFFERENT APPROACH, SCRUPULOUSLY LAYING OUT CUBAN POSITIONS ON ALL ISSUES. THE CUBAN TEXT, WHICH WOULD TIE THE NAM TO SOVIET "ANTI-IMPERIALIST" POLICIES, WAS WHOLLY UNACCEPTABLE TO YUGOSLAVIA. IT WAS A SUMMARY OF GLOBAL HOT SPOTS, WITH ALL THE ILLS OF THE WORLD LAID AT THE FEET OF THE US AND WITH FULSOME PRAISE ACCORDED TO THE "PEACE-LOVING AND PROGRESSIVE FORCES", A FORMULATION WHICH THE YUGOSLAVS COULD NOT ACCEPT.

B. THE CUBAN DRAFT OMITTED A NUMBER OF CENTRAL NAM POSITIONS AND DOCTRINES, INCLUDING: 1) UNIVERSALITY AND ACCEPTABILITY OF THE NAM IN WORLD AFFAIRS (AN EFFORT TO MINIMIZE THE NAM'S ROLE); 2) THE NAM OBJECTIVE OF A NEW SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BASED ON INDEPENDENCE, EQUALITY AND THE NIEO; 3) THE NON-BLOC CHARACTER OF THE NAM; 4) CONTINUITY WITH PREVIOUS NAM DOCUMENTS; 5) THE ROLE AND INTEREST OF THE NAM IN DETENTE, WHICH WAS MENTIONED ONLY IN THE NARROW CONTEXT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT BLOCS, WHEREAS THE YUGOSLAVS AND THE NAM MAJORITY BELIEVE IT ALSO PERTAINS TO RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES WITHIN THE NAM SYSTEMS;

6) THE KEY PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS; 7) THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE NAM; 8) REASONS FOR THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF LDCS WHICH GO BEYOND THE CUBAN INDICTMENT OF COLONIALISM AND IMPERIALISM; AND 9) A BALANCED ATTITUDE TOWARD WORLD CRISIS AREAS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, IN CONTRAST TO THE STRONGLY PRO-SOVIET ATTITUDES THAT APPEAR IN THE CUBAN DRAFT.

C. THE YUGOSLAVS WANT ABOVE ALL TO AVOID CASTING THE DEBATE ON CUBAN DRAFT AS A CUBAN-YUGOSLAV CONFRONTATION. THE YUGOSLAV FOCUS INSTEAD WOULD BE ON PRESERVING THE NAM COURSE OF GENUINE NON-ALIGNMENT, IN CONTRAST TO THE CUBAN DRAFT, WHICH WAS IN DIRECT COLLISION WITH BOTH THE COLOMBO NACB COMMUNIQUE AND PREVIOUS NAM SUMMIT DOCUMENTS. BELOVSKI SAID HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE NAM WOULD SUPPORT THESE YUGOSLAV GOALS; INDIA, SRI LANKA, NIGERIA AND INDONESIA WOULD BE SOME KEY ALLIES. PRINCIPAL CUBAN SUPPORTERS WOULD BE AFGHANISTAN, ETHIOPIA, VIET NAM, MOZAMBIQUE AND ANGOLA. EGYPT WOULD PLAY A PASSIVE ROLE IN LIGHT OF ITS OWN PROBLEMS. BELOVSKI EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT INDIA'S INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION MIGHT WEAKEN NEW DELHI'S INFLUENCE.

D. THE YUGOSLAV APPROACH WOULD BE TO START BY EXPRESSING THEIR CONCERN AT A GENERAL LEVEL IN KEY NAM CAPITALS. SPECIFIC AMENDMENTS, AND IF NECESSARY NEW DRAFTS,-WOULD BE OFFERED THEREAFTER BY THE YUGOSLAVS AND OTHER NAM MODERATES. THE NACB WAS IN PERMANENT SESSION AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL IN NEW YORK AND ALSO WOULD BE DEALING WITH THIS PROBLEM. THE CUBANS HAVE ASKED FOR AMENDMENTS BY THE FIRST WEEK OF AUGUST AND THE YUGOSLAVS ASSUME THAT THE NAM DEBATE WOULD GO ON THROUGH THE MINISTERIAL PREPARATORY MEETING THE WEEK PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT IN HAVANA.

EFFORT AND WAS COUNTING STRONGLY ON TITO IN THIS CONNECTION. THEY WERE HOPEFUL THAT THE OTHER MODERATE STATES ALSO WOULD SEND THEIR CHIEFS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT TO HAVANA TO WORK WITH TITO. TITO, ALL MEMBERS OF THE YUGOSLAV STATE PRESIDENCY AND OTHER NATIONAL LEADERS WOULD WORK TOGETHER AND TRAVEL AS NEEDED.

6. BELOVSKI CONCLUDED BY EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR THE RESPONSIBLE WAY IN WHICH THE US HAS APPROACHED THE NAM AND HOPED WE WOULD CONTINUE TO SHOW "MEASURE OF CONFIDENCE" IN THE CAPABILITY OF THE NAM MAJORITY TO PRODUCE A REASONABLE APPROACH. HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE US

WOULD WANT TO VOICE ITS CONCERNS ON ISSUES THAT AFFECTED ITS INTERESTS, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE SUMMIT WOULD TAKE PLACE "IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD" IN HAVANA. BELOVSKI HOPED, HOWEVER, THAT WE WOULD UNDERTAKE THESE EFFORTS IN A WAY THAT DID NOT SUGGEST INTERFERENCE IN NAM'S AFFAIRS AS THIS WOULD CONSTUTE AN ADDITONAL BURDEN THAT THE YUGOSLAVS AND OTHER MODERATES WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH. THE YUGOSLAVS WILL FIGHT HARD TO AVOID POSITIONS THAT WILL OFFEND THE US, BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THATINTHE END THERE WOULD BE SOME COMPROMISES THAT COULD CAUSE THE US SOME PROBLEMS.

7. UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM NOTED THAT THE US WAS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF 03 STATE 187420/03

TALKING FIRST TO YUGOSLAVIA ABOUT THE CUBAN DRAFT
BECAUSE WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT WE HAVE PARALLEL INTERESTS.
WHILE NOTING BELOVSKI'S POINTS, NEWSOM SAID IT WASOUR
DUTY, IN REPRESENTING THE US, TO MAKE KNOWN TO OTHER
COUNTRIES THE FACTS CONCERNING US POSITIONS ON WORLD
ISSUES. WE WOULD NOT INTERFERE IN NAM THEOLOGY BUT
WOULD BE OBLIGATED TO TALK WITH A NUMBER OF NATIONS TO
ENSURE THAT OUR INTERESTS WERE UNDERSTOOD IN THE
PROPER CONTEXT. WE WOULD TRY TO ACT WITH RESTRAINT AND
TRY TO AVOID INFLAMATORY PUBLIC STATEMENTS. ASTHE
HAVANA SUMMIT APPROACHES, HOWEVER, PRESS ATTENTION WILL
GENERATE PRESSURE TO SPEAK OUT UNLESS OUR NAM FRIENDS
ARE SUCCESSFUL IN SIGNIFICANTLY MODERATING THE EXTREME
CHARACTER OF THE PRESENT CUBAN DRAFT.

8. FYI. FOREGOING IS FOR INFORMATIONALLPOSTS EXCEPT
BELGRADE. SEPARATE INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE SENT FOR
SELECTED OTHER POSTS. END FYI.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 188761/01

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO ATHENS GENEVA OSLO ROME THE HAGUE JULY 19

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 03059

DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT TO INDIAN OCEAN COLLECTIVE

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/18/85 (JONES, B.J.) OR-P
TAGS: PARM, UNGA, XO
SUBJECT: (C) INDIAN OCEAN: REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF MEETING OF LITTORAL AND HINTERLAND STATES, JULY 2-13

REF: A) USUN 2843; B) USUN 2931; C) STATE 167419; D) USUN 3010

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: DESPITE THE DESIRE OF NON-ALIGNED ACTIVISTS TO USE JULY 1979 MEETING THAT HAD BEEN CALLED FOR BY 33RD UNGA AS A STEP TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE, PRELIMINARY MEETINGS OF INDIAN OCEAN COMMITTEE WERE UNABLE TO RESOLVE MAJOR POINTS OF DIFFERENCE AMONG MEMBERS. SAME DIFFERENCES RE-EMERGED IN JULY MEETING. MAJORITY OF PARTICIPANTS SOUGHT TO PROMOTE GALS OF COMPLETE DEMILITARIZATION OF AREA AND REGIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION MEASURES, BUT MET OPPOSITION FROM ALLIED STATES (AUSTRALIA, JAPAN AND GREECE) WITH SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS WITH U.S., AND FROM INDIA. EFFORTS OF PRESIDENT OF MEETING (FERNANDO OF SRI LANKA) TO FIND BALANCED FORMULATIONS FOR FINAL DOCUMENT ACCEPTABLE TO ALL FOUNDERED ON INTRANSIGENCE OF RADICALS SUCH AS IRAQ. FINAL DOCUMENT, WHICH WAS "ADOPTED" WITHOUT CONSENSUS, REQUESTS 34TH UNGA TO SET DATE AND TIME FOR A FULL CONFERENCE AND FORESEES EVENTUAL TREATY ON AN INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE. U.S., WHICH REMAINED THROUGHOUT MEETING AS OBSERVER, WILL BE APPROACHED AGAIN BY FERNANDO AS INDIAN OCEAN COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN IN NEAR FUTURE, AND WILL NEED TO DECIDE ON WHETHER TO PARTICIPATE IN FUTURE WORK OF COMMITTEE AND/OR CONFERENCE.
END SUMMARY.

3. BACKGROUND: SINCE THE CONCEPT OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE WAS FIRST SET FORTH BY SRI LANKA IN THE MID-1960'S, THE CONCEPT HAS BEEN A SACRED TOUCHSTONE OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT, AND THE JULY 1979 MEETING OF LITTORAL AND HINTERLAND STATES REPRESENTS ONLY LATEST OF A SERIES OF EFFORTS TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO THE IDEA. FRUSTRATED BY THE LACK OF "PROGRESS" IN THE SIX YEARS OF PERIODIC MEETINGS SINCE THE CREATION IN 1972 OF THE UN INDIAN OCEAN AD HOC COMMITTEE, WHOSE ANNUAL REPORTS WERE ROUTINELY NOTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, ACTIVIST MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE (E.G., SRI LANKA, PAKISTAN, IRAQ, MADAGASCAR) SOUGHT TO BRING ISSUES TO A HEAD IN 1978 BY CALLING FOR A CONFERENCE. FAILING CONSENSUS AT 33RD UNGA ON A CALL FOR A FULL-SCALE CONFERENCE, COMPROMISE WAS REACHED IN RESOLUTION 3368 TO CONVENE A PREPARATORY MEETING OF LITTORAL AND HINTERLAND STATES IN MID-1979. THREE PRELIMINARY 1979 SESSIONS OF INDIAN OCEAN COMMITTEE PRODUCED LITTLE AGREEMENT ON "PRINCIPLES" FOR THE IOZP OR STEPS TO BE TAKEN TO "IMPLEMENT" THEM, AND THE JULY MEETING BEGAN WITH A HEAVILY BRACKETED DRAFT FOR A FINAL DOCUMENT BEFORE IT. FULL PARTICIPANTS WERE REGULAR COMMITTEE MEMBERS (STATES OF THE IO REGION PLUS CHINA, JAPAN AND GREECE). "GREAT POWERS" (U.S., USSR, UK AND FRANCE) AND "MAJOR MARITIME USERS" (PRINCIPALLY OECD COUNTRIES) WERE INVITED TO ADDRESS INAUGURAL SESSION AND TO ATTEND SUBSEQUENT OPEN PLENARIES AS OBSERVERS AT THEIR DISCRETION. FINLAND, AUSTRIA AND VIETNAM WERE ALSO ADMITTED AS DESIGNATED OBSERVERS AT THEIR OWN REQUEST.

4. GENERAL DEBATE: AFTER HIS ELECTION AS PRESIDENT OF MEETING, INDIAN OCEAN COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN FERNANDO (SRI LANKAN PERMREP) MADE CAUTIOUSLY WORDED OPENING STATEMENT (REF A) WHICH APPEARED TO ACCOMMODATE INTERESTS OF ALL MEMBERS AND PARTICIPANTS, ENDING WITH CALL FOR EXPANDED PARTICIPATION IN INDIAN OCEAN MEETINGS AND AN EVENTUAL TREATY ON ZONE OF PEACE. HOWEVER, SAME TWO DISCORDANT THEMES WHICH HAD DOMINATED PRELIMINARY MEETINGS QUICKLY RE-EMERGED IN GENERAL DEBATE (JULY 2-5): CENSURE OF "GREAT POWER" MILITARY PRESENCE, DIRECTED ESPECIALLY AT U.S. BECAUSE OF RECURRING PRESS REPORTS OF AN IMPENDING AUGMENTATION OF U.S. INDIAN OCEAN NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS; AND EFFORTS OF SOME BUT NOT ALL MEMBERS TO PARALLEL PROPOSED RESTRICTIONS ON "GREAT POWERS" WITH REGIONAL MEASURES DESIGNED TO CURTAIL MILITARY COMPETITION AMONG THE STATES OF THE REGION THEMSELVES (REF B). THE INAUGURAL U.S. STATEMENT DRAWING A FIRM LINE ON FREE NAVIGATION AND FREE EXERCISE OF THE UN CHARTER RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE (REF C) WAS FAVORABLY RECEIVED AS A FRANK EXPRESSION OF U.S. VIEWS, AS WAS A LENGTHY STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET OBSERVER DELEGATION HEADED BY AMBASSADOR MENDELEVICH, BUT BOTH STATEMENTS WERE VIRTUALLY IGNORED BY PARTICIPANTS IN SUBSEQUENT DRAFTING WORK ON THE FINAL DOCUMENT. MODERATE NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO OPPOSE INSISTENT DEMANDS OF RADICALS FOR ELIMIMNATION OF "EVERY MANIFESTATION" OF GREAT POWER MILITARY PRESENCE FROM INDIAN OCEAN. INDIAN DEL FOR ITS OWN PURPOSES TOED THE RADICAL LINE (I.E., TO SHIFT FOCUS FROM REGIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION AND INDIAN MILITARY
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PREDOMINANCE), AND CHINESE JOINED THRONG, ARGUING THAT FINAL DOCUMENT SHOULD REFER MORE SPECIFICALLY TO "SUPER-POWER RIVALRY," AND LABELLING US-SOVIET BILATERAL TALKS A SHAM. EFFORTS BY PAKISTAN TO PROMOTE A REGIONAL "CODE OF CONDUCT" GENERATED CONSIDERABLY LESS ENTHUSIASM, LARGELY BECAUSE OF INDIAN FOOT-DRAGGING.

5. OUTCOME: WORKING GROUP OF MEETING WAS UNABLE TO MAKE ANY PROGRESS IN REMOVING BRACKETS FROM DRAFT FINAL DOCUMENT IN WEEK OF JULY 9-12. SOVIET REQUEST TO PARTICIPATE WAS REBUFFED BY PRESIDENT FERNANDO, WHO PROMISED TO STAY IN TOUCH WITH USSR (AND U.S.) DURING HIS CONSULTATIONS ON POSSIBLE COMPROMISE FORMULATIONS BUT THEN WAS NEVER HEARD FROM AGAIN UNTIL HE SPRUNG "COMPROM-ISES" IN PLENARY IN LAST TWO DAYS. AT THAT TIME, TO OVERCOME IMPASSES ON MOST CONTROVERSIAL PORTIONS OF DOCUMENT ON "PRINCIPLES" AND "IMPLEMENTATION" OF THE IOZP, FERNANDO PRESENTED FOLLOWING:

A) DELIMITATION OF INDIAN OCEAN PEACE ZONE (PARA 14): BEGIN QUOTE: IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DECLARATION CONTAINED IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2832 (XXVI), THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE SHOULD COVER THE INDIAN OCEAN ITSELF, ITS NATURAL EXTENSIONS, THE ISLANDS THEREON, THE OCEAN FLOOR SUBJACENT THERETO, THE LITTORAL AND HINTERLAND STATES AND THE AIR SPACE ABOVE.

- HOWEVER, THE FINAL LIMITS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE HAVE YET TO BE AGREED UPON. END QUOTE.

B) MILITARY PRESENCE OF GREAT POWERS (PARA 15): BEGIN QUOTE: ... THE GREAT POWERS ARE CALLED UPON TO: ...

- (C) ENTER INTO IMMEDIATE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE LITTORAL AND HINTERLAND STATES WITH A VIEW TO FORMULATING AN AGREED PROGRAMME FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR MILITARY BASES, MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND OTHER LOGISTICAL SUPPLY FACILITIES, THE DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND EVERY MANIFESTATION OF THEIR MILITARY PRESENCE. END QUOTE.
C) OBLIGATIONS OF STATES IN THE REGION (PARA 16): BEGIN QUOTE: ... ALL LITTORAL AND HINTERLAND STATES OF THE INDIAN OCEAN ARE CALLED UPON TO:

- (A) TAKE ACTION TO ENSURE THAT WARSHIPS AND MILITARY AIRCRAFT AS WELL AS OTHER MILITARY FORCES MAY NOT USE THE INDIAN OCEAN FOR ANY THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF ANY LITTORAL AND HINTERLAND STATE OF THE INDIAN OCEAN IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

- (B) UNDERTAKE, IN THIS CONTEXT, NOT TO ASSIST THE GREAT POWERS IN THEIR MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE DECLARATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE. END QUOTE.

D) DENUCLEARIZATION (PARA 17): BEGIN QUOTE:

- (A) THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES ARE CALLED UPON TO UNDERTAKE NOT TO ESTABLISH NUCLEAR BASES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND TO REFRAIN FROM CONDUCTING NUCLEAR TEST ACTIVITIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

- (B) SIMILARLY, THE LITTORAL AND HINTERLAND STATES OF THE INDIAN OCEAN SHOULD AGREE NOT TO ACQUIRE OR INTRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN THEMSELVES OR TO ALLOW THEIR INTRODUCTION BY AN EXTERNAL POWER.... END QUOTE.

E) NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (PARA 19): BEGIN QUOTE: ... THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES, IN ORDER TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS CLIMATE OF SECURITY, SHOULD UNDERTAKE EFFECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSURE THE LITTORAL AND HINTERLAND STATES OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AGAINST THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. END QUOTE.

F) IMPLEMENTATION (PARA 21): BEGIN QUOTE: THE MEETING RECOMMENDS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS THIRTY-FOURTH REGULAR SESSION TO FIX THE DATE AND THE VENUE OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS CALLED FOR IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 33/68, AND TO ENTRUST THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN, WHICH SHOULD BE EXPANDED FOR THIS PURPOSE, TO UNDERTAKE THE PREPARATORY WORK FOR THE CONFERENCE INCLUDING CONSIDERATION OF APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT THAT MAY ULTIMATELY BE REACHED FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE AS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2832 (XXVI). THE MEETING REQUESTS THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO INVITE THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND MAJOR MARITIME USERS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN, WHO HAVE NOT YET DONE SO, TO SERVE ON THE EXPANDED AD HOC COMMITTEE IN ORDER TO FACILITATE PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONFERENCE. END QUOTE.

6. FERNANDO'S "COMPROMISES" CLEARLY LEANED FAR MORE IN THE DIRECTION OF RADICAL POSITIONS THAN HIS CIRCUMSPECT REMARKS IN OPENING STATEMENT. THE PRESIDENT AND MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS WERE UNYIELDING WHEN ALLIED PARTICIPANTS IN MEETING (AUSTRALIA, JAPAN AND GREECE) SOUGHT TO REDESIGN LANGUAGE TO ALLOW THEM TO JOIN CONSENSUS, IN PARTICULAR ON ARTICLES 14, 15 AND 19. IN THE CASE OF
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INDIAN RESERVATIONS ON PARAGRAPH 17 B, WHICH THREATENED TO SPLIT NON-ALIGNED RANKS, HOWEVER, PARTICIPANTS ALLOWED INDIANS TO INTRODUCE FOOTNOTE FORESEEING RENEGOTIATION OF TEXT. THIS APPLICATION OF "DOUBLE STANDARD" GAVE RISE TO GENERAL INDIGNATION AMONG WESTERN ALLIED OBSERVERS (ALL OF WHICH SAVE FRANCE ATTENDED CONCLUDING PLENARIES) AND NGO REPS. LACK OF CONSENSUS RENDERED THE "ADOPTION" OF FINAL DOCUMENT VIRTUALLY MEANINGLESS; STATEMENT OF DISSOCIATION BY AUSTRALIA, TOGETHER WITH RESERVATIONS OF JAPAN AND GREECE, IS JUXTAPOSED IN REPORT WITH STATEMENT THAT REPORT WAS "ADOPTED" (REF D).

7. PROGNOSIS AND COMMENTARY: AD HOC INDIAN OCEAN COMMITTEE WILL MEET AGAIN IN SEPTEMBER TO PREPARE DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR 34TH UNGA, ADDRESSING IN PARTICULAR QUESTION OF TIME AND PLACE FOR CONVENING OF INDIAN OCEAN CONFERENCE, PER PARA 21 OF FINAL DOCUMENT. U.S., USSR, AND OTHER OBSERVERS WILL DOUBTLESSLY BE CONTACTED AGAIN SOON BY COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN FERNANDO TO GIVE AN INDICATION WHETHER THEY WOULD PARTICIPATE IN FUTURE WORK OF AD HOC COMMITTEE, PREPARATORY WORK FOR A CONFERENCE, AND/OR CONFERENCE ITSELF. DESPITE ROUGHSHOD TREATMENT BY NON-ALIGNED MAJORITY, AUSTRALIANS STILL TENTATIVELY PLAN TO REMAIN IN COMMITTEE, AND HOPE TO ENLIST U.S. TO JOIN IN FUTURE WORK, SO AS TO BEEF UP WESTERN POSITION. FRANCE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BOYCOTT AN EXPANDED IO COMMITTEE. OTHER WESTERN ALLIES WOULD BE INCLINED TO FOLLOW U.S. LEAD. SOVIET ATTITUDE IS AMBIGUOUS; WHILE MENDELEVICH THROUGHOUT MEETING EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR CONCEPT OF ZONE OF PEACE, CONCLUDING STATEMENT EXPRESSED SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT OUTCOME AND BROKE THE GROUND FOR A DECISION NOT TO PARTICIPATE, IF SOVIETS CHOOSE THIS OPTION. ANY DECISION BY U.S. TO TAKE PART IN FUTURE INDIAN OCEAN MEETINGS WOULD EXPOSE US TO DIRECT PRESSURE NOT TO STEP UP DEPLOYMENTS OF NAVAL FORCES TO INDIAN OCEAN AND IN FACT TO LIMIT OR REDUCE CURRENT ACTIVITIES. ON THE OTHER HAND, PARTICIPATION IN COMMITTEE WOULD BE AN EFFECTIVE MEANS TO WORK WITH REGIONAL GROUP TOWARDS SOLUTION OF CRITICAL ISSUE OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIA. AS CONDITION FOR ANY U.S. DECISION TO PARTICIPATE, BELIEVE WE SHOULD INSIST THAT CHAIRMAN FERNANDO AND MEMBERS OF IO COMMITTEE ADHERE MORE CLOSELY TO CONSENSUS PRINCIPLE THAN WAS THE CASE DURING JULY MEETING.

CORRECTION: PARA 3, LINE 15, CHANGE "RESOLUTION 3368" TO "RESOLUTION 33/68".
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RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5132
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 5641
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 6075
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 6907
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0128
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 1014
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1081
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8279
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 2901
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 8322
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2388
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 6827
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 2769
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 6592
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 9434
RUDKFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 4818
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 8377
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 3054
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 1900
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 7986
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 7144
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 9046
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 0797
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 7940
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 5136
RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 7903
RUDKEBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 9804
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 3448
INFO RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 9293
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 6022
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 1313
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 1660
RUTAOU/AMEMBASSY COTONOU 2751
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 2745
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 8084
RUTABA/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 3012
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 9344
RUFHTA/AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO 8191
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 9019
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4163
RUEEUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 6999

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 193073/01

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR EC, FROM UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM

E.O. 12065GDS 7/24/85 (NEWSOM, D.)

TAGS: PORG

SUBJECT: INITIAL US REACTION TO CUBAN DRAFT FOR THE HAVANA SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE

REF: STATE 187420

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. ALL ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENTS AT APPROPRIATELY SENIOR LEVEL TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS CONCERNING CUBAN DRAFT NAM SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE ACCORDING TO THE INDIVIDUAL INSTRUCTIONS BELOW. SINCE THE CUBANS ARE ASKING FOR NON-ALIGNED COMMENTS BY THE FIRST WEEK IN AUGUST, WE MUST REGISTER OUR INITIAL VIEWS PROMPTLY. PLEASE REPORT BY COB, JULY 30.

3. WE HAVE NO WISH TO INTRUDE IN NAM INTERNAL AFFAIRS OR IDEOLOGICAL DISPUTES. INSTEAD, AS ADVISED BY THE YUGOSLAVS (REFTEL PARA 6), WE INTEND TO STRESS ISSUES THAT CLEARLY RELATE TO US INTERESTS. THE-US-WISHES TO APPROACH THE HAVANA NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT IN SEPTEMBER WITH AN OPEN MIND, REFLECTING OUR GROWING UNDERSTANDING FOR THE NAM COMMITMENT OF GENUINE NON-ALIGNMENT. WE NATURALLY HOPE THAT THE NON-ALIGNED WILL RESPOND IN KIND, WILL EXAMINE THE ISSUES AT

THE SUMMIT ON THEIR MERITS AND WILL ADOPT BALANCED POSITIONS WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO THE SOLUTION OF DIFFICULT INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS.

4. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE FIND THE CUBAN DRAFT FOR THE SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE, WHICH HAS BEEN CIRCULATED FOR COMMENT AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED STATES, TO BE TOTALLY UNHELPFUL IN BOTH ITS OVERALL ORIENTATION AND SPECIFIC POSITIONS. IF ADOPTED AT THE SUMMIT IN ANYTHING LIKE ITS PRESENT FORM, THE CUBAN DRAFT COULD TAKE US BACK TO THE CONFRONTATIONS OF THREE YEARS AGO, WHICH EMBITTERED THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE THIRD WORLD. EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE SOLUTIONS TO CONFLICTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST, AND TO GENERATE ECONOMIC PROGRESS, COULD NOT THRIVE IN SUCH AN ATMOSPHERE. THE CREDIBILITY OF THE

NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM) AS A CONSTRUCTIVE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE FOR PEACE WOULD BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED.

5. WE BELIEVE THE STRONG MAJORITY OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES DISAGREE WITH THE CUBAN EFFORT TO SHIFT THE NAM TOWARD A CONFRONTATIONAL MODE, IN WHICH THE NAM AND ITS POSITIONS WOULD BE LINKED TO THE SOVIET UNION. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE NAM MAJORITY WILL WORK, IN THEIR OWN INTERESTS, TO TRANSFORM THE CUBAN DRAFT INTO A DOCUMENT THAT REFLECTS POLICIES OF GENUINE NON-ALIGNMENT, FOR WHICH THE US HAS UNDERSTANDING.

6. THE US IS THE DIRECT TARGET OF CONSIDERABLE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 06 STATE 193073/02

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR EC, FROM UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM

CRITICISM IN THE DRAFT. FOR EXAMPLE, WE DEEPLY REGRET THE GENERAL RESURRECTION OF THE FORMULATION ON VIETNAM, WHICH IMPLICITLY MALIGNS THE US. THIS LANGUAGE ON INDOCHINA SEEMS PARTICULARLY INAPPROPRIATE IN VIEW OF THE CONTINUED VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA AND OF THE REFUGEE EXODUS.

7. WE, TOGETHER WITH ALLIES AND FRIENDS FROM BOTH THE DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING WORLD, HAVE AN INTEREST IN EXPRESSING OURSELVES REGARDING ISSUES BEFORE THE NAM. WE URGE

THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES TO EXAMINE THE DRAFT CRITICALLY, AND, ABOVE ALL, IN TERMS OF THEIR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS. THE LANGUAGE SHOULD BE TESTED AGAINST OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS, ITS EFFECT ON STRENGTHENING PEACEFUL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND RESOLVING COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE CREDIBILITY OF THE NAM -- AS WELL AS THE COMPATIBILITY WITH THE BROADLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF NON-ALIGNMENT.

8. WE WILL BE CONSULTING WITH THE NON-ALIGNED AGAIN ON SPECIFIC ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED AT THE SUMMIT. AT THIS POINT, HOWEVER, WE WOULD WELCOME HOST GOVERNMENT VIEWS ON THE CUBAN DRAFT -- INCLUDING ITS TREATMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA, ASIA, LATIN AMERICA AND PUERTO RICAN ISSUES, AND ITS LIKELY RECEPTION AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED.

9. WE ALSO WOULD LIKE TO SHARE OUR OWN PRELIMINARY REACTIONS TO THE CUBAN TEXT. ACCORDINGLY, ALL ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD DRAW UPON ANALYSIS PRESENTED BY UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM IN PARA 3 OF REFTEL, WITHOUT REFERRING TO YUGOSLAVIA IN ANY WAY. AT POST'S DISCRETION, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO LEAVE THIS ANALYSIS AS NON-PAPER. YOU ALSO MAY DRAW AS APPROPRIATE ON PARAS 3 - 8 ABOVE, INCLUDING PARA 6 REFERENCES TO INDOCHINA AND REFUGEE SITUATION. UPON RECEIPT OF YOUR REPORTS, AND ANY RECOMMENDATIONS, WE WILL PROVIDE FURTHER GUIDANCE. DETAILED CONTINUOUS REPORTING, WITH APPROPRIATE LATERAL DISTRIBUTION, WILL BE MOST HELPFUL TO DEPARTMENT IN THE PERIOD THROUGH THE HAVANA SUMMIT. PLEASE SLUG ALL CABLES FOR IO/ML.

10. FOR ADDRESSEES NOT SPECIFIED BELOW: EMBASSIES

SHOULD DRAW ON PARAS 3 - 8 AND NEWSOM PRESENTATION TO YUGOSLAVS, AS APPROPRIATE IN LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES, IN MAKING REPRESENTATIONS. YOU SHOULD POINT OUT THAT WE DO NOT EXPECT HOST GOVERNMENTS TO AGREE WITH US ON EVERY ISSUE ADDRESSED BY THE CUBAN DRAFT, BUT WE BELIEVE THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT AREAS OFAGREEMENT AND OF COMMON INTEREST WHICH ARE DOWNPLAYED OR IGNORED BY THE CUBAN TEXT, CREATING A DISTORTED VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. CERTAINLY, WE SHARE A STRONG INTEREST IN MAKING THE DRAFT AS CONSTRUCTIVE AND CONDUCIVE TO INTERNATIONAL HARMONY AS POSSIBLE. THE PART PLAYED BY EVERY NAM MEMBER IN THAT PROCESS IS

IMPORTANT, WITH CUMULATIVE INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS
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BRUSSELS ALSO FOR EC, FROM UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM

BEYOND THE WORDING OF A SINGLE DOCUMENT. WE HOPE EACH HOST GOVERNMENT WILL PLAY ITS PART.

11. FOR BELGRADE: WE RECOGNIZE THAT US AND YUGOSLAV VIEWS ON CUBAN PROPOSAL APPEAR TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH YUGOSLAV PRESENTATION PLACED GREATER EMPHASIS ON IDEOLOGICAL RATHER THAN SPECIFIC SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. YOU SHOULD REVIEW WITH PONOFF UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM'S PRESENTATION TO BELOVSKI OF US VIEWS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ANY FURTHER INFORMATION YOU CAN PICK UP ON YUGOSLAVIA'S PLANS FOR COMBATTING THE CUBAN DRAFT AND DISCUSSIONS THEY ARE HAVING WITH OTHER NAM COUNTRIES.

12. FOR NEW DELHI, JAKARTA, COLOMBO, LAGOS: YOU SHOULD STRESS OUR HOPE, AND CONFIDENCE, THAT THE MODERATE MAJORITY OF NAM MEMBER STATES WILL REJECT THE EXTREME CUBAN DRAFT AND SUCCEED IN CREATING A DOCUMENT REFLECTING UNDERLYING NAM IDEALS OF GENUINE NON ALIGNEMENT. YOU SHOULD REQUEST THAT THESE GOVERNMENTS ALSO TAKE ACCOUNT OF OUR SPECIFIC CONCERNS IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHICH AM MEMBERS NOW HAVE UNDERWAY.

13. FOR CAIRO AND TEL AVIV: WE WILL WANT TO DISCUSS MIDDLE EAST ISSUES WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS IN DETAIL FOLLOWING YOUR REPORT OF INITIAL EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI REACTIONS.

14. FOR DUBLIN, LONDON, PARIS, BONN, ROME, LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE, COPENHAGEN, BRUSSELS, OTTAWA, TOKYO AND CANBERRA: DUBLIN SHOULD PROVIDE IRISH, IN THEIR EC-9 PRESIDENCY CAPACITY, WITH TEXT OF NEWSOM PRESENTATION (PARA 3 REFTEL) AND ASK THAT IT BE CIRCULATED AS PRELIMINARY US REACTION TO CUBAN DRAFT. EMBASSIES IN ALL EC-9 CAPITALS SHOULD ENCOURAGE EUROPEANS TO MAKE APPROACHES SIMILAR TO NEWSOM PRESENTATION TO NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES WITH WHICH THEY BELIEVE THEY WOULD HAVE INFLUENCE. WE HOPE THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH CAN DRAW FULLY ON TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIPS WITH ANGLOPHONE AND FRANCOPHONE AFRICANS RESPECTIVELY. YOU MIGHT STRESS TO UK AND FRANCE THE TIME FACTOR, WHICH ARGUES FOR EARLY PRESENTATIONS. CANBERRA, OTTAWA AND TOKYO SHOULD COVER THE SAME GROUND WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS, ALSO SUGGESTING PARALLEL APPROACHES TO COUNTRIES WITH WHICH THEY ENJOY CLOSE RELATIONS, AND INDICATING OUR DESIRE TO CONSULT CLOSELY CONCERNING THE

HAVANA SUMMIT. EMBASSIES LONDON, CANBERRA AND OTTAWA ALREADY WERE ASKED TO INCLUDE THIS SUBJECT IN APPROACHES RELATING TO THE LUSAKA COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE (STATE 186185 - NOTAL).

15. FOR USNATO: YOU SHOULD CIRCULATE UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM'S ANALYSIS IN PARA 3 OF REFTEL, SAYING IT REFLECTS OUR PRELIMINARY REACTION TO THE CUBAN DRAFT. YOU SHOULD NOT AT THIS TIME SUGGEST COORDINATION WITHIN NATO. WE DO NOT WISH TO MAKE NATO A PRINCIPAL FORUM FOR COORDINATION ON THE HAVANA SUMMIT. HOWEVER, ANY REACTION OF OTHER ALLIES IN NATO WOULD BE OF INTEREST.

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BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 06 STATE 193073/04

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR EC, FROM UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM

16. FOR MADRID AND LISBON: RECENT BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS IN CAPITALS IDENTIFIED A MUTUAL INTEREST IN EXCHANGING VIEWS ON THE HAVANA SUMMIT (AT WHICH GOS AND GOP ARE LIKELY TO BE GUESTS OR OBSERVERS) AND NON-ALIGNED MATTERS GENERALLY. ISSUE ALSO WAS DISCUSSED WITH SPANISH DURING CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ON LATIN AMERICA. EMBASSIES SHOULD MAKE POINT IN THEIR REPRESENTATIONS THAT WE VIEW EXCHANGES ON CUBAN DRAFT AS PART OF A CONTINUING PROCESS BETWEEN US AND OUR EUROPEAN FRIENDS AND THAT WE LOOK FORWARD TO APPROPRIATE COORDINATED ALLIED ACTION IN THE NON-ALIGNED CONTEXT. WE PARTICULARLY VALUE SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE VIEWS -- AND HELP -- CONCERNING LATIN AMERICAN ASPECTS. SEPTEL COVERS OUR CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE PORTUGUESE ATTENDENCE IN HAVANA AT FOREIGN MINISTERS LEVEL.

17. FOR STOCKHOLM, VIENNA, AND BERN: EUROPEAN NEUTRALS ENJOY CONSIDERABLE MORAL AND POLITICAL STANDING IN NAM. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT THESE EUROPEAN FRIENDS WILL CONSULT CLOSELY WITH US AND BE SUPPORTIVE OF BASIC APPROACH OUTLINED IN UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM'S PRESENTATION.

18. FOR BUCHAREST: EMBASSY SHOULD GO OVER OUR PRELIMINARY REACTIONS WITH ROMANIANS, STRESSING THAT WE DO NOT WISH TO INTRUDE IN NAM BUT DO WISH TO NOTE POINTS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN. YOU SHOULD SEEK ROMANIAN VIEWS ON SUBSTANCE AND REPORT ANY INFO AVAILABLE ON ROMANIAN REACTIONS AND POSSIBLE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS.

19. FOR BEIJING: EMBASSY SHOULD SHARE OUR PRELIMINARY REACTIONS WITH APPROPRIATE SENIOR FO OFFICALS. YOU SHOULD SEEK CHINESE VIEWS ON THE DRAFT. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED, IN ANY INFO YOU CAN PICK UP ON HOW CEINESE PLAN TO COUNTERACT CUBAN TEXT. YOU SHOULD AVOID IMPRESSION THAT WE WISH TO TAKE JOINT ACTION ON THIS SUBJECT AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED.

20. FOR ASEAN ADDRESSEES: YOU SHOULD COVER GROUND MENTIONED IN PARA 9, AND SEEK HOST GOVERNMENT VIEWS. IS THERE ANY INDICATION THAT ASEAN MEMBERSARE CONSIDERING EXPANDING NAM SUMMIT DISCUSSION OF INDO-CHINA BEYOND KAMPUCHEAN REPRESENTATION ISSUE, TO

INCLUDE INDOCHINA AND REFUGEES. DEPENDENT ON REACTIONS FROM OTHER ASEANS AND RESULTS OF GENEVA CONFERENCE, FURTHER GUIDANCE WILL FOLLOW.

21. FOR MEXICO, BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, CARACAS, BRIDGETOWN, BRASILIA: YOU SHOULD ASK HOST GOVERNMENTS TO USE WHATEVER INFLUENCE THEY MAY HAVE WITH LATIN AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE NAM (ARGENTINA, CUBA, GUYANA, JAMAICA, PANAMA, PERU, TRINIDAD) AND PROSPECTIVE MEMBERS (SURINAME, BOLIVIA, GRENADA) TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO REWRITE LATIN AMERICAN PORTIONS OF THE DRAFT, ESPECIALLY CONCERNING PUERTO RICO AND INTER-AMERICAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. US TRUSTS THAT LATIN AMERICAN PARTNERS
BT
#3073

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 06 STATE 193073/05

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR EC, FROM UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM

WILL SPEAK OUT AGAINST CUBAN ATTACK ON ENTIRE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM. SEPTEL REPORTS ON SECRETARY VANCE'S CONVERSATION WITH MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTER CASTENADA AND PROVIDES FURTHER GUIDANCE.

22. FOR BUENOS AIRES, PANAMA, PORT OF SPAIN, KINGSTON, LIMA: EMBASSIES ALSO SHOULD MAKE POINTS IN PARA 21, DRAWING AS APPROPRIATE ON UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM'S PRESENTATION.

23. FOR USUN AND GENEVA: YOU SHOULD FIND OCCASIONS IN COURSE OF ROUTINE CONTACTS WITH OTHER MISSIONS TO CONVEY OUR CONCERNS REGARDING THE CUBAN DRAFT. OTHER SENIOR USUN OFFICIALS ALSO MAY WISH TO STRESS OUR DISMAY AND COUNSEL MODERATION. WE WILL APPRECIATE REGULAR REPORTING ON NEW YORK NACB MEETINGS, WHICH YUGOSLAVS TOLD US WERE IN NEARLY PERMANENT SESSION.

24. FOR KABUL, COTONOU, DAMASCUS, ALGIERS, BRAZZAVILLE, HAVANA, ADDIS ABABA, BAGHDAD, TRIPOLI, ANTANANARIVO, MAPUTO: DEPARTMENT RECOGNIZES THAT HOST GOVERNMENTS HAVE RECORD OF OPPOSING US INTERESTS AND COULD WORK WITH CUBANS TO PRESERVE THE MOST EXTREME LANGUAGE OF DRAFT. EMBASSIES HAVE DISCRETION, HOWEVER, TO RAISE SELECTED POINTS FROM GUIDANCE WHICH INVOLVE US INTERESTS, IF THEY BELIEVE ON BALANCE THAT THIS WOULD PROMOTE OUR OBJECTIVES. WE ALSO ARE INTERESTED IN ANY INFORMATION THAT YOU ARE ABLE TO DEVELOP ON TACTICS OF THESE GOVERNMENTS ASTHE NON-ALIGNED BEGIN PROCESS OF VETTING DRAFT. ALGIERS MAY WISH TO RECOMMEND HOW TO DEAL WITH GOA ON THIS MATTER.

25. FOR GABORONE, YAOUNDE, LIBREVILLE, BISSAU, BANGUL, ABIDJAN, NAIROBI, MONROVIA, NIAMEY, DAKAR, KHARTOUM, MOGADISHU, OUAGADOUGOU, KINSHASA, BAMAKO: THESE AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS ARE MODERATE FOR THE MOST PART AND HAVE BEEN HELPFUL IN THE PAST ON A RANGE OF ISSUES, ESPECIALLY THOSE RELATING TO MIDDLE EAST -- E.G. PROTECTING EGYPT'S MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL FORA AND FENDING OFF ARAB EFFORTS TO REAFFIRM THE ZIONISM - RACISM EQUATION. THEIR CONTINUED HELPFULNESS, WHICH WE RECOGNIZE WILL DEPEND IN PART ON OUR KEEPING INITIATIVE IN RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA OVER NEXTFEW MONTHS, IS ESSENTIAL TO ANY EFFORT TO TURN AROUND THE CUBAN DRAFT. IN MAKING REPRESENTATIONS IN THESE CAPITALS,

EMBASSIES SHOULD INDICATE THAT WE ARE AWARE OF THEIR SPECIAL ROLE IN NON-ALIGNED AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORA AND STRONGLY SUPPORT THEIR EFFORTS TO DEFEND MODERATE INTERESTS AGAINST RAIDS BY THE CUBANS AND OTHER EXTREMISTS. YOU SHOULD ENCOURAGE THESE GOVERNMENTS TO PLAN TOGETHER TO MAXIMIZE THEIR IMPACT ON THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS OVER THE CUBAN DRAFT. MONROVIA SHOULD STRESS WITH PRESIDENT TOLBERT THE PARTICULARIMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO HIS LEADERSHIP OF OAU IN THIS CONNECTION.

26. FOR LA PAZ, PARAMARIBO, TEHRAN, ISLAMABAD: NEW MEMBERS OF THE NAM (BEGINNING AT THE HAVANA SUMMIT), WHICH IN SOME CASES ARE PASSING THROUGH DIFFICULT
BT
#3073

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF 06 STATE 193073/06

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR EC, FROM UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM

INTERNAL TRANSFORMATIONS, THESE COUNTRIES WILL BE RE-
EXAMINING MANY OF THEIR POSITIONS ON THE ISSUES.THE
CUBAN DRAFT WILL OBLIGE THEM TO MAKE IMPORTANT DECISIONS
QUICKLY. WE WILL WISH TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON NON-ALIGNED
ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN, AND WE WILL CONSIDER THEIR
VIEWS SERIOUSLY AND OBJECTIVELY. WE, OF COURSE, HOPE
TO RECEIVE THE SAME CONSIDERATION. LA PAZ AND
PARAMARIBO SHOULD FOCUS PARTICULARLY ON LATIN AMERICA.
EMBASSY TEHRAN MAY IN ITS OWN DISCRETION DRAW ON THESE
POINTS AS APPROPRIATE. VANCE
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#3073

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RUDKEBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 9822
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 1939
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 9078
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE 5873
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 3463
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 7167
RUESLZ/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ IMMEDIATE 2173
RUDKFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 4843
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 6373
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 9477
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 3093
RUESDO/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO IMMEDIATE 0314
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO IMMEDIATE 5103
RUESQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 3309
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSEIIMMEDIATE 8005
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 5158
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 3714
RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 7931
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 194793

E.O. 12065 GDS 7/26/85 (MAYNES, C. W.)

TAGS: PORG, UNGA

SUBJECT: HIGH LEVEL ATTENDANCE - NAM SUMMIT/UNGA

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. IN VIEW OF THE PROXIMITY OF DATES OF THE NAM HAVANA SUMMIT AND THE CONVENING OF THE 34TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT SOME HEADS OF STATE/GOVERNMENT OR OTHER HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS MAY PROCEED TO NEW YORK FOLLOWING THE SUMMIT IN ORDER TO PARTICIPATE IN THE UNGA. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY MAY LEAD SOME OF THEM TO PLAN STOPOVERS IN THE U.S. EITHER ENROUTE OR RETURNING FROM THE SUMMIT.

3. POSTS ARE REQUESTED TO ADVISE DEPARTMENT ASAP SHOULD THEY LEARN OF SUCH PLANS. HOWEVER, POSTS SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT RAISE THE SUBJECT WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AND SHOULD UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES MAKE OR IMPLY ANY COMMITMENT FOR MEETINGS WITH THE SECRETARY, VICE PRESIDENT OR PRESIDENT.

VANCE
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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2970
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 08074

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE 7/30/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: POL:VLTOMSETH:GO
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL2 CHRG ECON
RF

FOR 10/ML

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/30/85 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.)OR-P
TAGS: PORG, IR
SUBGECT: IRANIAN REACTION TO CUBAN DRAFT FOR THE HAVANA SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE

REF: (A) STATE 193073, (B) 187420

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. PER INSTRUCTIONS IN REF A POLCOUNS CALLED ON HEAD OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DEPARTMENT IN MFA, MEHDI EHSASI. JULY 30 AND MADE POINTS IN PARAS 3 THROUGH 8 OF REF A AND RAISED SPECIFIC POINTS OF CONCERN ENUMERATED IN PARA 3 OF REF B. EHSANI RESPONDED TO POLCOUNS' INVITATION TO COMMENT BY SAYING THAT IRAN, BECAUSE IT IS NOT YET A FULL- FLEDGED MEMBER OF THE NAM, HAD NOT BEEN INVITED TO COMMENT ON THE CUBAN DRAFT. FURTHER, THE PGOI IS STILL IN THE PROCESS OF REVIEWING WHAT ITS POLICIES ON A RANGE OF ISSUES, INCLUDING SOME OF THOSE CITED BY POLCOUNS, SHOULD BE, AND THUS HE, EHSASI, WAS NOT IN A POSITION YET TO GIVE ANY OFFICIAL REACTION TO POLCOUNS' INVITATION.

3. HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT UNOFFICIALLY HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT IRAN WOULD FOLLOW AN INDEPENDENT POLICY WITHIN THE NAM, EXAMINING EACH ISSUE ON ITS MERITS. HE RECOGNIZED THAT THERE ARE VARIOUS BLOCS WITHIN THE NAM, SOME OF WHICH TEND TOWARD EXTREMIST POSITIONS. OCCASSIONALLY, IRAN MIGHT FIND ITSELF SIDING WITH ONE OF THESE BLOCS ON A PARTICULAR ISSUE, BUT IT WOULD NOT BE BECAUSE IRAN WAS ALIGNING ITSELF WITH THAT BLOC BUT RATHER

BECAUSE INDEPENDENT EXAMINATION OF THE ISSUE HAD LED IRAN TO CONCLUDE THAT IT SHOULD TAKE THE POSITION IT DID.

4. COMMENT: IRAN IS STILL VERY MUCH PREOCCUPIED IN PUTTING ITS FOREIGN AFFAIRS HOUSE IN ORDER FOLLOWING THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION. WE THINK THAT EHSASI WAS BEING PERFECTLY CANDID WHEN HE DECLINED TO COMMENT ON THE ISSUES RAISED BY POLCOUNS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE PGOI DOES NOT YET HAVE AN OFFICIAL POSITION ON THEM. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE ARE INCLINED TO CONCLUDE THAT IRAN'S POSTURE AT THE NAM-AS WELL AS IN OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORA-WILL FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE BE GOVERNED MORE BY THE PERSONALITY OF THE LEADING MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION. IF FM YAZDI HIMSELF ATTENDS, WE CAN PROBABLY COUNT ON IRAN TAKING A RELATIVELY RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO MOST ISSUES BASED UPON A REASONABLY PRAGMATIC ASSESSMENT OF WHAT IRAN'S OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS ARE. IF, HOWEVER, IRAN'S DELEGATION IS HEADED BY SOMEONE LACKING EXPERIENCE AND/OR SWEPT UP WITH THE MYSTIQUE OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, MODERATION AND PRAGMATISM MAY BE THE VICTIMS. LAINGEN

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RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5282
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 5686
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 6329
RUFHPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 7204
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 8365
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 1266
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1121
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8348
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 2958
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 8417
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2462
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 6943
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 2829
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 6699
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 9543
RUDKFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 4896
RUMJPQ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 8497
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 3155
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 1989
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 8042
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 7228
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 9124
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 1884
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 8122
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 5189
RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 7978
RUDKEBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 9846
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 3515
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4395
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 7877
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 198854

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PORG

SUBJECT: CUBAN DRAFT FOR THE HAVANA SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE BEING POUCHED

REF: STATE 193873

1. DEPARTMENT HAS NOTED REQUESTS FOR FULL TEXT OF CUBAN DRAFT. WE ARE POUCHING 75 PAGE TEXT TO ALL ADDRESSEES.

2. AS IT WAS GIVEN TO US IN CONFIDENCE, POSTS SHOULD MAKE NO PUBLIC REFERENCE TO OUR POSSESSION OF DRAFT. POSTS IN NATO CAPITALS, TOKYO AND CANBERRA MAY GIVE COPIES TO HOST GOVERNMENTS IF REQUESTED TO DO SO. BUCHAREST AND POSTS IN OTHER NON-NATO COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE ASKED FOR COPIES SHOULD REFER HOST GOVERNMENTS TO NAM MEMBERS WITH WHOM THEY HAVE CLOSE RELATIONS. THESE POSTS SHOULD NOT DISTRIBUTE COPIES WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL BY DEPARTMENT. VANCE
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TO NONALIGNED MOVEMENT COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE EHRON
RUEHGR/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE 5915
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5304
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 5686
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 6365
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 7244
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0331
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 1225
RUFEBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1126
RUDKGPC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8344
RUDKPNC/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 2955
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 8426
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2469
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 6967
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 2833
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 6721
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 9552
RUDKFDC/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 4903
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 8521
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 3167
RUESBC/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 1999
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 8049
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 7229
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 9133
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 1024
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 9152
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 5190
RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 7987
RUDKBBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 9851
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 3522
INFO RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 9363
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 6150
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 1374
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1721
RUTAOU/AMEMBASSY COTONOU PRIORITY 2779
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE PRIORITY 2773
RUESUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 8154
RUTABA/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 3102
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 9422
RUFHTA/AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO PRIORITY 8208
RUEHGR/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO PRIORITY 9050
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 4428
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 7083

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 199145/01

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/31/79 (MAYNES, C.W.)

TAGS: PORG

SUBJECT: ECONOMIC PORTIONS OF CUBAN DRAFT NAM SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE AND UNCTAD VI VENUE

REF: STATE 193093

. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. REFTEL REQUESTED ADDRESSEES TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS CONCERNING POLITICAL ASPECTS OF CUBAN DRAFT NAM SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE. FOLLOWING IS THE DEPARTMENT'S ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC PORTION OF DRAFT. YOU SHOULD DRAW ON THIS ANALYSIS IN FOLLOW-UP CONVERSATIONS WITH HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, EMPHASIZING CONTINUED US INTEREST IN PROMOTING COOPERATION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND OUR DISTRESS AT THE UNHELPFUL CUBAN ATTEMPT TO REINTRODUCE CONFRONTATIONAL RHETORIC IN THE DIALOGUE.

3. MOST OF THE ECONOMIC PORTION OF THE CUBAN TEXT REPEATS IDEAS THAT WERE PUT FORWARD AT THE RECENT COLOMBO MEETING OF THE NON-ALIGNED COORDINATING BUREAU, THE ARUSHA G-77 MINISTERIAL MEETING AND UNCTAD V IN MANILA -- A CHANGE IN THE TERMS OF TRADE IN FAVOR OF THE LDCS; PRODUCER CARTELS; BROADER SPECIAL PREFERENCES FOR LDC PRODUCTS; INDEXATION OF COMMODITY PRICES; AN INCREASE IN OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE; CONTROLS ON MULTI-NATIONAL CORPORATIONS; SOVEREIGNTY OVER RESOURCES; ETC.

4. HOWEVER, CUBAN DRAFT COUCHES THESE IDEAS IN TERMS WHICH ARE MUCH MORE STRIDENT AND CONDEMNATORY OF DEVELOPED MARKET ECONOMY COUNTRIES. IT DISCOUNTS THE VALUE OF DIALOGUE AND STATES THAT 'IMPERIALISM HAS BEEN, IS AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE CHIEF OBSTACLE TO DEVELOPMENT'.

5. THE CUBANS' RHETORICAL STYLE EMERGES CLEARLY IN THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLE. THE "FAILURE OF UNCTAD V AND THE "DILATORY AND DISTORTING PRACTICES ADOPTED BY TH- MAIN DEVELOPED MARKET ECONOMIES MEAN, ACCORDING TO THE CUBANS, THAT "THERE IS AN IMPERATIVE NEED OF SEARCHING FOR NEW WAYS, (BEGIN UNDERLINE) NOT BASED EXCLUSIVELY ON PARLIAMENTARY DIALOGUE AS IT IS CURRENTLY CONCEIVED (END UNDERLINE), THAT WILL ENHANCE THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES'

STRUGGLE TO OBTAIN THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHTS., IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT THE CUBANS MEAN BY THIS, BUT THE IMPLICATIONS ARE NOT ENCOURAGING IN TERMS OF CUBAN LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE NAM AND, MORE GENERALLY, AMONG THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

6. ONE MAJOR NEW ECONOMIC PROPOSAL IN THE CUBAN DRAFT CALLS FOR THE CREATION OF ,A NEW RATIONAL, EQUITABLE AND UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM THAT WILL RADICALLY ELIMINATE (LDC BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICITS) AND, IN ADDITION, WILL SUPPRESS THE PREDOMINANT ROLE OF SOME CURRENCIES -- MAINLY THE US DOLLAR -- AND ASSURE EQUALITY BETWEEN THE DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
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NHNNVV ESB027BRA653
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TO NONALIGNED MOVEMENT COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE 5916
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5305
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 5687
RUQTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 6366
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 7245
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0332
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 1226
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1127
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8345
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 2956
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 8427
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2470
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 6968
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 2834
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 6722
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 9553
RUDKFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 4904
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 8522
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 3168
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 2888
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 8850
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 7230
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 9134
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 1025
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 8153
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 5191
RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 7988
RUDKEBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 9852
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 3523
INFO RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 9364
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 6151
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 1375
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1722
RUTAOU/AMEMBASSY COTONOU PRIORITY 2780
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE PRIORITY 2774
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 8155
RUTABA/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 3103
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 9423
RUFHTA/AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO PRIORITY 8209
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO PRIORITY 9051
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 4429
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 7084

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C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF Ø2 STATE 199145/02

IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS-. IT FURTHER STATES THAT THIS MONETARY SYSTEM "CANNOT BE ACHIEVED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EXISTING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS." THE FORUM IN WHICH THIS SWEEPING CHANGE IS TO BE NEGOTIATED IS UNCLEAR, EXCEPT THAT IT IS TO BE NEGOTIATED WITH "THE FULL PARTICIPATION OF ALL COUNTRIES ON AN EQUAL FOOTING." THIS PROPOSAL, IF APPROVED BY THE CONFERENCE, WOULD NOT, IN OUR VIEW, BE AN ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION. SUCH VAGUE, SWEEPING IDEAS DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE TANGIBLE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS THAT WE NEED TO WORK TOGETHER TO RESOLVE.

7. HOSTILE TONE OF CUBAN DRAFT MAKES IT CLEAR THAT CUBA IS STILL SEEKING TO STEER NAM TOWARD NORTH/SOUTH CONFRONTATION AND AWAY FROM GENUINE NON-ALIGNMENT, FOR WHICH WE HAVE UNDERSTANDING. IT ALSO CONFIRMS OUR VIEW THAT HAVANA WOULD NOT BE A SUITABLE SITE FOR UNCTAD VI.

8. CUBA THUS FAR IS THE ONLY COUNTRY TO HAVE EXTENDED A FORMAL INVITATION TO HOST UNCTAD VI, SCHEDULED FOR 1982 OR 1983. IT SOUGHT TO HAVE ITS INVITATION ENDORSED BY UNCTAD V IN MANILA EARLIER THIS YEAR. UNCTAD V TOOK NO DECISION ON THE SITE BUT DID ADOPT A CONSENSUS RESOLUTION REQUESTING THE UNCTAD TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD (TDB) TO RECOMMEND THAT UNGA DECIDE ON THE SITE, 'BEARING IN MIND' THE CUBAN OFFER. THE RESOLUTION ALSO CITED A UNGA RESOLUTION WHICH REAFFIRMED THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE THAT UN BODIES SHOULD MEET AT THEIR RESPECTIVE ESTABLISHED HEADQUARTERS (WHICH, IN THE CASE OF UNCTAD, IS GENEVA). IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE CUBANS WILL SEEK ENDORSEMENT FOR THEIR INVITATION AT THE NAM SUMMIT AND TRY TO PUSH FOR A DECISION AT THE NEXT MEETING OF THE TDB THIS OCTOBER.

9. WE BELIEVE IT IS PREMATURE TO REACH A DECISION ON THIS MATTER. THE TDB DOES NOT HAVE TO MAKE ITS RECOMMENDATION UNTIL ITS MEETING IN THE FALL OF 1980. MOREOVER, CUBA HAS NOT YET BEGUN ITS THREE-YEAR NAM CHAIRMANSHIP. THE OUTCOME OF THE NAM SUMMIT AND THE CHARACTER OF THE CUBAN CHAIRMANSHIP AFTER THE SUMMIT WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL BASES FOR PERMITTING UNCTAD MEMBER STATES TO JUDGE THE SUITABILITY OF HAVANA AND OTHER POTENTIAL CANDIDATE CAPITALS AS UNCTAD VI VENUE.

10. ACTION POSTS IN THEIR DISCRETION, ARE REQUESTED TO DRAW ON THE ABOVE POINTS AND REPORT REACTIONS BY COB AUGUST 3.

11. FOR BELGRADE: EMBASSY SHOULD POINT OUT TO THE GOY THAT PARA 9 APPROACH MAY BE OF SOME USE TO MODERATES AT HAVANA AND IN PERIOD FOLLOWING NAM SUMMIT. VANCE
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NNNNVV ESB041BRA211
PP RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #1137/01 2142327
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
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INFO RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPARTMENT WASHDC PRIORITY 2580
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 201137/01

E.O.12065: GDS 8/2/85 (MONTVILLE,JOSEPH V.)

TAGS:EG,IS,PINR

SUBJECT: INTSUM 866-AUGUST 2,1979

LONDON FOR GLASPIE
PARIS FOR NICHOLAS MURPHY
DOD/ISA FOR RANSOM
OTHER ADDRESSEES FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION

(PARAGRAPHS 1-10 CONFIDENTIAL)

1. NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT: EGYPT FACES A TOUCH TIME AT THE HAVANA SUMMIT. EGYPT WILL FACE AN UPHILL BATTLE IN TRYING TO HEAD OFF CONDEMNATION AT THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT IN HAVANA FOR SIGNING A SEPARATE PEACE THREATY WITH ISRAEL AND FOR FAILING TO RESOLVE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. CUBA, FOR ITS PART, IS URGING A HARD LINE AGAINST EGYPT IN LIEU OF THE LIKELY DEFEAT OF AN ATTEMPT BY ARAB REJECTIONISTS TO SUSPEND EGYPT'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM). THE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICANS ARE CRUCIAL TO EGYPT'S STRATEGY. THESE STATES OPPOSE

EGYPT'S SUSPENSION FROM THE NAM, BUT THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE WISDOM OF THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TREATY BECAUSE IT FAILS TO DEAL WITH WHAT THEY CONSIDER THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS AND HAS SERIOUSLY AFFECTED AFRICAN-ARAB UNITY. NOR CAN EGYPT COUNT ON SUPPORT FROM NAM LEADERS, YUGOSLAVIA AND INDIA.

2. THE ARAB REJECTIONISTS PROBABLY WILL TRY TO INCREASE

EGYPT'S ISOLATION BY DEMANDING ITS SUSPENSION FROM THE NAM. THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO SUCCEED, HOWEVER. THREE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL FORUMS SINCE JUNE HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE IS LITTLE SENTIMENT FOR SUSPENDING EGYPT FROM INTERNATIONAL BODIES IN WHICH ARAB STATES ARE IN THE MINORITY.

3. THE FAILURE OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR SUSPENSION HAS LED THE ARAB REJECTIONISTS TO SEEK CONDEMNATION OF EGYPT (AND THE US) BY DENOUNCING THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT AND UN RESOLUTIONS" ON THE PALESTINE ISSUE. THEY SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING THIS CONDEMNATION AT THE MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NON-ALIGNED COORDINATING BUREAU (NACB) IN COLOMBO IN JUNE. DESPITE REPEATED ATTEMPTS, HOWEVER, THEY OBTAINED ONLY INDIRECT CRITICISM OF EGYPT AT THE RECENT OAU SUMMIT.

4. CUBA ADAMANT: CUBA WELCOMED THIS SHIFT OF TACTICS. IT DOES NOT WANT TO BECOME TOO CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH THE SUSPENSION MOVE BECAUSE THE DIVISIVENESS OF THIS ISSUE WOULD UNDERMINEHAVANA'SINTEREST IN A SUCCESSFUL SUMMIT. THE FAILURE OF THE SUSPENSION CAMPAIGN AT THE COLOMBO MEETING FORCED CUBA TO EXTEND AN INVITATION TO SADAT TO ATTEND THE HAVANA MEETING, A MOVE WHICH PROMPTED THE ARAB REJECTIONISTS TO THREATEN TO BOYCOTT THE SUMMIT.

5. TO PLACATE THE REJECTIONISTS (AND TO CRITICIZE THE US) THE CUBANS INSERTED INTO THEIR DRAFT FINAL DECLARATION FOR THE HAVANA SUMMIT TOUCH LANGUAGE DENOUNCING THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT AND THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAEL TREATY FOR "FLAGRANTLY, VIOLATING UN RESOLUTIONS AND NAM DECLARATIONS AND FOR PROVIDING AN INCENTIVE FOR THE "ZIONIST STATE TO CONTINUE ITS EXPANSIONIST, RACIST, DISCRIMINATORY AND AGGRESSIVE POLICY.; IT ALSO CHARGED EGYPT WITH DEVIATING FROM NAM POLICY AND IGNORING THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS.

6. IN ADDITION, THE CUBANS HAVE SPURNED EGYPTIAN EFFORTS TO DISCUSS THE DECLARATION IN HAVANA PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT. THE EGYPTIANS HAVE EXPRESSED STRONG DISSATISFACTION WITH THE MIDDLE EAST SECTION OF THE DRAFT DECLARATION AND HAVE ASKED THE CUBANS TO DELETE THE OFFENDING LAN-

GUAGE. CUBA HAS MADE CLEAR ITS REFUSAL TO MODIFY THE LANGUAGE PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT.

7. AFRICAN SUPPORT WEAKENS: EGYPT'S MAIN LINE OF DEFENSE REMAINS THE AFRICANS. BUT A MAJORITY OF THE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICANS, WHILE OPPOSING EGYPT'S SUSPENSION FROM INTERNATIONAL FORUMS, ARE CONCERNED THAT SADAT'S INITIATIVE WITH ISRAEL WILL NOT RESOLVE WHAT THEY REGARD AS THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION--THE RESTORATION OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE.

8. EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER BUTRUS GHALI PUBLICLY WARNED ON JULY 30 THAT THE EGYPTIAN "VICTORY" AT THE OAU SUMMIT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY MEAN A VICTORY IN HAVANA EVEN THOUGH ALL AFRICAN STATES ARE NAM MEMBERS.

9. NO HELP FROM MODERATE LEADERS: THE EGYPTIANS CANNOT COUNT ON YUGOSLAVIA AND INDIA TO DEFEND THEM AT HAVANA UNLESS AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO SUSPEND EGYPT. YUGOSLAVIA'S AND INDIA'S LEADERSHIP ROLE IN SUPPORT OF EGYPT WEAKENED AT THE COLOMBO MEETING. NEITHER BELGRADE NOT NEW DELHI, WHEN SUBJECTED TO INTENSE ARAB PRESSURE, WANTED TO BE

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S E C R E TOFINAL SECTION OF 02 STATE 201137/02

FORCED TO MAKE A CHOICE BETWQEN THE REJECTIONISTS AND EGYPT.

10. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES--THE LACK OF STRONG BACKING FROM NAM MODERATES AND THE SHAKINESS OF THE AFRICANS--SADAT COULD FIND HIMSELF REBUFFED BY THE SUMMIT WITH CONSEQUENT DAMAGE TO HIS PRESTIGE. BUT SADAT HAS TAKEN RISKS BEFORE. HE MAY FEEL CONFIDENT THAT HIS PRESENCE AND PERSUASIVENESS CAN AT LEAST WEAKEN THE FORCES PUSHING FOR CRITICISM OF HIS POLICIES AND THE ISOLATION OF EGYPT.

11. (C) TREATY VIOLATIONS-ISRAELI POLITICS: EMBASSY TEL AVIV REPORTS THAT DAYAN HAS IMPLICITLY FAULTED WEIZMAN FOR FAILING TO BRING THE ISSUE OF EGYPTIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE SINAI PEACE TREATY TO THE ATTENTION OF THE CABINET. THE TREATY SPECIFIES THAT THE AL ARISH AIRFIELD IS TO BE CIVILIANIZED . HOWEVER, THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY HAS CONTINUED TO REMAIN ACTIVE IN THE AIRFIELD'S OPERATION BY MANNING GUIDANCE (NOT WARNING) RADARS AND IN

MAINTAINING A HELICOPTER SQUADRON THERE. THE ISRAELI MINISTRY OF DEFENSE MADE THESE CIRCUMSTANCES KNOWN TO THE US TWO MONTHS AGO, BUT EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT GENERAL ALI AND DEFENSE MINISTER WEIZMAN COULD CLARIFY THE MATTER. EGYPT CLAIMS IT IS IN THE PROCESS OF TRAINING CIVILIANS TO TAKE OVER THE STRIP. EMBASSY TEL AVIV COMMENTS THAT DUE TO BEGIN'S ILLNESS AND HOSPITALIZATION, DAYAN MAY BE REASSERTING HIS INFLUENCE AND AUTHORITY OVER NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING AND FOREIGN POLICY

AT THE EXPENSE OF WEIZMAN.

12. (U) ISRAEL-BEGIN'S HEALTH: PRIME MINISTER BEGIN IS SCHEDULED TO LEAVE THE HOSPITAL AUGUST 3, AND SPEND ANOTHER WEEK RECUPERATING AT HOME, ACCORDING TO JERUSALEM RADIO. BEGIN'S DOCTOR EXPLAINED THAT HIS SIGHT WOULD ONLY BE SLIGHTLY IMPAIRED, AND THAT OTHERWISE HE WOULD BE IN GOOD HEALTH. FOR THE NEXT THREE MONTHS AN ANTI-COAGULANT WILL BE PRESCRIBED TO REDUCE THE CHANCES OF ANOTHER BLOOD CLOT FORMING IN VITAL ARTERIES. THERE HAS BEEN NO BRAIN DAMAGE WHICH WOULD LIMIT MEMORY, JUDGMENT, SPEECH OR MOTOR ACTIVITIES, ACCORDING TO THE DOCTOR.

13. (C) BEGIN-EGYPTIAN PRESS: THE EDITOR OF THE EGYPTIAN PAPER GUMHURRIYYA LEVELED AN ATTACK ON BEGIN AND ISRAEL AUGUST 1. HE SAID THAT PEACE DOES NOT SERVE ISRAEL'S INTERESTS. THE REPORTS ON BEGIN'S POOR HEALTH "STRENGTHEN MY FAITH IN GOD," HE SAID. AMBASSADOR ATHERTON INTENDS TO DRAW VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S ATTENTION TO THIS ITEM.

14. (U)EGYPT-ISRAEL-OIL: ISRAELI ENERGY MINISTER MODAI, IS TO GO TO CAIRO NEXT WEEK TO DISCUSS THE TAKEOVER OF THE OCCUPIED OIL FIELDS BY EGYPT NEXT NOVEMBER. TECHNICAL QUESTIONS RELATING TO COMPENSATION FOR INSTALLED EQUIPMENT WILL BE AMONG THE ITEMS ON THE AGENDA.

15. (S) EGYPT-POLAND: A EUROPEAN BUSINESSMAN HAS TOLD EMBASSY WARSAW THAT HE IS NEGOTIATING WITH THE POLISH GOVERNMENT FOR THE SALE TO EGYPT OF SPARE PARTS FOR MIG-17, 19 AND 21 AIRCRAFT. SOVIET BUILT ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT AND DIESEL ENGINES FOR TANKS ARE REPORTEDLY ALSO INCLUDED IN THE PROPOSED SALE. THE BUSINESSMAN CLAIMS THAT POLISH OFFICIALS SAY THE SALE HAS SOVIET APPROVAL.

16. (C) SYRIA-ALAWITE ASSASSINATED: E,BASSY DAMASCUS REPORTS THAT A PROMINENT ALAWITE DOCTOR WAS ASSASSINATED IN DAMASCUS JULY 31. THE DOCTOR WAS A COLONEL IN THE ARMY. ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT, HE WAS A RELATIVE OF PRESIDENT ASSAD. THIS ATTACK IS T'E FIRST SUCH INCIDENT SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE HOLY MONTH;RAMADAN, DURING WHICH SUNNI DISSIDENTS CLAIMED THEY WOULD SUSPEND ATTACKS ON ALAWITES.

17. (U) PALESTINIANS-AMBASSADOR STRAUSS: THE JORDANIAN PAPER AL-AKHBAR AUGUST 1 FEATURED A STATE;ENT BY THE PLO REPRESENTATIVE IN KUWAIT DENYING THAT 'PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES WILL SOON JOIN IN SELF-RULE TALKS.' EDITORIALIZING, THE PAPER APPLAUDS ANY STEPS THAT LEAD TO A US-PLO DIALOGUE AND SPECULATES THAT THIS DIALIGUE , NOT PARTICIPATION IN THE TALKS, WAS PROBABLY WHAT AMBASSADOR STRAUSS REFERRED TO. VANCE
BT
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E.O. 12065: GDS 8/21/85 (HELMAN, GERALD B.)

TAGS: PORG

SUBJECT: HAVANA NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT - ZIONISM/RACISM

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. IN POSTS' CONTACTS WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS REGARDING NAM SUMMIT AND CUBAN DRAFT COMMUNIQUE, REQUEST YOU STRONGLY UNDERSCORE THE EXTREMELY NEGATIVE POLITICAL IMPACT THAT WOULD BE FELT HERE AS A RESULT OF REAFFIRMATION AT NAM SUMMIT OF ZIONISM/RACISM (Z/R) EQUATION. YOU SHOULD MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- CONSTANT REITERATION OF Z/R LINKAGE THROUGHOUT CUBAN DRAFT COMMUNIQUE IS PARTICULARLY EGREGIOUS EXAMPLE OF DISTORTED AND CONFRONTATIONAL CHARACTER OF THAT DOCUMENT.

-- REAFFIRMATION OF Z/R AT HAVANA COULD DEAL SERIOUS SETBACK TO EFFORTS TO IMPROVE UNDERSTANDING OF NAM AMONG OUTSIDERS. IT WOULD PRESENT MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO US EFFORTS TO GIVE DUE WEIGHT TO LEGITIMATE NAM VIEWS AND ASPIRATIONS AND TO RESPOND SYMPATHETICALLY.

-- Z/R WAS DOWN PLAYED AT 1978 BELGRADE MEETING OF NON-ALIGNED COORDINATING BUREAU AND HAS BEEN QUIESCENT SINCE - A DEVELOPMENT US HAD VIEWED AS POSITIVE.

-- WE SEE REEMERGENCE OF Z/R LINKAGE AS ESPECIALLY INAPPROPRIATE AND UNHELPFUL AT A TIME WHEN ISRAEL IS WITHDRAWING FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY IN SINAI AND IS MOVING IN DISCUSSION WITH EGYPT TOWARD PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY. REASSERTION OF Z/R CAN ONLY COMPLICATE THIS PROCESS AND OBSTRUCT THE SEARCH FOR PEACE.

-- ACCORDINGLY, WE HOPE NAM MEMBERS WILL SEE Z/R LINKAGE AS MAJOR DISSERVICE TO THEIR COMMON GOALS AND WILL OPPOSE REFERENCES TO IT AT HAVANA SUMMIT AND IN FINAL COMMUNIQUE.

3. FOR AFRICAN ADDRESSEES: IN RAISING Z/R ISSUE WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS AS ALREADY INSTRUCTED IN STATE 216829 AND IN FURTHER CONTACTS, REQUEST YOU GIVE STRONG EMPHASIS TO ADVERSE POLITICAL POTENTIAL IN US.

4. FOR POSTS IN ARAB STATES, JAKARTA AND KUALA LUMPUR: SUGGEST YOU DRAW ON ABOVE POINTS ON THIS ISSUE AS APPROPRIATE. HOWEVER, YOU SHOULD ENSURE THERE IS NO MISUNDERSTANDING ON PART OF HOST GOVERNMENT REGARDING POLITICAL SENSITIVITY HERE TOWARD Z/R LINKAGE AND PROBLEMS THAT IT CAN CREATE FOR US. CHRISTOPHER
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH POL
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TO NONALIGNED MOVEMENT COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE ECON
INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 5891 RF
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4096
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 220561

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/22/85 (KAPLAN, PHILIP S.)

TAGS: PORG

SUBJECT: HAVANA NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT - ZIONISM/RACISM

REF: STATE 220059

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN MAKING REPRESENTATIONS REFTEL, POSTS WHICH HAVE NOT YET APPROACHED FOREIGN MINISTRY SHOULD DELETE THIRD TIC ITEM ("Z/R WAS DOWN PLAYED ..." ETC.) CHRISTOPHER
BT
#0561

DE RUQMHR #9384 235 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231209Z AUG 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3384
INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0066
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0011
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 09384

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STATE 8/23/7
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAI
DRFTD: POL:VLTOMSET
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL2 CHG ECO
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DEPT PLEASE PASS NONALIGNED MOVEMENT COLLECTIVE, IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 12065: GDS 8/23/85 (TOMSETH, VICTOR L.) OR-P
TAGS: PORG
SUBJECT: HAVANA NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT - ZIONISM/RACISM

REF: STATE 220059

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. CHARGE RAISED CUBAN DRAFT COMMUNIQUE AND ITS REAFFIRMATION OF THE ZIONISM/RACISM EQUATION WITH FM MINISTER YAZDI DURING AUGUST 22 MEETING. YAZDI REACTED BY ASKING, "WHAT IS YOUR OBJECTION TO THE EQUATION?" AND THEN LAUNCHING INTO A LECTURE ON THE AMERICAN DOUBLE STANDARD IN KEEPING ITS COMMITMENTS TO ISRAEL AND TO LEBANON, SPECIFICALLY THE LEBANESE SHIA COMMUNITY WHICH HAS BORNE THE BRUNT OF ISRAELI ATTACKS ON SOUTHERN LEBANON. IRAN, HE SAID, COULD NOT BE INDIFFERENT TO SUCH A BLATANTLY RACIST POLICY WHICH IS INTENDED TO EXTERMINATE THE LEBANESE SHIA COMMUNITY. HE SAID THAT ON THIS SCORE IRAN AGREES WITH THE CUBAN DRAFT, ALTHOUGH IT WILL TAKE AN INDEPENDENT STANCE ON OTHER ISSUES WHERE IT APPEARS TO IRAN THE PURPOSE OF GENUINE NON-ALIGNMENT ARE BEING SUBVERTED.

3. A LONG DISCUSSION ENSUED AS TO WHAT POSITION THE U.S. HAD TAKEN TOWARD ISRAELI RAIDS, WITH YAZDI REFUSING TO BACK AWAY FROM HIS INSISTENCE THAT THE U.S. HAS NOT DEALT WITH THE SITUATION IN AN EVEN-HANDED MANNER. ON THE SUBJECTS OF ISRAEL, ZIONISM AND RACISM YAZDI CLEARLY HAD VERY FIXED OPINIONS AND WAS NOT TO BE MOVED FROM THEM. WE CAN EXPECT NO HELP WHATSOEVER FROM IRAN AT THE NAM CONFERENCE ON THE ISSUE OF ZIONISM/RACISM. HOWEVER, WE ARE SOMEWHAT MORE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE POSITION IRAN WILL TAKE ON OTHER TOPICS IN THE CUBAN DRAFT. INDEED YAZDI STATED THAT HE DID NOT AGREE WITH EVERYTHING IN THE CUBAN DRAFT. LAINGEN
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INFO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4217
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 5552
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 223010

CN: 1030

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CHRG
ECON
DAO
CHRN

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/22/85 (BARTHOLOMEW, REGINALD)

TAGS: PARM, XO

SUBJECT: ; S. POSITION ON INDIAN OCEAN TALKS

REF: (A) STATE 200247, (B) STATE 167419

1. ON AUGUST 21, THE SOVIETS MADE PUBLIC THEIR CRITICISMS OF THE U.S. POSITION ON THE INDIAN OCEAN TALKS. A PRAVDA ARTICLE ACCUSED THE UNITED STATES OF DELAYING THE NEGOTIATIONS ON DEMILITARIZING THE INDIAN OCEAN DESPITE AGREEMENT TO MOVE AHEAD ON THE ISSUE AT THE VIENNA SUMMIT CONFERENCE. PRAVDA ALLEGED THAT IN A RECENT MEETING WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS WE HAD REFUSED TO RESUME THE TALKS.

2. ACTION ADDRESSEES WHOSE HOST COUNTRIES ARE SENDING REPRESENTATIVES TO THE HAVANA NAM AND OTHERS AS APPROPRIATE SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS AT THE APPROPRIATE FOREIGN MINISTRY LEVEL TO ENSURE THAT OUR VIEWS ON THE INDIAN OCEAN TALKS ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BEFORE THE OPENING OF THE HAVANA NON-ALIGNED COORDINATING BUREAU ON AUGUST 28.

Faxed at 12:00, Main Bldg. in lobby B.--

-- THE UNITED STATES REMAINS COMMITTED TO AVOIDING A US/SOVIET MILITARY COMPETITION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, AND WE SHARE THE BELIEF EXPRESSED ON MANY OCCASIONS BY INDIAN OCEAN STATES THAT THE INDIAN OCEAN SHOULD NOT BECOME AN ARENA FOR AN ARMS RACE.
-- IN EARLY 1977 THE US TOOK THE INITIATIVE IN PROPOSING TO THE SOVIET UNION BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON WAYS TO PREVENT A COMPETITIVE EXPANSION OF THE US AND SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. BETWEEN JUNE 1977 AND FEBRUARY 1978 THERE WERE FOUR ROUNDS OF THESE TALKS. UNFORTUNATELY, WHILE THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE IN PROGRESS, THE SOVIET UNION SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED THE SIZE OF ITS NAVAL FORCES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN IN CONNECTION WITH ITS MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA. IT WAS THIS WHICH LED TO THE SUSPEN-

SION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE CONTINUING UNSETTLED SITUATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA HAS COMPLICATED EFFORTS TO RESUME THE TALKS.

-- DURING THE RECENT SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT CARTER AND PRESIDENT BREZHNEV, IT WAS AGREED THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO SIDES WOULD MEET TO DISCUSS RESUMPTION OF THE TALKS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS AGREEMENT, ON JULY ~~20~~ AMBASSADOR RALPH EARLE, OUR INDIAN OCEAN DELEGATION HEAD, MET IN WASHINGTON WITH HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART, AMBASSADOR L. I. MENDELEVICH. AT THIS MEETING, BOTH SIDES REVIEWED THE STATUS OF THE TALKS, AND PROSPECTS FOR A RESUMPTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE US SIDE HAS SUGGESTED A FOLLOW-ON MEETING THIS FALL BETWEEN THE US AND SOVIET DELEGATION HEADS. THE SOVIETS HAVE EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION WITH THIS APPROACH, BUT HAVE AGREED TO CONSIDER THE SUGGESTION.

-- RECENT SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN PRAVDA ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN TALKS HAVE NOT BEEN HELPFUL IN FURTHERING DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. FOR OUR PART, WE INTEND TO CONTINUE CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIETS WITH REGARD TO THE RESUMPTION OF FORMAL TALKS. CHRISTOPHER
BT
#3010

UNNNB EZVV ESA338BRA225
OO RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #3273 2370422
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
BT

S E C R E T STATE 223273

EXDIS
CN: 10811
CHARGE
CHRN

EXDTS FOR AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE ONLY

E.O. 12065: RDS 8/24/89 (KREISBERG, PAUL H.)

TAGS: CU, NAM, PORG, UR

SUBJECT: CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

1. IN VIEW OF CUBA'S INCREASINGLY AGGRESSIVE EFFORTS TO DOMINATE THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, AND IN CONNECTION WITH FOLLOW-UP TO THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT IN HAVANA, WE ARE LOOKING AT HOW WE CAN BEST FOCUS INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION ON CUBAN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES ARE SIMILAR. WE ENVISAGE PROVIDING EMBASSIES WITH MATERIALS FOR USE AS APPROPRIATE IN HOST COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD MAKE CLEAR THE EXTENT OF THIS RELATIONSHIP, INCLUDING CUBAN DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN CARRYING OUT ITS FOREIGN POLICY ADVENTURES, THEIR SHARING OF INTERNATIONAL SERVICE BROADCASTING FACILITIES, THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN CUBA, AND THE ROLE THE CUBANS PLAY AS SOVIET SURROGATES IN INTERNATIONAL FORA AND IN MANY SPECIFIC COUNTRIES. ICA WILL BE COOPERATING IN DEVELOPING THESE MATERIALS.

2. TO ASSIST THE DEPARTMENT IN THIS PROCESS, ADDRESSEE RESPONSES ARE REQUESTED ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) HOW SUCH INFORMATION MIGHT EFFECTIVELY BE USED IN YOUR COUNTRY. WE RECOGNIZE THERE MAY BE COUNTRIES WHERE IT COULD BE UNPRODUCTIVE OR COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO UNDERTAKE SUCH AN INFORMATION EFFORT OR WHERE WE MAY ONLY WISH TO DO SO CONFIDENTIALLY TO HOST GOVERNMENTS OR PERHAPS THROUGH THIRD COUNTRIES RATHER THAN THROUGH PUBLIC CHANNELS.

(B) WHAT TYPE OF INFORMATION WOULD BE MOST PERSUASIVE TO HOST GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLE.

(C) WHAT MIGHT BE THE EFFECT OF SUCH AN EFFORT ON HOST GOVERNMENT POLICIES OR POSITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL FORA.

(D) WHAT INFORMATION RELATING TO SOVIET-CUBAN LINKS INVOLVING HOST COUNTRY COULD WE USE TO STRENGTHEN AND SUBSTANTIATE OUR APPROACHES BOTH IN THAT COUNTRY AND ELSEWHERE. SHOULD THERE BE EVIDENCE OF SOVIET-CUBAN DIFFERENCES AND CONFLICTING POLICY COURSES DIRECTLY AFFECTING HOST COUNTRY, PLEASE INDICATE THIS AS WELL.

3. YOUR REPLIES ARE NEEDED NO LATER THAN AUGUST 31. SRF AND PAO MAY BE CONSULTED IN FORMULATING RESPONSES BUT ~~DISTRI~~BUTION OF THIS MESSAGE AND KNOWLEDGE OF THIS EXERCISE AT EACH POST SHOULD BE RESTRICTED. OBVIOUSLY, POSTS SHOULD ALSO NOT REVEAL THIS EXERCISE TO HOST GOVERNMENTS. CHRISTOPHER
BT
#3273

NNNNVV ESA350BRA307
OO RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #3445 2370606
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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TO NONALIGNED MOVEMENT COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0572
RUDKEBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0007
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 2366
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6149
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 3724
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 7503
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 6836
RUESLZ/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ IMMEDIATE 2526
RUDKFEQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 5183
RUDKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 5385
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 9957
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 3631
RUESDO/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO IMMEDIATE 0471
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO IMMEDIATE 5190
RUESQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 3668
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 8292
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 5447
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 4237
RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 8431
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L

CN: 1026

POL
CHRG
ECON
RF
CHRN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 223445

E.O. 12065:

TAGS: PORG, NAM, OTRA

SUBJECT: TRANSIT OF US BY HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS ATTENDING NAM HAVANA SUMMIT

REF: STATE 194793

1. DEPARTMENT IS RECEIVING SCATTERED REPORTS OF HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS WHO WILL TRANSIT OR STOP OVER IN US WHILE GOING TO, AND/OR RETURNING FROM, NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT IN HAVANA SEPTEMBER 3-7. REQUEST ADDRESSES REVIEW REPLIES

TO REFTEL (SAME SUBJECT) AND PROVIDE UPDATES ON AN URGENT BASIS.

2. REPLIES SHOULD BE SENT BY IMMEDIATE CABLE TO REACH DEPARTMENT BY COB (WASHINGTON TIME) TUESDAY, AUGUST 28. REPLIES SHOULD INDICATE MRN OF ORIGINAL CABLE REPLYING TO REFTEL.

3. ONLY POSITIVE REPLIES NEED BE MADE. CHRISTOPHER

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 8653
INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 224860

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CN 1085

POL
CHG
CHRON
ECON
RF

E.O. 12065: GDS 8/27/85 (HELMAN, GERALD B.)

TAGS: PORG

SUBJECT: STATE OF PLAY ON THE EVE OF THE HAVANA NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT (SEPTEMBER 3-7)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. PREPARATORY MEETINGS BEGIN AUGUST 28 AT THE AMBASSADORIAL/EXPERTS LEVEL. THE MODERATES APPEAR TO HAVE IDEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS FAIRLY WELL IN HAND AND ARE LIKELY TO REBUFF CUBA'S ATTEMPT TO GIVE THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM) A PRO-SOVIET POLITICAL BIAS. THE POSITION ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES OF CONCERN TO US, HOWEVER, IS LESS CLEAR.

3. CUBA'S COMPLETELY UNBALANCED FIRST DRAFT FOR THE COMMUNIQUE HAS GENERATED WIDESPREAD OPPOSITION, EVEN REVULSION, AND A ROUND OF INTENSE DIPLOMACY AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED. THE LATIN AMERICANS, ASEANS, KEY AFRICANS AND THE YUGOSLAVS ARE PURSUING ACTIVELY ISSUES OF PRIMARY CONCERN TO THEM, AS WELL AS POSSIBLE NEW PROCEDURES TO RESTRICT CUBA'S FREEDOM OF ACTION AS PRESIDENT OF THE NAM (1979-1982). WE DO NOT YET KNOW THE OUTCOME OF THESE EFFORTS BUT A SECOND DRAFT IS DUE TO BE CIRCULATED BY THE CUBANS IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO.

4. WE ARE MOVING DIPLOMATICALLY TO: A) ENCOURAGE THE LATIN AMERICANS TO ORGANIZE THEMSELVES TO RE-WRITE THE LANGUAGEON HEMISPHERIC ISSUES; B) ENCOURAGE THE AFRICANS TO BE HELPFUL ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN AND MID-EASTERN ISSUES, INCLUDING EGYPTIAN MEMBERSHIP; AND C) ENCOURAGE ALL NON-ALIGNED AND ALLIED COUNTRIES TO BE HELPFUL ON THE ZIONISM/RACISM AND PUERTO RICAN ISSUES. IN ADDITION, THE ASEAN COUNTRIES ARE SEEKING TO GO BEYOND THE KAMPUCHEAN CREDENTIALS ISSUE AND FORCE BROAD POLITICAL DISCUSSION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, FOCUSSING ON VIETNAM'S ROLE.

5. ONE THING IS SURE. THE SUMMIT, WITH 40-50 HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT, AND WELL OVER 100 NATIONAL DELEGATIONS PRESENT, WILL BE GREAT POLITICAL THEATER. THE WORLD MEDIA WILL BE WELL REPRESENTED, INCLUDING SUCH US TELEVISION PERSONALITIES AS BARBARA WALTERS. CASTRO WILL MAKE AS MUCH POLITICAL CAPITAL AS HE CAN, IN PREPARATION FOR HIS PROBABLE APPEARANCE AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN LATE SEPTEMBER.

6. WE WILL BE WORKING SYSTEMATICALLY RIGHT THROUGH THE SUMMIT AND WILL HAVE AN EXPANDED GROUP OF US DIPLOMATS IN PLACE AT HAVANA TO KEEP US ABREAST OF DEVELOPMENTS. CHRISTOPHER
BT
#4860

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DE RUOMHR #9521 240 **
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CLASS: LIMIUED OFFICIAI
CHRGE: STATE 8/27/79
APPRV: CHARGE:VLUOMS_UE
DRFTD: POL:EASWIFT:GO
CLEAR: NONE
DISUR: POL2 CHG ICA
CHRON RF

LIMIUED OFFICIAL TSE UEHRAN 09521

E.O. 12065: N/A
UAGS: PORG, NAM, OURA
SUBJECT: TRANSIT OF OFFICIALS ATTENDING HAVANA SUMMIT CONFERENCE

REF: STATE 223445

1. FOREIGN MINISURY INFORMS EMBASSY THEY DO NOT BELIEVE ANY MEMBERS OF IRANIAN DELEGATION INTEND TO VISIT T.S. ON REUTRN UO IRAN FROM HAVANA.

2. IRANIAN DELEGATION OF ABOUT SIX MEMBERS WHICH LEFT FOR HAVANA ATGTSU 26 WAS LED BY FOREIGN MINISUER DR. EBRAHIM YAZDI AND INCLUDED MANSUR FARHANG, PROFESSOR OF POLIUICAL SCIENCE, UEHRAN TNIVERSIUY; JAVAD YARJANI, UNIVERSITY LECTURER IN ECONOMICS; AND MEHDI EHSASSI, HEAD OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DEPARTMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISURY.

3. FOREIGN MINISTRY INFORMS US THAT IRANIAN CHARGE AU TN AND ABOTU UWO SUAFF MEMBERS OF IRANIAN EMBASSY WASHINGTON ALSO PLAN ATTEND CONFERENCE.

4. FOREIGN OFFICE WILL INFORM EMBASSY TEHRAN OF ANY CHANGES IN PLAN. DEPARTMENT, HOWEVER, MIGHT ALSO WISH UO CHECK WIUH IRANIAN EMBASSY WASHINGUON. UOMSEUH
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TO RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 8750
INFO NONALIGNED MOVEMENT COLLECTIVE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 229285

E.O. 12065 N/A

TAGS: PORG, SOPN, CU

SUBJECT: HAVANA NAM SUMMIT: PRESS ACCESS/GUIDANCE

1. DEPARTMENT OFFICERS HAVE TAKEN FORTHCOMING APPROACH IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR BACKGROUNDING OF US MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTURE FOR HAVANA. WE ASSUME USINT WILL, TO EXTENT PRACTICAL AND APPROPRIATE, BE RESPONSIVE TO THEIR REQ ESTS IN HAVANA.

2. MANY US JOURNALISTS HAVE INDICATED INTENTION TO CONTACT USINT UPON ARRIVING IN HAVANA. WE HAVE NOT RPT NOT PROVIDED CUBAN TEXT OR MADE IT AVAILABLE FOR THEM TO READ, BUT WE HAVE BRIEFED ON ITS SUBSTANCE.

3. WE HAVE EMPHASIZED US APPROACH OF (A) SCRUPULOUS NON-INTERVENTION ON NAM INTERNAL/IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES AND OUR CONFIDENCE THAT MODERATES WOULD PREVAIL HERE; AND (B) OUR EFFORTS TO EXPRESS US CONCERN ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AFFECTING OUR INTERESTS.

4. FOLLOWING TALKERS, PREPARED FOR USE ON HILL, MAY BE OF SOME HELP TO YOU IN YOUR MEETINGS WITH AMERICAN PRESS:

-- THE 87 MEMBER NATION NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM) HOLDS ITS TRIENNIAL SUMMIT MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 3-7 IN HAVANA.

-- CUBA, AS HOST COUNTRY AND INCOMING NAM CHAIRMAN FOR THE NEXT THREE YEARS, HAS PREPARED AN EXTREME DRAFT SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE, WHICH WOULD REPRESENT A MOVE BY THE NAM AWAY FROM ITS PROFESSED NON-ALIGNED PRINCIPLES TOWARD A VISIBLY PRO-SOVIET AND ANTI-US LINE.

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977—225-323

-- WE HAVE MOUNTED A LARGE DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO PROMOTE MAJOR CHANGES IN THE CUBAN DRAFT. WHILE SCRUPULOUSLY AVOIDING ANY INTERFERENCE IN NAM INTERNAL AND IDEOLOGICAL DISPUTES, WE HAVE STRESSED OUR STRONG CONCERNS WITH THE CUBAN DRAFT'S HOSTILE TREATMENT OF SPECIFIC SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH TOUCH DIRECTLY ON US INTERESTS. AMONG SECTIONS OF THE DRAFT WHICH WE FIND PARTICULARLY UNACCEPTABLE ARE THOSE ON THE MIDDLE EAST, LATIN AMERICA (INCLUDING PUERTO RICO), SOUTHEAST ASIA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA.

-- NAM MODERATES SHARE OUR CONCERN AT THE CONFRONTATIONAL TONE AND ONE-SIDEDNESS OF THE CUBAN DRAFT, WHICH THEY REGARD AS TOTALLY AT VARIANCE WITH THE NAM'S NON-ALIGNED PRINCIPLES. THEY ARE PRESSING FOR MAJOR CHANGES AND PROBABLY WILL BE ABLE TO BEAT BACK CUBAN EFFORTS TO SHIFT THE NAM FROM ITS BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NON-ALIGNMENT TO A "NATURAL ALLIANCE" WITH THE USSR.

-- WE ARE LESS CONFIDENT ON THE OUTCOME CONCERNING SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND HAVE URGED THE MODERATES NOT TO TRADE-OFF HARSH TREATMENT OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES OF CONCERN TO US IN RETURN FOR CUBAN CONCESSIONS OVER NAM IDEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES. PROFESSIONS OF IDEOLOGICAL NON-ALIGNMENT WOULD NOT BE VERY MEANINGFUL IF OFFSET BY CONFRONTATIONAL AND PRO-SOVIET NAM POSITIONS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES.

-- NO NAM SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE WILL BE WHOLLY PALATABLE TO THE US. RESULTS IN HAVANA WILL REFLECT BOTH ABIDING NAM PERCEPTIONS OF WORLD AFFAIRS AND CUBA'S INFLUENCE AS HOST NATION. NONETHELESS, WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT THE NAM SUMMIT WILL PRODUCE A REASONABLY BALANCED OUTCOME.

VANCE

BT

#9295

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977—231-333

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TO NONALIGNED MOVEMENT COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0662
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4126
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 2490
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1494
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 9575
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9023
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACS IMMEDIATE 7593
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 3167
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1890
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8588
RUDKFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 5250
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 7747
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1332
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0065
RUESMG/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA IMMEDIATE 6052
RUESDO/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO IMMEDIATE 0504
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 7301
RUDKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 8973
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 2876
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 8748
RUESQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 3741
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 2177
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 8369
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 5498
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 6143
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 7880
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4557
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 3196
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 230644

E.O. 12065GDS 8/31/85 (HELMAN, GERALD B.)

TAGS: PORG

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF CUBA'S SECOND DRAFT FOR THE HAVANA

CN 1344

POL
CHG
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RF

SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. ANALYSIS OF PORTIONS OF THE REVISED DRAFT COMMUNIQUE, SUB;ITTED BY CUBA TO NON-ALIGNED FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING IN HAVANA ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT (SEPTEMBER 3-7), SHOWS THAT THE REVISIONS ARE NO IMPROVEMENT FROM OUR STANDPOINT AND PROBABLY NOT MUCH OF ONE FOR THE MODERATES. THE REVISIONS WILL NOT DEFLECT MODERATE PRESSURES FOR SUBSTANTIAL REVISIONS, AS WELL AS FOR PROCEDURAL RESTRAINTS ON CUBA AS PRESIDENT OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM).

3. KEY SECTIONS OF THE REVISED DRAFT:

A. MIDEAST: ASIDEFROMEDITORIAL CHANGES AND ADDED MATERIAL ON THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION AND THE SITUATION IN LEBANON, IT INCLUDES THE SAME SYSTEMATIC ATTACK ON US POLICY, INCLUDING CONDEMNATION BY NAME OF EGYPT, ISRAEL, THE US, THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TREATY. IT PROVIDES

GROUNDS FOR EGYPTIAN EXPULSION FROM THE MOVEMENT AS A "VIOLATOR" OF NAM AGREEMENTS.

B. SOUTHEAST ASIA: DROPS ONE PARAGRAPH OF PRAISE FOR VIETNAM (A HOLD-OVER FROM THE ERA OF US MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN INDOCHINA) AND SUBSTITUTES A MORE RELEVANT PARAGRAPH ON THE NEED FOR FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION AMONG THE STATES OF THE REGION, WHICH DOES NOT POINT A FINGER AT ANYONE. DOES NOTHING FOR THE ASEAN GROUP WHICH WANTS AGREED PRINCIPLES IMPLICITLY CONDEMNING VIETNAM. THE KAMPUCHEA CREDENTIALS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.

C. KOREA: MAKES NO CHANGE IN THE RATHER BLAND REAFFIRMATION OF THE NAM'S TRADITIONAL PRO-NORTH KOREAN LINE.

D. LATIN AMERICA: CARRIES OVER INTACT THE SYSTEMATIC ATTACK OF THE US POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE HEMISPHERE, AS WELL AS ON THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, THE RIO PACT AND RELATED DEFENSE

ORGANS . THERE IS A DEMAND FOR PUERTO RICAN INDEPENDENCE. ONE CHANGE IS AN UPDATE OF THE SECTION ON NICARAGUA, WHICH, INTERESTINGLY, ELIMINATES DIRECT ATTACKS ON THE US.

E. SOUTHERN AFRICA: WITH ONLY SLIGHT EDITORIAL CHANGES, IT AFFIRMS US, UK, FRG, FRENCH AND ISRAELI RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONTINUATION OF APARTHEID AND EFFORTS TO ARRANGE "INTERNAL SETTLEMENTS" IN RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA THAT THWART THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE. IT GIVES TOTAL SUPPORT TO THE ARMED STRUGGLE OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND SWAPO, AND ALSO LAUDS THE AID OF "SOCIALIST" STATES TO THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE. THERE IS NO MENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH RHODESIAN INITIATIVE.

4. IN SHORT , THE SECOND DRAFT APPEARS TO BE ONLY A PRELUDE TO THE CONTEST, WITH BOTH THE CUBANS AND THE MODERATES MAINTAINING THEIR BARGAINING POSITIONS. THE FIRST INDICATORS OF HOW THE CONFERENCE WILL DEVELOP MAY EMERGE FROM CASTRO-TITO MEETINGS BEGINNING AUGUST 31.

5. POSTS MAY DRAW ON THE ABOVE AS APPROPRIATE. VANC#
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TO RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 8792
INFO NONALIGNED MOVEMENT COLLECTIVE
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 7749
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 8752
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1497
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2878
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 7881
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 3197
RUDKFM9/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 5499
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 7303
RUDKSN9/AMEMBASSY OSLO 8975
RUDKPN9/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 3168
RUDKGP9/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 8589
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 9025
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 1333
RUDKFD9/AMEMBASSY LISBON 5257
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0067
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 2178
RUCMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 4127
RUCMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0663
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 9576
RUESDO/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 0505
RUESQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO 3742
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2491
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 7595
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 8370
RUESMG/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 6055
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 6144
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4558
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1891
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 230645

E.O. 12065 GDS 8/31/85 (HELMAN, GERALD E.)

TAGS: PORG

SUBJECT: HAVANA NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT: SECOND CUBAN DRAFT FOR THE SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE: MIDEAST

REF: HAVANA 7944 (NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. MIDEAST PORTION OF THE SECOND CUBAN DRAFT (REFTEL) CONTAINS ALL OF THE UNHELPFUL ELEMENTS OF THE FIRST DRAFT WITH MINOR EDITORIAL CHANGES AND ADDED MATERIAL ON THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) AND THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. IN ITS EXTREMISM AND LOOSENESS OF PHRASEOLOGY IT CAN EVEN BE READ AS A CALL FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ISRAEL. AS BASIS FOR DISCUSSION ON MIDEAST QUESTION AT HAVANA, THEREFORE, THE SECOND DRAFT IS NO IMPROVEMENT OVER THE FIRST. YOU MAY CONVEY ABOVE IN YOUR CONSERVATIONS WITH NON-ALIGNED AND ALLIED CONTACTS. WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE REPORTING ON OTHER REACTIONS TO NEW DRAFT LANGUAGE ON THE MIDEAST, PARTICULARLY THE EGYPTIANS.

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CN 1345

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RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 3197
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 5499
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RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 3168
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 8589
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 9025
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 1333
RUDKFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON 5257
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0067
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 2178
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RUESQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO 3742
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2491
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 7595
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 230645

E.O. 12065 GDS 8/31/85 (HELMAN, GERALD B.)

TAGS: PORG

SUBJECT: HAVANA NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT: SECOND CUBAN DRAFT FOR THE SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE: MIDEAST

REF: HAVANA 7944 (NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. MIDEAST PORTION OF THE SECOND CUBAN DRAFT (REFTEL) CONTAINS ALL OF THE UNHELPFUL ELEMENTS OF THE FIRST DRAFT WITH MINOR EDITORIAL CHANGES AND ADDED MATERIAL ON THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) AND THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. IN ITS EXTREMISM AND LOOSENESS OF PHRASEOLOGY IT CAN EVEN BE READ AS A CALL FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ISRAEL. AS BASIS FOR DISCUSSION ON MIDEAST QUESTION AT HAVANA, THEREFORE, THE SECOND DRAFT IS NO IMPROVEMENT OVER THE FIRST. YOU MAY CONVEY ABOVE IN YOUR CONSERVATIONS WITH NON-ALIGNED AND ALLIED CONTACTS. WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE REPORTING ON OTHER REACTIONS TO NEW DRAFT LANGUAGE ON THE MIDEAST, PARTICULARLY THE EGYPTIANS.

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-- ASSERTS THAT THE US HAS BEEN PERSISTENTLY HOSTILE TO PALESTINIAN RIGHTS AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

-- CONDEMNS THE POLICY OF PARTIAL SOLUTIONS AND AGREEMENTS THAT THE US ALLEGEDLY IS TRYING TO IMPOSE.

-- CONDEMNS THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS AND THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY SPONSORED BY THE US.

-- CALLS ON ALL NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES TO REFRAIN FROM ANY RECOGNITION OF THESE AGREEMENTS AND THE TREATY.

-- AFFIRMS THAT THE PLO IS THE ONLY LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

-- AFFIRMS THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANSTO A NATIONAL STATE.

-- STATES THAT EGYPT DEVIATED FROM NON-ALIGNED POSITIONS AND VIOLATED NON-ALIGNED AGREEMENTS WHEN IT CONCLUDED ITS AGREEMENTS WITH THE US AND ISRAEL.

-- STATES THAT AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY EGYPT AND ISRAEL ENCOURAGE ISRAELI EXPANSIONISM.

-- ASSERTS THAT THE PLO HAS THE FULL RIGHT TO CONTINUE ITS STRUGGLE AGAINST US POLICY, USING ALL POSSIBLE MEANS, INCLUDING FORCE.

-- CONDEMNS ISRAEL'S ALLEGED WARMONGERING TIES WITH THE US, SOUTH AFRICA AND OTHERS (UNSPECIFIED).

-- CONDEMNS ACTIONS OF THE "IMPERIALIST" POWERS (LISTED ELSEWHERE AS THE US, UK, FRG, FRANCE) TO AUGMENT THEIR PRESENCE IN THE MIDEAST AND TO THREATEN ARAB AND OIL-PRODUCING STATES IN THE AREA. VANCE
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RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4572
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 3804
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 231147

E.O. 12065 GDS 9/1/85 (GERALD B. HELMAN)

TAGS: PORG

SUBJECT:NAM SUMMIT

REF: (A) HAVANA 8011; (B) BELGRADE 6536; (C) HAVANA 8037; (D) HAVANA 8033 (E) HAVANA 8032

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. APPRECIATE YOUR EXCELLENT, DETAILED REPORTING AND ANALYSIS.

3. GRAHAM TOOK EXACTLY THE RIGHT POSITION WITH HAGGAG (REF A) AND THIS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED.

4. WE ARE INTERESTED IN CONFIRMATION OF BELGRADE (REF B) REPORT, IN SEPTEMBER 1 WASHINGTON POST STORY (BY KAREN DE YOUNG IN HAVANA), THAT "YUGOSLAVIA BEGAN SELECTIVELY CIRCULATING AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE MAIN SUMMIT DOCUMENT WRITTEN BY CUBA". ANY INFO ON SUCH AN ALTERNATIVE DRAFT WOULD BE USEFUL.

5. YUGOSLAV, INDIAN AND NIGERIAN DCMS HERE HAVE TOLD HELMAN AND KAPLAN THAT MODERATES WENT TO HAVANA WITH A NUMBER OF COMPLETE DRAFTS. KEY DECISION FOR MODERATES WILL BE WHEN AND HOW THEY ARE TO BE PLAYED TACTICALLY IN CONFERENCE. HOW, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE MODERATES LIKELY TO REACT TO ADAMANT CUBAN REBUFF TO THEIR AMENDMENTS IN SECOND DRAFT, INCLUDING ON PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES (REF C)? HOW WILL MODERATE ANGER AT TOUGH CUBAN USE OF CHAIR (REF D) TRANSLATE INTO MODERATE STRATEGY AND TACTICS?

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6. WE WOULD BE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN EXTENT TO WHICH ALTERNATIVE DRAFTS DEAL WITH OUR SUBSTANTIVE INTERESTS AS WELL AS MODERATE IDEOLOGICAL CONCERNS. IN CONTACTS WITH FRIENDLY DELEGATIONS, YOU SHOULD CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE OUR CONCERN OVER SUCH TRADE-OFFS WHICH COULD UNDERCUT OUR DIRECT INTERESTS.

7. CONFERENCE REACTION TO REPORTS OF SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA ALSO WILL BE OF INTEREST. ARE THESE REPORTS BEING READ INACCURATELY AS US EFFORT TO INFLUENCE SUMMIT PROCEEDINGS OR AS FURTHER CONFIRMATION OF INTIMATE CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP WHICH UNDERSCORES HAVANA'S EFFORT TO PROMOTE NAM/SOVIET "NATURAL ALLIANCE"?

8. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN REACTION OF OIL-IMPORTING COUNTRIES TO REVISED ECONOMIC CHAPTER'S ADVOCACY OF OPEC LINE (REF E).

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 232651

E.O. 12065 N/A

TAGS: PORG

SUBJECT: NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT - DEPARTMENT COMMENT ON SEPTEMBER 3 CASTRO SPEECH

1. FOLLOWING IS UNOFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF EXCHANGE BETWEEN REUTERS CORRESPONDENT AND DEPARTMENT PRESS SPOKESMAN CARTER AT DEPARTMENT'S NOON PRESS BRIEFING SEPTEMBER 4:

2. BEGIN TEXT. Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON MR. CASTRO'S SPEECH?
A. I THINK OUR COMMENT WAS OFFERED BY THE CHIEF OF THE INTERESTS SECTION WHEN HE WALKED OUT. END TEXT. VANCE
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 234200/01

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/6/85 (MONTVILLE, JOSEPH V.)

TAGS: EG, I-, PINR

SUBJECT: INTSUM 899 - SEPTEMBER 6, 1979

LONDON FOR GLASPIE
PARIS FOR NICHOLAS MURPHY
DOD/ISA FOR RANSOM
OTHER ADDRESSEES FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION

(PARAGRAPHS 1-8 SECRET)

1. NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT: EGYPT'S POSITION WORSENS: DESPITE EGYPT'S EFFORTS TO ELICIT SUPPORT AMONG NAM MEMBERS AT THE SUMMIT IN HAVANA, IT WILL BE UNABLE TO ESCAPE CONDEMNATION FOR SIGNING THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND THE PEACE TREATY WITH ISRAEL. THIS IS BECAUSE:

(A) THE MODERATES ARE PREOCCUPIED WITH THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE WITH CUBA OVER THE ROLE AND DIRECTION OF THE MOVEMENT, AND THUS ARE NOT FOCUSSING ON THE CAMPAIGN FOR EGYPT;

(B) EGYPT HAS CHOSEN THE TACTIC OF LOBBYING TO PREVENT ITS SUSPENSION FROM THE NAM RATHER THAN TO ACHIEVE THE EXCISION OF LANGUAGE CONDEMNING EGYPT;

(C) CASTRO HAS STRONGLY ATTACKED THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TREATY;

(D) THE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICANS, WHILE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO EGYPT'S SUSPENSION, ARE NOT THEMSELVES SYMPATHETIC TO THE EGYPT-ISRAEL TREATY; AND

(E) ADAT IS ABSENT FROM THE SUMMIT, WHILE THE ARAB STEAD FAST GROUP IS REPRESENTED BY HEADS OF STATE

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1977-225 333

OR GOVERNMENT.

2. TO SHORE UP ITS POSITION AMONG THE NAM MODERATES--PARTICULARLY YUGOSLAVIA AND INDIA WHICH ARE COOL TO THE PEACE TREATY--EGYPT HAS JOINED FORCES WITH THEM TO OPPOSE CUBA'S PROPOSAL FOR A CLOSER ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE NAM AND THE SOCIALIST BLOC. EGYPT CIRCULATED A REVISION OF CUBA'S HARSH ORIGINAL DRAFT FINAL COMMUNIQUE (WHICH DENOUNCED THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TREATY FOR "FLAGRANTLY" VIOLATING UN RESOLUTIONS AND NAM DECLARATIONS, AND CHARGED EGYPT WITH DEVIATING FROM NAM POLICY AND IGNORING T;E RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS). EGYPT'S DOCUMENT IN FACT TOOK EXCEPTION TO CUBA'S ENTIRE DRAFT, STATING THAT IT WAS INTENDED TO MOVE THE NAM AWAY FROM ITS BASIC POSITION AS AN INDEPENDENT NON-BLOC FORCE AND TOWARD A "NATURAL ALLIANCE" WITH THE USSR.

3. EGYPT ALSO JOINED WITH YUGOSLAVIA AND OTHER MODERATES IN SEEKING TO CURB CUBA'S POWERS AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NON-ALIGNED COORDINATING BUREAU (NACB) FOR THE NEXT THREE YEARS BY RESTRUCTURING THE BUREAU, REDEFINING ITS FUNCTIONS, AND BROADENING ITS REPRESENTATION. EGYPT ALSO CONSIDERED TRYING TO REGAIN ITS NACB SEAT, WHICH IT HAD LOST AT THE 1976 COLOMBO SUMMIT.

4. THE EGYPTIANS HAVE ALSO APPROACHED THE CUBANS DIRECTLY. BUT CUBA'S RESPONSE TO EGYPT'S APPROACHES WAS IMMEDIATE AND NEGATIVE. THE MIDDLE EAST SECTION OF CUBA'S REVISED DRAFT FINAL DECLARATION WAS STRONGER AND TOUGHER ON EGYPT THAN THE ORIGINAL. BESIDES CALLING THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS AND THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TREATY VIOLATIONS OF UN RESOLUTIONS, NAM DECISIONS AND DECLARATIONS, IT ALSO CONDEMNS THEM AS A "CLEAR CONSPIRACY" AGAINST THE PALESTINIANS AND THE ARABS. IT CALLS ON ALL NAM MEMBERS

NOT TO RECOGNIZE THEM SINCE THEY SERVE AS AN INCENTIVE FOR ISRAEL TO CONTINUE ITS ,EXPANSIONIST, RACIST, DISCRIMINATORY AND AGGRESSIVE POLICY.

5. MEANWHILE, THE STEADFAST GROUP LED BY THE IRAQIS, HAS CONTINUED TO WORK FOR EGYPT'S SUSPENSION FROM THE NAM. ON AUGUST 30 THE ARAB GROUP IN HAVANA APPROVED AN IRAQI DRAFT RESOLUTION CALLING FOR SUSPENSION OF EGYPT'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE NAM AND DENUNCIATION OF THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENT.

6. THE STEADFAST COUNTRIES ARE FULLY REPRESENTED AT HAVANA BY IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN, SYRIAN PRESIDENT

ASSAD, QADHAFI, ARAFAT, ALGERIA'S PRESIDENT BENJEDID, AND SOUTH YEMENI COUNCIL PRESIDENT ISMAIL. THE PRESENCE OF THESE HIGH-LEVEL REPRESENTATIVES FROM THEIR CAMP (AND THE ABSENCE OF SADAT) PUTS GREAT PRESSURE ON THE NON-ARAB STATES TO SANCTION LANGUAGE CONDEMNING EGYPT'S POLICIES TOWARD ISRAEL.

7. IN RESPONSE TO US REPRESENTATIONS ON EGYPT'S BEHALF, LEADERS OF THE AFRICAN GROUP AT THE SUMMIT HAVE SAID THAT, WHILE THEY WOULD OPPOSE EGYPT'S SUSPENSION, TOUGH LANGUAGE ON THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TREATY WAS ANOTHER MATTER. MANY BELIEVE THAT THE TREATY HAS HARMED THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE.

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8. THE BEST THE AFRICANS COULD OFFER WAS TO TRY TO BRING CUBA'S LANGUAGE INTO LINE WITH THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE OAU SUMMIT: AN INDIRECT BUT UNMISTAKEABLE CRITICISM OF EGYPT BY LABELING THE CAMP DAVID AND EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENTS AS "FLAGRANT" VIOLATIONS OF THE OAU AND UN CHARTERS. BUT, GIVEN CUBA'S POSITION, THE ARAB ATTITUDE, AND SADAT'S PRESENCE IN HAIFA WHILE THE NAM LANGUAGE IS BEING NEGOTIATED, THERE IS LITTLE HOPE THE AFRICANS WILL BE ABLE TO MODIFY THE CONDEMNATION OF EGYPT.

9. (U) BEGIN-SADAT-HAIFA TALKS: BEGIN AND SADAT HELD A JOINT NEWS CONFERENCE ON SEPTEMBER 5 FOLLOWING THEIR SECOND MEETING IN HAIFA IN WHICH THEY ANNOUNCED AGREEMENT ON SEVERAL ISSUES. AMONG THE MAJOR ISSUES ON WHICH THERE WAS PARTIAL AGREEMENT:

(A) A TEMPORARY DECISION WAS REACHED ON THE SUPERVISION OF THE LINES SEPARATING THEIR TWO ARMIES IN THE SINAI DESERT. BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE DECIDED TO TRY TO PERSUADE THE U.S. TO SUPPORT THE IDEA OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN SINAI. THE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTERS HAVE DECIDED TO COME TO WASHINGTON SEPTEMBER 17 TO DISCUSS

THE SITUATION WITH SECRETARY VANCE.

(B) EGYPT ;AS AGREED TO SUPPLY ISRAEL WITH OIL BUT EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS IN HAIFA SAID THAT ISRAEL WILL HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN AN EGYPTIAN CONCESSION ON QUANTITIES AND A CONCESSION ON THE PRICE.

(C) SADAT SAID HE HAD INVITED BEGIN TO EGYPT BUT GAVE NO DATE FOR THE PROPOSED VISIT. BOTH LEADERS PLAN TO HOLD ANOTHER SUMMIT WITH PRESIDENT CARTER ON THE LINES OF CAMP DAVID IN NOVEMBER.

(D) ISRAEL HAS AGREED TO HAND BACK THE SAINT CATHERINE

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AREA IN THE SINAI AHEAD OF SCHEDULE.

THE MAJOR AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT WERE:

(A) THE QUESTION OF THE DISPOSITION OF JERUSALEM; AND

(B) THE DEGREE OF AUTONOMY FOR PALESTINIANS.

10. (C) ISRAEL-SETTLEMENTS: EMBASSY TEL AVIV REPORTS THAT DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER YAGAEL YADIN STORMED OUT OF THE SEPTEMBER 2 CABINET MEETING IN PROTEST OVER AGRICULTURE MINISTER SHARON'S "DECEITFULNESS, IN PUSHING THROUGH FOUR NEW SETTLEMENTS UNDER THE COVER OF "THICKENING" EXISTING SETTLEMENTS IN HIS ABSENCE. AFTER SOME PRODDING FROM YADIN ABOUT HOW FAR AWAY FROM AN EXISTING SETTLEMENT ONE COULD START A NEW SETTLEMENT AND STILL CALL IT THICKENING, SHARON ADMITTED THAT, INDEED, THE SETTLEMENTS WERE NEW AND THAT THE THICKENING REFERRED TO "BLOCS" OF SETTLEMENTS. MEANWHILE, BEGIN HAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE ORIGINAL COALITION AGREEMENT GIVING YADIN'S DMC PARTY THE RIGHT TO APPEAL SETTLEMENTS DECISIONS TO THE KNESSET DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE NO LONGER APPLIES TO THE MUCH REDUCED DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT FACTION. THIS CUTS OFF THE ONLY AVENUE OF APPEAL WHERE YADIN MIGHT HAVE HAD A CHANCE FOR SUCCESS. THE EMBASSY COMMENTS THAT SHARON CONTINUES TO GET HIS WAY ON SETTLEMENTS SINCE NO OTHER MINISTER HAS THE INCLINATION OR THE FORTITUDE TO BLOCK THE SHARON BULLDOZER, EXCEPT WHERE THE SEIZURE OF UNQUESTIONABLY PRIVATE LAND IS CONCERNED.

11. (LOU) EGYPT-ISRAEL-OIL: PRESS REPORTS WHICH, ACCORDING TO EMBASSY TEL AVIV, RING TRUE, INDICATE THAT MINISTER OF ENERGY MODAI PROPOSED AT THE SEPTEMBER 2 CABINET MEETING THAT ISRAEL DELAY THE TURNOVER OF THE ALMA OIL FIELDS TO EGYPT GIVEN HIS INABILITY TO AGREE WITH HIS EGYPTIAN COUNTERPART ON ISSUES INVOLVING PRICE AND QUANTITY OF OIL PRODUCED. THE PROPOSAL DID NOT GAIN CABINET BACKING BUT THREE MINISTERS REPORTEDLY URGED BEGIN NOT ONLY TO SETTLE THE OIL QUESTION WITH SADAT BUT ALSO TO OBTAIN A WRITTEN GUARANTEE OF THE SETTLEMENT.

12. (LOU) ISRAEL-WEST BANK MAYORS: ACCORDING TO THE JERUSALEM POST, A NUMBER OF "ARAB PUBLIC FIGURES," INCLUDING SEVERAL WEST BANK MAYORS WERE PREVENTED FROM HOLDING A POLITICAL MEETING IN EAST JERUSALEM SEPTEMBER 4 TO "ATTACK" PRESIDENT SADAT. THE PAPER REPORTED THAT THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS ORDERING THE INDIVIDUALS NOT TO ENTER ISRAEL INCLUDING THE EAST

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JERUSALEM SUBURB WHERE THE MEETING WAS SCHEDULED TO OCCUR. NABLUS' MAYOR SHAKA' CONFIRMED THE CONTENTS OF THE POST ARTICLE TO THE CONSULATE GENERAL ON SEPTEMBER 5 AND ADDED THAT HE WAS TURNED BACK AT A MILITARY CHECK-POINT 10 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF NABLUS.

13. (U) LIKUD-DAYAN: ACCORDING TO IDF RADIO SEVERAL LIKUD FACTION MEMBERS ARE GOING TO DEMAND THAT FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN RESIGN FOLLOWING HIS MEETINGS WITH PLO SUPPORTERS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. DAYAN HAS SAID THAT HE WILL CONTINUE MEETING WITH PEOPLE IN THE TERRITORIES. AN AIDE TO DAYAN CLAIMED THAT THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THESE TALKS IS TO CHECK WHETHER THERE IS ANYONE IN THE TERRITORIES

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ONE COULD SPEAK WITH ABOUT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AUTONOMY."

14. (LOU) SARKIS-"MINI-SUMMIT": ACCORDING TO THE SEPTEMBER 4 EDITION OF THE BEIRUT DAILY, AS SAFIR, PRESIDENT SARKIS IS CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF HOLDING A "MINI-SUMMIT" TO INCLUDE HIMSELF, ASSAD AND ARAFAT.

15. (U) IRAN-INVITATION TO SADDAM HUSAYN: ACCORDING TO A SEPTEMBER 5 PRESS REPORT FROM DOHA, IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IBRAHIM YAZDI SAID THAT HE HAS INVITED IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAYN TO VISIT TEHRAN. YAZDI, CURRENTLY ATTENDING THE NAM SUMMIT, TOLD THE KUWAITI PRESS THAT ELEMENTS OF US AND ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE ARE TRYING TO HARM IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS, PARTICULARLY IRAQ. YAZDI ALSO SAID HE WAS ENDEAVORING TO ACHIEVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING WITH SAUDI ARABIA.

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* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977—225-523

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 236246

INFORM CONSULS

E.O. 12065:  N/A

TAGS: MPOL, CU, UR

SUBJECT:  SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN CUBA

SUMMARY.  THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS GUIDANCE FOR BRIEFING
HOST GOVERNMENTS ON SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN CUBA.
SEE ACTION REQUESTED PARAGRAPH 7.
END SUMMARY.

1.  YOU MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING TO BRIEF HOST
GOVERNMENTS REQUESTING INFORMATION ON THE ISSUE
OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN CUBA.  BULK OF INFORMATION IS
DRAWN FROM SECRETARY'S SEPTEMBER 5 PRESS STATEMENT.
WE WILL BE PROVIDING ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE AS IT
BECOMES AVAILABLE.

2.  BACKGROUND:  WE HAVE RECENTLY CONFIRMED THE
PRESENCE IN CUBA OF A SOVIET GROUND FORCES UNIT.  EARLIER
FRAGMENTARY EVIDENCE OF THE UNIT'S PRESENCE HAD BEEN
INCONCLUSIVE.  OUR BEST ESTIMATE IS THAT THE UNIT
HAS BEEN IN CUBA SINCE AT LEAST THE MID-1970'S,
ALTHOUGH THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THE UNIT MAY HAVE BEEN
THERE BEFORE THAT.

3.  COMPOSITION:  THE UNIT APPEARS TO CONSIST OF
2-3,000 PERSONNEL.  IT INCLUDES MOTORIZED RIFLE
BATTALIONS, TANK AND ARTILLERY BATALLIONS, AND COMBAT
AND SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS.  THESE FIGURES ARE
SEPARATE FROM THE SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORY AND TECH-
NICAL MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CUBA, WHICH WE NOW
ESTIMATE NUMBER BETWEEN 1,500 AND 2,000.

4.  MISSION:  THE MISSION OF THE UNIT IS UNCLEAR.
IT HAS NO AIR OR SEALIFT CAPABILITY FOR ASSAULT
PURPOSES.  THE PRESENCE OF THE UNIT IS NOT COVERED
BY OUR BILATERAL UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE SOVIETS ON
CUBA, WHICH DEALT PRIMARILY WITH OFFENSIVE WEAPONS
SYSTEMS.

5.  US POSITION:  THE PRESENCE OF THE UNIT IS NONE-
THELESS A MATTER OF SERIOUS CONCERN TO THE US.

6.  APPROACHES TO SOVIETS:  WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO
THE SOVIETS THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR CONCERNS IN THIS
MATTER.  SECRETARY VANCE STATED SEPTEMBER 5 THAT
"I WILL NOT BE SATISFIED WITH THE STATUS QUO."
DISCUSSIONS ARE PROCEEDING AT A HIGH LEVEL.

7.  ACTION REQUESTED:  NATO, OAS, AND MAJOR NAM POSTS
SHOULD REPORT BY WASHINGTON COB MONDAY SEPTEMBER 10
SIGNIFICANT LOCAL REACTIONS TO REPORTS OF SOVIET
GROUND FORCES IN CUBA.  MOST USEFUL FORMAT COULD BE
BRIEF SYNTHESIS, RATHER THAN BLOW-BY-BLOW ACCOUNT.  VANCE
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E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: MPOL, CU, UR, IR
SUBJECT: SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN CUBA

REF: STATE 236246

1. EMBASSY HAS HAD NO REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN CUBA. CONSIDERING FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI'S RECENT WARM PRAISE FOR PRESIDENT CASTRO, WE THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT WE WILL RECEIVE ANY REQUEST FOR BRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT.

2. WHILE GIVING PROMINENT COVERAGE TO NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT, IRANIAN MEDIA HAS GENERALLY IGNORED SOVIET GROUND FORCES CONTROVERSY. EXCEPTION WAS PERSIAN-LANGUAGE "ETALA'AT" OF SEPTEMBER 6 WHICH CARRIED HEADLINE: "U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS WORSEN OVER CUBA." PAPER CARRIED AFP STORY OF SEPTEMBER 5 NSC MEETING ON SUBJECT. PAPER ALSO CARRIED UPI STORY OF SECRETARY VANCE'S STATEMENT CRITICIZING CUBA'S CLAIM TO NON-ALIGNMENT. PAPER CARRIED NO COMMENT ON SUBJECT.
TOMSETH
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3764
INFO RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 0005
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10049

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STAT 9/13/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN
DRFTD: POL:EASWIFT:GO
CLEAR: NONE
LISTR: POL2 CHG ICA
ECON CONS CHRON
RF

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/13/85 (SWIFT, E. A.) OR-P
TAGS: PORG, PINT, IR
SUBJECT: FONMIN YAZDI AT NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION DEPARTMENT OR HAVANA CAN PROVIDE ON ACTIVITIES AND STATEMENTS OF IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI AT NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT.MEETING WAS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE FOR IRAN AS IT WAS THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S FIRST REAL FORAY INTO THE NON-ALIGNED WORLD.

2. AS CHARGE WILL MEET FON MINISTER YAZDI TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18 WOULD APPRECIATE IMMEDIATE REPLY BY COB WASHINGTON TIME AUGUST 17. LAINGEN
BT
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NNNN

C O N D I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 10049

US Government Printing Office: 1979—204-830

NNNNVV ESA364BRA153
OO RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #4178/01 2610821
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 172203Z SEP 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESON/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6054
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 2506
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 9668
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 7149
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA IMMEDIATE 0279
RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE 2414
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 7743
RUFHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 1504
RUTAAK/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 2004
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 3895
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 1615
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 8496
RUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 9733
RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 6191
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 4838
RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU IMMEDIATE 5787
RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 5918
RUMJRV/AMEMBASSY RANGOON IMMEDIATE 2629
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1127
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 2687
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 7724
RUESLZ/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ IMMEDIATE 2784
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 9778
RUESQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 3896
RUESLM/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 1186
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE 9050
RUTAAM/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 9719
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 0886
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 8503
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 3575
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1075
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 4800
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 2712
RUTADR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 3997
RUTAIJ/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 3962
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 9404
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8340
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9465
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1977
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1408
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8703
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 3271
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9271
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 3069
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 8221
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 3344
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4327
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0818
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 3909
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0228
RUDKFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 5437
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 5617
RUDKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 5510
RUDKEBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0126
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 6027
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 7554
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 9653
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 5326
RUTADE/AMCONSUL DOUALA IMMEDIATE 2932
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 7835
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6427
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2688
RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4018
RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUETIAA/NSA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUTALB/AMCONSUL LUBUMBASHI 3176
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 2116
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 12 STATE 244178/01

E.O. 12065 GDS 9/14/85 (NEWSOM, DAVID)

TA PORG

SUBJECT: NAM SUMMIT

, (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. WE HAVE A DEFINITE INTEREST IN THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE VARIOUS NAM SUMMIT PARTICIPANTS AND THE DEGREE TO WHICH INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTS MAY BE PREPARED TO FILE RESERVATIONS ON ACTIONS OF THE CONFERENCE. AT THE S;ME TIME, WE BELIEVE THAT A SUBSTANTIAL FURTHER EFFORT ON OUR PART TO APPROACH GOVERNMENTS SPECIFICALLY ON THE NAM COULD RISK REACTIONS ADVERSE TO OUR IN;ERESTS. THIS TELEGRAM, THEREFORE, SETS OUT OUR PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS ON THE CONFERENCE RESULTS AND WHAT WE NOW WOULD LIKE TO KNOW ABOUT THE REACTIONS AND FURTHER ACTIONS OF PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS. WE ARE NOT REPEAT NOT SUGGESTING THAT SPECIFIC DEMARCHES BE MADE ON THIS MATTER EXCEPT WHERE IT WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED WITHOUT RISK OF NEGATIVEREACTIONS.

OUR PREFERENCE IN MOST CASES WOULD BE FOR OUR AMBASSADORS TO FIND INFORMAL OCCASIONS OR OFFICIAL OCCASIONS WHEN APPROACHING GOVERNMENTS ON OTHER MATTERS TO DRAW OUT HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ON THIS MATTER. WHAT FOLLOWS IS OUR PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE NAM SUMMIT AND GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR DISCUSSIONS ACTION ADDRESSEES WILL BE HAVING WITH HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

3. BASED ON OUR PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE NAM SUMMIT DECLARATION, IT APPEARS THAT THE DECLARATION OF THE HAVANA NAM SUMMIT WAS SATISFACTORY TO THOSE NAM MEMBERS WHO

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00 RUGMHR
DE RUEHC #4178/02 2610824
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O R 172203Z SEP 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESON/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6055
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 2507
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 9669
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 7150
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA IMMEDIATE 0280
RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE 2415
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 7744
RUFHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 1505
RUTAAK/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 2005
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 3896
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 1616
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 8497
RUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 9734
RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 6192
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 4839
RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU IMMEDIATE 5788
RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 5919
RUMJRV/AMEMBASSY RANGOON IMMEDIATE 2630
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1128
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 2688
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 7725
RUESLZ/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ IMMEDIATE 2785
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 9779
RUESQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 3897
RUESLM/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 1187
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE 9051
RUTAAM/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 9720
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 0887
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 8504
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 3576
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1076
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 4801
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 2713
RUTADR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 3998
RUTAIJ/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 3963
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 9405
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8341
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9466
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1978
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1409
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8704
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 3272
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9272
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 3070
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 8222
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 3345
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4328
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0819
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 3910
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0229
RUDKFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 5438
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 5618
RUDKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 5511
RUDKEBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0127
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 6028
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 7555
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 9654
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 5327
RUTADE/AMCONSUL DOUALA IMMEDIATE 2933
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 7836
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6428
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2689
RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4019
RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUETIAA/NSA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUTALB/AMCONSUL LUBUMBASHI 3177
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 2117

ATTACH SPECIAL IMPORTANCE TO THE SECTION ON THE PRINCIPLES AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE MOVEMENT. THE RESULTS WERE MIXED BY NAM STANDARDS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN THE DECLARATION.

4. DETAILS OF THE DECLARATION ASIDE, CASTRO CLEARLY PRODUCED A MAJOR ANTI-AMERICAN "POLITICAL HAPPENING" IN HAVANA, WHICH RECEIVED WIDE PUBLICITY IN THE WORLD PRESS. IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THIS CUBAN PERFORMANCE WILL, OVER THE LONGER-TERM, BOLSTER CASTRO'S BID FOR THIRD WORLD LEADERSHIP (PARTLY VIA THE NAM) OR STRENGTHEN PERCEPTIONS OF CUBA AS BEING FUNDAMENTALLY DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIET UNION. WE CANNOT YET EVALUATE THE FULL EFFECT OF CASTRO'S PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN BUT WANT NAM MODERATES TO UNDERSTAND OUR CONCERN OVER ;HIS SERIOUS DIMENSION OF THE CONFERENCE.

5. NAM PRINCIPLES AND ORIENTATION - THE YUGOSLAVS, INDIANS AND OTHERS APPEAR TO HAVE SUCCEEDED IN REPLACING THE ORIGINAL CUBAN LANGUAGE, WHICH IMPLIED AN IDEOLOGICAL SHIFT TOWARD MOSCOW, WITH A PAPER PREPARED BY MODERATES STRESSING NAM'S TRADITIONAL POSTURE "BETWEEN THE BLOCS". THESE GAINS, WHICH THE YUGOSLVAS ARE PORTRAYING AS A MAJOR VICTORY FOR TITO, ARE COUNTERACTED BY A GREAT DEAL OF STANDARD NAM DIATRIBE AGAINST IMPERIALISM, COLONIALISM AND ZIONISM/RACISM. MOREOVER, THE DECLARATION IS LACED THROUGHOUT WITH A SHRILL ANTI-AMERICAN TONE. IT IS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, THAT THE NA; DECLARATION ALSO CONTAINS PEJORATIVE REFERENCES TO "HEGEMONY" (I.E. THE USSR).

6. AS TO SPECIFIC ISSUES:

A. ON LATIN AMERICA. REFERENCES TO DISSOLUTION
BT
#4178

NNNNVV ESA366BRA163
OO RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #4178/03 2610828
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 172203Z SEP 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESON/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6056
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 2508
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 9670
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 7151
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA IMMEDIATE 0281
RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE 2416
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 7745
RUFHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 1506
RUTAAK/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 2006
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 3897
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 1617
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 8498
RUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 9735
RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 6193
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 4840
RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU IMMEDIATE 5789
RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 5920
RUMJRV/AMEMBASSY RANGOON IMMEDIATE 2631
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1129
RUEH[illegible]/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 2689
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 7726
RUESLZ/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ IMMEDIATE 2786
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 9780
RUESQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 3898
RUESLM/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 1188
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE 9052
RUTAAM/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 9721
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 0888
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 8505
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 3577
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1077
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 4802
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 2714
RUTADR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 3999
RUTAIJ/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 3964
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 9406
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8342
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9467
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1979
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1410
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8705
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 3273
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9273
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 3071
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 8223
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 3346
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4329
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0820
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RUDKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 5512
RUDKEBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0128
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 6029
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 7556
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 9655
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 5328
RUTADE/AMCONSUL DOUALA IMMEDIATE 2934
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 7837
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6429
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2690
RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4020
RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUETIAA/NSA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUTALB/AMCONSUL LUBUMBASHI 3178
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 2118
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 12 STATE 244178/03

OF THE RIO TREATY AND THE INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD HAVE BEEN DELETED. THE PANAMANIAN LANGUAGE IS MUCH IMPROVED (AT PANAMANIAN INITIATIVE) AND THE DECLARATION NOTES WITH SATISFACTION A STATEMENT MADE BY THE ANDEAN PACT COUNTRIES EXPRESSING FULL SUPPORT FOR THE ORIGINAL NAM PRINCIPLES. PERU APPEARS TO HAVE PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN THESE IMPROVEMENTS. ON PUERTO RICO, THE LANGUAGE CALLS FOR A TRANSFER OF POWER, WHILE EXPRESSING SATISFACTION WITH THE RELEASE OF THE FOUR PUERTO RICAN NATIONALISTS. HOWEVER, THE HIGHLY PEREMPTORY ANTI-US ORIGINAL CUBAN LANGUAGE WAS TONED DOWN AT SEVERAL POINTS. THE LANGUAGE ON NICARAGUA NO LONGER SPECIFICALLY INDICTS THE US AS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SOMOZA REGIME, AS DID THE ORIGINAL CUBAN DRAFT. PARAGRAPHS ACCUSING THE US OF MALTREATMENT OF LATIN AMERICAN IMMIGRANTS AND OF USING ISRAEL AS AN ARMS CONDUIT TO REPRESSIVE REGIMES (AS EVIDENCE OF US HYPOCRISY ON HUMAN RIGHTS) WERE DELETED. RETENTION OF ONE PARAGRAPH CRITICIZING LATIN AMERICAN TIES WITH ISRAEL DREW OBJECTIONS FROM PERU, PANAMA, BOLIVIA AND ARGENTINA, WHOSE RESERVATIONS WERE RECORDED IN TEXT. TEXT STILL SUPPORTS INDEPENDENCE OF FRENCH CARIBBEAN TERRITORIES.
B. ON SOUTHEAST ASIA, LANGUAGE STRESSING FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL CONFIDENCE OF THE NATIONS IN THAT AREA HAS BEEN REPLACED WITH A CALL FOR STATES OF THE AREA TO SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES ON THE BASIS OF THE NAM PRINCIPLES (PRESUMABLY INCLUDING NON-INTERVENTION AND RESPECT FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY). THE DECLARATION ALSO INCLUDES PARAGRAPHS WHICH MAY BE CONSIDERED AS INDIRECTLY CRITICAL OF VIETNAM, WHICH NOTES THE GENEVA REFUGEE CONFERENCE AND WHICH GOES ON TO CALL ON THE PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT THEIR UNDERTAKINGS. THE TEXT EXPRESSES SATISFACTION IN THE DECREASED NUMBER OF
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NNNNVV ESA367
PP RUESCK
DE RUESCK #0854A 2610854
ZNR UUUUU
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UNCLAS CHANNEL CHECK RYRYRY ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ 1234567890
BT
#0854

NNNNVV ESA368BRA167
OO RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #4178/04 2610831
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 172203Z SEP 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESON/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6057
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 2509
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 9671
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 7152
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA IMMEDIATE 0282
RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE 2417
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 7746
RUFHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 1507
RUTAAK/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 2007
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 3898
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 1618
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 8499
RUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 9736
RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 6194
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 4841
RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU IMMEDIATE 5790
RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 5921
RUMJRV/AMEMBASSY RANGOON IMMEDIATE 2632
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1130
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 2690
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 7727
RUESLZ/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ IMMEDIATE 2787
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 9781
RUESQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 3899
RUESLM/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 1189
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE 9053
RUTAAM/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 9722
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 0889
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 8506
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 3578
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1078
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 4803
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 2715
RUTADR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 4000
RUTAIJ/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 3965
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 9407
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8343
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9468
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1980
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1411
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8706
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 3274
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9274
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 3072
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 8224
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 3347
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4330
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0821
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 3912
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RUDKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 5513
RUDKEBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0129
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 6030
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 7557
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 9656
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 5329
RUTADE/AMCONSUL DOUALA IMMEDIATE 2935
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 7838
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6430
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2691
RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4021
RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUETIAA/NSA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUTALR/AMCONSUL LUBUMBASHI 3179

ILLEGAL DEPARTURES AND HOPES EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO STOP THEM (AN IMPLIED CRITICISM OF VIETNAM).

C. ON THE INDIAN OCEAN, THERE WERE MAJOR CHANGES FROM THE CUBAN DRAFTS TOWARD A MORE EVEN-HANDED APPROACH. ALL OF THE ORIGINAL ONE-SIDED REFERENCES TO THE US HAVE

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BEEN DELETED AND THE LANGUAGE ON IMPERIALIST OR US MILITARY PRESENCE HAS BEEN REPLACED BY REFERENCES TO GREAT POWER INTERVENTION. THE DOCUMENT NOW CALLS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN BASES, MILITARY UNITS, SUPPORT FACILITIES, ETC. SO THE AREA CAN BE TURNED INTO A ZONE OF PEACE.

D. ON AFRICA, THERE IS A REFERENCE TO THE LUSAKA COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE, WHICH APPARENTLY WAS CLEARED WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT REPRESENTATIVES. THE DECLARATION STRESSED THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATING POWERS WOULD BE FORTHCOMING ONLY IF IT ESTABLISHED GENUINE MAJORITY RULE AND INDEPENDENCE, IN CONFORMITY WITH OAU, UNGA AND NAM RESOLUTIONS. UNSC RESOLUTION 435, CONCERNING WESTERN CONTACT GROUP EFFORTS ON NAMIBIA, ALSO RECEIVES BRIEF REFERENCE. OTHER SECTIONS OF THE AFRICAN SECTION ARE FAIRLY MILITANT WITH A NUMBER OF OUR ALLIES BEING SINGLED OUT BY NAME WITH US FOR SUPPORTING SOUTH AFRICA. THOSE ALLIES INCLUDE FRANCE, FRG, UK, ITALY, BELGUIM, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, ISRAEL AND JAPAN. THE SUMMIT ENDORSES THE OAU CALL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN 1980 ON ECONOMIC AND OTHER SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA.

E. THE MIDEAST SECTION APPEARS TO BE THE MOST
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OO RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #4178/01 2610835
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 172203Z SEP 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESON/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6058
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 2510
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 9672
RUSBGD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 7153
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA IMMEDIATE 0283
RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE 2418
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 7747
RUFHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 1508
RUTAAK/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 2008
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 3899
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 1619
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 8500
RUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 9737
RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 6195
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 4842
RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU IMMEDIATE 5791
RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 5922
RUMJRV/AMEMBASSY RANGOON IMMEDIATE 2633
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1131
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 2691
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 7728
RUESLZ/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ IMMEDIATE 2788
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 9782
RUESQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 3900
RUESLM/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 1190
RUEHGR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE 9054
RUTAAM/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 9723
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 0890
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 8507
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 3579
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1079
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 4804
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 2716
RUTADR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 4001
RUTAIJ/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 3966
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 9408
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8344
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9469
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1981
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1412
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8707
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 3275
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9275
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 3073
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 8225
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 3348
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4331
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0822
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 3913
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0232
RUDKFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 5441
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 5621
RUDKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 5514
RUDKEBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0130
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 6031
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 7558
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 9657
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 5330
RUTADE/AMCONSUL DOUALA IMMEDIATE 2936
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 7839
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6431
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2692
RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4022
RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUETIAA/NSA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUTALB/AMCONSUL LUBUMBASHI 3180
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 2120 122
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UNACCEPTABLE IN TERMS OF US INTERESTS.ACTUAL CONDEMNATION OF CAMP DAVID H;S BEEN MOVED FROM THE DECLARATION TO A SEPARATE STATEMENT, WHICH ALSO CALLS FOR A REPORT ON EGYPTIAN MEMBERSHIP STATUS AT THE 1981 NAM MINISTERIAL. THE ARAB PUSH FOR EGYPTIAN EXPULSION WAS MORE SERIOUS THAN ANTICIPATED, AND EGYPT'S MEMBERSHIP WAS SAVED LARGELY DUE TO AFRICAN EFFORTS. MANY AFRICAN LEADERS REPORTEDLY FOUGHT HARD FOR MORE BALANCED LANGUAGE AND FORCED LENGTHY NIGHT SESSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT. WE HOPE FOR NUMEROUS RESERVATIONS ON THE MIDEAST LANGUAGE.
F. ECONOMIC SECTION WILL BE COVERED BY SEPTEL.
7. IN SUM,A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC CONCERNS WHICH WE RAISED IN OUR REPRESENTATIONS HAVE BEEN CHANGED FOR THE BETTER, DUE, WE BELIEVE, AT LEAST IN PART TO POSTS' EFFORTS. MOREOVER, THE YUGOSLAVS AND OTHER MODERATES

SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING A SIGNIFICANT SHIF; FROM THE NAM/ SOVIET ALLIANCE URGED BY CASTRO AND A RE-STATEMENT OF THE ORIGINAL PRINCIPLES OF THE MOVEMENT.

8. IN NAM TERMS, A MAJOR QUESTION FOR THE POST-SUMMIT PERIOD WILL BE THE EXTENT TO WHICH CUBA'S EXTRAORDINARY INTIMIDATION TACTICS AT HAVANA WILL LEAVE CASTRO CHAIRING A NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT WHICH IS MORE DIVIDED AND LESS INFLUENTIAL, AND THEREFORE LESS USEFUL AS AN ELEMENT IN CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY.

9. FOR ALL ACTION ADDRESSES. WE HAVE SELECTED YOUR POSTS

FOR ACTION ON THIS MESSAGE BECAUSE WE WISH TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AT THIS POINT WITH ALLIES AND MODERATE NAM MEMBER-STATES. IN MAKING REPRESENTATIONS AC-ORDING TO INSTRUC-
BT
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NNNNVV ESA370BRA178
00 RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #4178/06 2610839
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 172203Z SEP 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESON/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6059
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 2511
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 9673
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 7154
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA IMMEDIATE 0284
RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE 2419
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 7748
RUFHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 1509
RUTAAK/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 2009
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 3900
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 1620
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 8501
RUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 9738
RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 6196
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 4843
RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU IMMEDIATE 5792
RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 5923
RUMJRV/AMEMBASSY RANGOON IMMEDIATE 2634
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1132
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 2692
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 7729
RUESLZ/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ IMMEDIATE 2789
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 9783
RUESQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 3901
RUESLM/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 1191
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE 9055
RUTAAM/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 9724
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 0891
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 8508
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 3580
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1080
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 4805
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 2717
RUTADR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 4002
RUTAIJ/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 3967
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 9409
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8345
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9470
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1982
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1413
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8708
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 3276
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9276
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 3074
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 8226
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 3349
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4332
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0823
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 3914
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0233
RUDKFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 5442
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 5622
RUDKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 5515
RUDKEBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0131
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 6032
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 7559
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 9658
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 5331
RUTADE/AMCONSUL DOUALA IMMEDIATE 2937
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 7840
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6432
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2693
RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4023
RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUETIAA/NSA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUTALB/AMCONSUL LUBUMBASHI 3181
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 2121
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TIONS BELOW, OUR INITIAL AIMS ARE TO:

A. IMPROVE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SUBSTANCE AND ATMOSPHERICS OF THE CONFERENCE, WHICH (FROM US STANDPOINT) OCCURRED LARGELY BEHIND CLOSED DOORS;

B. SHARE PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENTS WITH ALLIED AND FRIENDLY NON-ALIGNED GOVERNMENTS;

C. ACKNOWLEDGE THE PARTICULARLY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE WHICH CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS PLAYED AT HAVANA. WE WILL WANT TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF YOUR ADVICE ON THIS SCORE;

D. INDICATE OUR CONCERN ON S,ECIFIC NAM SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS THAT CHALLENGE US INTERESTS, AND WHERE APPROPRIATE, REQUEST THAT HOST GOVERNMENTS SERIOUSLY CONSIDER LODGING RESERVATIONS ON SECTIONS OF FINAL DECLARATION;

E. INQUIRE CONCERNING ATTITUDES OF MEMBER-STATES TO POST-HAVANA NAM, INCLUDING MODERATE EFFORTS TO RESTRICT CASTRO'S CAPACITY TO ABUSE HIS NAM CHAIRMANSHIP; AND

F. DETERMINE, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE DEGREE TO WHICH NAM MEMBER-STATES WILL FEEL OBLIGED TO FOLLOW POSITIONS IN THE SUMMIT DECLARATION DURING UPCOMING UNGA DEBATES. YOU NEED NOT NECESSARILY PRESS CONCERNING HOST GOVERNMENT INTENTIONS.

10. AFTER RECEIVING YOUR REPORTS, WE PLAN TO ASSESS US POLICY TOWARD THE NAM AND TO CONSIDER, WHERE APPROPRIATE AND PRODUCTIVE, WHETHER TO EXPRESS OUR DISPLEASURE TO SOME NON-ALIGNED LEADERS WHO MADE PARTICULARLY OFFENSIVE
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NNNNVV ESA372BRA187
OO RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #4178/07 2610842
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 172203Z SEP 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESON/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6060
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 2512
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 9674
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 7155
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA IMMEDIATE 0285
RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE 2420
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 7749
RUFHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 1510
RUTAAK/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 2010
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 3901
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 1621
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 8502
RUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 9739
RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 6197
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 4844
RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU IMMEDIATE 5793
RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 5924
RUMJRV/AMEMBASSY RANGOON IMMEDIATE 2635
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1133
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 2693
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 7730
RUESLZ/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ IMMEDIATE 2790
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 9784
RUESQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 3902
RUESLM/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 1192
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE 9056
RUTAAM/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 9725
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 0892
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 8509
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 3581
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1081
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 4806
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 2718
RUTADR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 4003
RUTAIJ/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 3968
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 9410
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8346
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9471
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1983
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1414
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8709
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 3277
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9277
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 3075
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 8227
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 3350
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4333
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0824
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 3915
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0234
RUDKFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 5443
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 5623
RUDKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 5516
RUDKEBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0132
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 6033
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 7560
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 9659
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 5332
RUTADE/AMCONSUL DOUALA IMMEDIATE 2938
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 7841
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6433
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2694
RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4024
RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUETIAA/NSA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUTALB/AMCONSUL LUBUMBASHI 3182
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 2122

STATEMENTS ABOU, THE UNITED STATES AND US POLICIES. WE HAVE NOTED EMBASSY KINGSTON VIEWS IN THIS CONNECTION AND ARE RESPONDING SEPTEL. THIS PARA IS STRICTLY FYI.

11. ACCORDINGLY, FOLLOWING THE GUIDANCE IN THE OPENING PARAGRAPH OF THIS MESSAGE, POSTS WHICH FEEL THE EFFORT CAN BE MADE WITHOUT PROVOKING A NEGATIVE REACTION ARE REQUESTED EITHER TO FIND INFORMAL OCCASIONS, OR IN CONNECTION WITH OFFICIAL CALLS ON OTHER ISSUES, TO VISIT WITH OFFICIALS WHO ATTENDED THE NAM SUMMIT. YOU SHOULD SEEK THEIR VIEWS ON THE CONFERENCE; ON FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR ;AM UNDER CUBAN CHAIRMANSHIP; ON EFFORTS TO DEMO"RATIZE NAM MEETINGS, ESPECIALLY FOLLOWING CUBAN PERFORMANCE AT HAVANA;AMDON ROLE HOST GOVERNMENT PLANS TO PLAY IN FUTURE NAM MEETINGS. WE ARE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN THE PROCEDURAL DYNAMICS AND HOW COMPROMISES/FINAL RESULTS EMERGED IN COMMITTEE SESSIONS. WE ALSO WOULD WELCOME ANY INFO YOU CAN PICK UP ON KEY COUNTRIES WHICH SUPPORTED AND OPPOSED US VIEWS AND INTERESTS.

12. YOU SHOULD INDICATE OUR PARTICULAR CONCERN WITH MIDEAST, PUERTO-RICAN AND NORTH-SOUTH CHAPTERS, POINTING OUT THAT THESE AND OTHER SECTIONS, AS WELL AS GENERALLY CONFRONTATIONAL TONE OF MANY SPEECHES AND FINAL DECLARATION, IS UNLIKELY TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL UNDER-STANDING FOR OR INFLUENCE OF NAM. ALL ACTION ADDRESSEES (EXCEPT NEA) MAY SUGGEST THAT HOST GOVERNMENTS SERIOUSLY CONSIDER LODGING RESERVATIONS ON MIDEAST, PUERTO RICO, AND ZIONISM/RACISM MATERIAL. WHERE EMBASSIES CONSIDER APPROPRIATE, YOU ALSO SHOULD INQUIRE CONCERNING HOST GOVERNMENT PLANS TO LODGE RESERVATIONS TO OTHER PORTIONS OF DECLARATION. FINALLY, YOU SHOULD INDICATE US HOPE THAT, IN PERIOD AHEAD, HOST GOVERNMENTS
BT
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NNNNVV ESA373BRA190
00 RUQMKR
DE RUEHC #4178/08 2610846
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O R 172203Z SEP 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESON/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6061
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 2513
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 9675
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 7156
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA IMMEDIATE 0286
RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE 2421
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 7750
RUFHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 1511
RUTAAK/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 2011
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 3902
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 1622
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 8503
RUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 9740
RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 6198
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 4845
RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU IMMEDIATE 5794
RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 5925
RUMJRV/AMEMBASSY RANGOON IMMEDIATE 2636
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1134
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 2694
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 7731
RUESLZ/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ IMMEDIATE 2791
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 9785
RUESQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 3903
RUESLM/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 1193
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE 9057
RUTAAM/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 9726
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 0893
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 8510
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 3582
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1082
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 4807
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 2719
RUTADR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 4004
RUTAIJ/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 3969
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 9411
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8347
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9472
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1984
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1415
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8710
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 3278
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9278
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 3076
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 8228
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 3351
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4334
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0825
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 3916
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0235
RUDKFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 5444
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 5624
RUDKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 5517
RUDKEBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0133
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 6034
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 7561
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 9660
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 5333
RUTADE/AMCONSUL DOUALA IMMEDIATE 2939
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 7842
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6434
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2695
RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4025
RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUETIAA/NSA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUTALB/AMCONSUL LUBUMBASHI 3183
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 2123

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 08 OF 12 STATE 244178/08

WILL SUBORDINATE UNHELPFUL HAVANA RHETORIC TO CONCRETE EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES AND TO PROMOTE WORLD ECONOMIC DIALOGUE.

13. WHERE APPROPRIATE, ACT,ON ADDRESSEES MAY DRAW ON PARAS 3-8 ABOVE IN SHARING PRELIMINARY US ASSESSMENTS. YOU SHOULD REPORT INITIAL HOST GOVERNMENT REACTIONS BY COB, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 20. IN POST DISCRETION, INFO ADDRESSES IN NAM CAPITALS MAY MAKE ABOVE POINTS AND

SOLICIT INFO ON RESULTS OF SUMMIT, WHERE THEY CONSIDER THIS WOULD BE USEFUL. WE WOULD WELCOME ANY INFO RPT INFO NEA POSTS CAN PICK UP FROM ARAB CAPITALS ON MIDEAST/ EGYPTIAN EXPULSION ISSUES.

14. WE RECOGNIZE THAT SOME DESIRED HIG;-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS WILL NEED TO COME LATER, AS MANY RETURNING LEADERS ARE STILL TRAVELING. WHILE WE URGE SUCH FOLLOW-UPS, WE NOW HAVE URGENT NEED FOR THESE INITIAL REACTIONS. ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR SPECIFIC POSTS FOLLOWS.

15. FOR DUBLIN, USNATO, LONDON, PARIS, BONN, ROME, LUXEMBOURG, THE HAGUE, COPENHAGEN, BRUSSELS, OTTAWA, TOKYO, CANBERRA, ATHENS, ANKARA, BUCHAREST, MADRID, LISBON, STOCKHOLM, HELSINKI, VIENNA AND BERN. YOU SHOULD REQUEST HOST-GOVERNMENT VIEWS ON OUTCOME OF CONFERENCE AND ON RESULTS OF THEIR REPRESENTATIONS IN NAM CAPITALS. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN WHETHER THEY PLAN ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS OR FUTHER DIPLOMATIC RE,RESENTATIONS ON SUMMIT. TOKYO SHOULD REITERATE US APPRECIATION FOR SONODA'S EFFORTS I; LATIN AMERICA. MADRID SHOULD INDICATE APPRECIATION FOR SPANISH EFFORTS IN LATIN AMERICA, NOTING MEASURABLE IMPROVEMENT OF LATIN
BT
#4178

NNNNVV ESA376BRA197
00 RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #4178/09 2610849
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 172203Z SEP 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESON/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6062
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 2514
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 9676
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 7157
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA IMMEDIATE 0287
RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE 2422
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 7751
RUFHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 1512
RUTAAK/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 2012
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 3903
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 1623
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 8504
RUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 9741
RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 6199
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 4846
RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU IMMEDIATE 5795
RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 5926
RUMJRV/AMEMBASSY RANGOON IMMEDIATE 2637
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1135
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 2695
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 7732
RUESLZ/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ IMMEDIATE 2792
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 9786
RUESQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 3904
RUESLM/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 1194
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE 9058
RUTAAM/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 9727
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 0894
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 8511
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 3583
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1083
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 4808
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 2720
RUTADR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 4005
RUTAIJ/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 3970
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 9412
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8348
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9473
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1985
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1416
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8711
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 3279
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9279
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 3077
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 8229
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 3352
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4335
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0826
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 3917
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0236
RUDKFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 5445
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 5625
RUDKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 5518
RUDKEBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0134
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 6035
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 7562
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 9661
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 5334
RUTADE/AMCONSUL DOUALA IMMEDIATE 2940
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 7843
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6435
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2696
RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4026
RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUETIAA/NSA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUTALB/AMCONSUL LUBUMBASHI 3184
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 2124

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AMERICAN CHAPTER. MADRID AND LISBON SHOULD INQUIRE CONCERNING SPANISH VIEW OF POST-HAVANA NAM. BONN SHOULD BE AWARE THAT FRG EMBASSY HERE HAS INFORMED US THAT CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HAS EXPRESSED PERSONAL ANGER AT GERMANY HAVING BEEN SINGLED OUT FOR CRITICISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN SECTION. EMBASSIES IN OTHER CAPITALS SINGLED OUT (SEE PARA 5D) ALSO MAY WISH TO EXPLORE THEIR HOST GOVERNMENT REACTIONS. LONDON SHOULD SEEK UK ASSESSMENT OF NAM.

16. FOR BELGRADE, YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE OUR RESPECT FOR THE ROLE WHICH PRESIDENT TITO PLAYED IN PRESERVING THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NON-ALIGNMENT WHICH INSPIRED TITO AND THE OTHER FOUNDERS OF THE NAM. YOU SHOULD INDICATE OUR CONCERN ON THE UNSATISFACTORY RESULTS ON THE MIDEAST AND A NUMBER OF OTHER SPECIFIC ISSUES, AS WELL AS THE EGREGIOUS ANTI-AMERICAN TONE OF MANY SPEECHES AND THE

FINAL DECLARATION. YOU SHOULD INQUIRE AS TO YUGOSLAV THINKING CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF THE NAM UNDER CASTRO'S CHAIRMANSHIP AND STRESS OUR INTEREST IN YUGOSLAV ANALYSIS OF THE HAVANA CONFERENCE.

17. FOR NEW DELHI. WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT INDIAN DELEGATION PLAYED A SOMEWHAT MORE HELPFUL ROLE THAN ANTICIPATED, GIVEN POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN NEW DELHI. YOU MAY WISH TO CONVEY OUR THANKS TO FOREIGN MINISTER MISHRA, DRAWING ON STATE 240341, WHILE NOTING US CONCERN WITH THE CONFRONTATIONAL TONE OF THE NORTH-SOUTH SECTION, AND SAYING THAT THIS HARDLY CONTRIBUTES TO PROGRESS IN THIS IMPORTANT AREA.

18. FOR CAIRO, AMBASSADOR REQUESTED TO MEET WITH BOUTROS
BT
#4178

DE RUEHC #4178/10 2610853
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 172203Z SEP 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESON/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6063
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 2515
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 9677
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 7158
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA IMMEDIATE 0288
RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE 2423
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 7752
RUFHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 1513
RUTAAK/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 2013
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 3904
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 1624
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 8505
RUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 9742
RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 6200
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 4847
RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU IMMEDIATE 5796
RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 5927
RUMJRV/AMEMBASSY RANGOON IMMEDIATE 2638
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1136
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 2696
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 7733
RUESLZ/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ IMMEDIATE 2793
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 9787
RUESQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 3905
RUESLM/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 1195
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE 9059
RUTAAM/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 9728
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 0895
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 8512
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 3584
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1084
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 4809
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 2721
RUTADR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 4006
RUTAIJ/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 3971
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 9413
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8349
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9474
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1986
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1417
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8712
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 3280
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9280
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 3078
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 8230
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 3353
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4336
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0827
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 3918
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0237
RUDKFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 5446
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 5626
RUDKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 5519
RUDKEBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0135
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 6036
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 7563
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 9662
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 5335
RUTADE/AMCONSUL DOUALA IMMEDIATE 2941
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 7844
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6436
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2697
RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4027
RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUETIAA/NSA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUTALB/AMCONSUL LUBUMBASHI 3185
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 2125

GHALI AND INDICATE OUR SATISFACTION THAT, DESPITE OUT-
RAGEOUS HARRASSMENT AT HAVANA, EGYPT MANAGED TO AVOID
EXPULSION FROM THE NAM. WE WISH TO STRESS OUR DEEP
DISAGREEMENT WITH THE MIDEAST SECTION OF THE TEXT, WHICH
OFFERS NO CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO THE CAMP DAVID
PEACE PROCESS. YOU SHOULD ASK EGYPTIANS WHETHER THEY
PLAN TO URGE RESERVATIONS WITH AFRICANS AND OTHERS TO
THE MIDEAST SECTION OF THE TEXT AND INDICATE THAT WE
WOULD LIKE TO COORDINATE OUR DIPLOMACY WITH THEM ON THIS
SCORE. WE WOULD APPRECIATE EGYPTIAN RESPONSE SOONEST.
SEPTEL COVERS MOUSSA COMMENTS TO THE US ON NAM, WHICH YOU
NEED NOT DUPLICATE.

19. FOR BEIJING. EMBASSY SHOULD SHARE OUR PRELIMINARY
REFLECTIONS WITH APPROPRIATE SENIOR FOREIGN OFFICE
OFFICIALS, DRAWING AS APPROPRIATE FROM PARAS 3-8, AND
ELICITING ANY INFO YOU CAN ON CHINESE REACTION.

20. FOR DAKAR AND ABIDJAN. YOU SHOULD EXPRESS OUR
APRECIATION TO FOREIGN MINISTERS FOR THEIR ATTENDANCE
OF SUMMIT AND OUR ADMIRATION FOR THEIR COURAGEOUS EFFORTS
ON BEHALF OF GENUINE NON-ALIGNED PRINCIPLES AND
RESPONSIBLE MODERATE POSITIONS. WE WOULD WELCOME THEIR
VIEWS ON FUTURE OF NAM AND T;E ROLE THEY INTEND TO PLAY
IN IT.

21. FOR LIMA AND BUENOS AIRES. FYI. WE HAVE PRELIMINARY
IMPRESSION THAT PERU AND ARGENTINA PLAYED GENERALLY
CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE AT SUMMIT AND WOULD WELCOME EMBASSY
COMMENTS ON THIS POINT. END FYI. YOU SHOULD SEEK VIEWS
OF BOTH COUNTRIES ON SUMMIT (ESPECIALLY LATIN AMERICAN

DYNAMICS), ON NAM FUTURE AND ON LATIN AMERICAN ROLE IN
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ESA381BRA210
OO RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #4178/11 2610856
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 172203Z SEP 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESON/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6064
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 2516
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 9678
RUSBGD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 7159
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA IMMEDIATE 0289
RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE 2424
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 7753
RUFHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 1514
RUTAAK/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 2014
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 3905
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 1625
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 8506
RUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 9743
RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 6201
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 4848
RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU IMMEDIATE 5797
RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 5928
RUMJRV/AMEMBASSY RANGOON IMMEDIATE 2639
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1137
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 2697
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 7734
RUESLZ/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ IMMEDIATE 2794
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 9788
RUESQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 3906
RUESLM/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 1196
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE 9060
RUTAAM/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 9729
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 0896
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 8513
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 3585
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1085
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 4810
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 2722
RUTADR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 4007
RUTAIJ/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 3972
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 9414
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8350
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9475
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1987
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1418
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8713
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 3281
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9281
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 3079
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 8231
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 3354
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4337
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0828
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 3919
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0238
RUDKFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 5447
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 5627
RUDKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 5520
RUDKEBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0136
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 6037
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 7564
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 9663
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 5336
RUTADE/AMCONSUL DOUALA IMMEDIATE 2942
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 7845
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6437
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2698
RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4028
RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUETIAA/NSA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUTALB/AMCONSUL LUBUMBASHI 3186
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 2126

NAM. WE ASSUME YOU WILL BE MAKING RESERVATIONS ON SOME PARTS OF THE COMMUNIQUE AND HOPE THAT YOU WILL INCLUDE RESERVATIONS ON PUERTO RICO AND OTHER APPROPRIATE SECTIONS OF LAT,N AMERICAN CHAPTER.

22. FOR PANAMA. EMBASSY SHOULD EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR PANAMANIAN ROLE IN HAVANA ON PANAMA ISSUE AND SEEK GOP COMMENT ON SUMMIT. WE ASSUME YOU WILL BE MAKING RESERVATIONS ON SOME PARTS OF THE COMMUNIQUE AND HOPE THAT YOU WILL INCLUDE RESERVATIONS ON PUERTO RICO AND OTHER APPROPRIATE SECTIONS OF LATIN AMERICAN CHAPTER.

23. FOR BOGOTA, SAN JOSE, CARACAS, LA PAZ, BRASILIA, QUITO. WE WOULD APPRECIATE HOST GOVERNMENT VIEWS ON THE SUMMIT, ON NAM FUTURE AND ON FUTURE LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP TO NAM. YOU SHOULD URGE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF RESERVATIONS ON PUERTO RICO AND OTHER APPROPRIATE SECTIONS OF LATIN AMERICAN CHAPTER. CARACAS ALSO MAY DRAW ON PARAS 3-8 IN BRIEFING US IPU RE,RESENTATIVES.

24. FOR DAR ES SALAAM AND LAGOS. YOU SHOULD SEEK HIGH LEVEL ASSESSMENT OF THE SUMMIT, OF FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR THE NAM AND OF LIKELY FUTURE AFRICAN ROLES THEREIN.

25. FOR COLOMBO, ISLAMABAD AND DACCA. EMBASSIES SHOULD SEEK HOST GOVERNMENT ASSESSMENT OF THE SUMMIT.

26. FOR RANGOON. WE HAVE NOTED REPORTS OF POSSIBLE BURMESE WITHDRAWAL FROM NAM AND WOULD WELCOME ANY INFO ON THIS. IF ASKED, HOWEVER, YOU SHOULD TAKE NO POSITION ON THIS. YOU SHOULD INDICATE OUR APPRECIATE FOR IMPORTANT ROLE PLAYED BY FOREIGN MINISTER ON BEHALF OF GENUINE NON-ALIGNED PRINCIPLES AND RESPONSIBLE MODERATE

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DE RUEHC #4178/12 2610901
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESON/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6065
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE 2517
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 9679
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 7160
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DACCA IMMEDIATE 0290
RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE 2425
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 7754
RUFHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 1515
RUTAAK/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 2015
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 3906
RUFHRS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 1626
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 8507
RUMJKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 9744
RUKOBT/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 6202
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 4849
RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU IMMEDIATE 5798
RUESBA/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 5929
RUMJRV/AMEMBASSY RANGOON IMMEDIATE 2648
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1138
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 2698
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 7735
RUESLZ/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ IMMEDIATE 2795
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 9789
RUESQI/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 3987
RUESLM/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 1197
RUEHGR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE 9061
RUTAAM/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE 9738
RUMJGM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 0897
RUESJO/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 8514
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 3586
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1086
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 4811
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 2723
RUTADR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 4008
RUTAIJ/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 3973
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 9415
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8351
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9476
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1988
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1419
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8714
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 3282
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9282
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 3068
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 8232
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 3355
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4338
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0829
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 3920
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0239
RUDKFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 5448
RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 5628
RUDKHLQ/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 5521
RUDKEBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0137
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 6038
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 7565
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 9664
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 5337
RUTADE/AMCONSUL DOUALA IMMEDIATE 2943
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 7846
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE 6438
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 2699
RUEAIIA/ CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4029
RUEHIA/USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUETIAA/NSA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUTALB/AMCONSUL LUBUMBASHI 3187
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 2127

POSITIONS.

27. FOR ASEAN CAPITALS - WE WOULD APPRECIATE HOST GOVERNMENT REACTIONS TO SUMMIT, APPRAISAL OF EFFECTS ON KEY SEA ISSUES, PLANS FOR FUTURE NAM ROLE AND FOR ANY RESERVATIONS. SINGAPORE SHOULD EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION FOR KEY ROLE PLAYED BY FOREIGN MINISTER ON BEHALF OF MODERATES AT HAVANA. MANILA SHOULD SEEK GOP VIEW OF POST-HAVANA NAM AND, IN RESPONSE TO YOUR 17390, YOU MAY DRAW ON PARAS 3-8 ABOVE. YOU SHOULD NOTE IMPROVEMENTS IN DECLARATION BUT ALSO POINT OUT EXTREME ANTI-US/WESTERN ATMOSPHERE OF MOVEMENT'S PROCEEDINGS IN HAVANA.

28. FOR AMMAN, MUSCAT, KHARTOUM AND MOGODISHU - WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR SEEKING HOST GOVERNMENT APPRECIATION OF ARAB TACTICS AT HAVANA.

29. FOR SEOUL. DO SOUTH KOREANS PLAN TO ENCOURAGE

RESERVATIONS ON THE KOREAN SECTION, WHICH CONTINUES TO CONTAIN BLAND RE-STATEMENT OF THE NORTH KOREAN POSITION?

30. FOR USUN. DEPARTMENT WISHES TO ALERT MISSION IN ADVANCE TO REQUEST FOR USUN ANALYSIS OF EFFECT OF NAM SUMMIT ON 34TH UNGA. WE WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE, AT END OF 34TH UNGA, YOUR ANALYSIS OF DEGREE TO WHICH NAM MEMBER-STATES FELT OBLIGED TO DEFEND NAM SUMMIT POSITIONS AT UNGA.

31. FOR BARBADOS - YOU SHOULD SEEK GOB ASSESMENT OF SUMMIT BUT SHOULD NOT RAISE ISSUE WITH GRENADA, DOMINICA OR ST. LUCIA. VANCE
BT
#4178

NNNN

DE RUQMHR #0222 262 **
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 191126Z SEP 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3845
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 12222

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
CHRGE: STAT 9/19/79
APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAI
DRFTD: POL:EASWIFT:a
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL2 CHG ICA
ECON CONS CH
RF

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/19/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P
TAGS: PORG, IR
SUBJECT: NAM SUMMIT

REF: STATE 244178

POL 3
NAM

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI SEPT 18, CHARGE ASKED FOR YAZDI'S COMMENTS ON RESULTS OF HAVANA NON-ALIGNED MEETING.

3. DURING THE DISCUSSION, YAZDI STRESSED IRAN'S INDEPENDENT ROLE AT THE NAM AND MADE IT CLEAR IRAN DID NOT FOLLOW CUBA'S LEAD DURING THE MEETING. YAZDI MENTIONED BRIEFLY SOME OF THE NAM ISSUES, TOUCHING IN PARTICULAR ON IRAN'S ATTEMPT TO SUSPEND THE MEMBERSHIP OF EGYPT. HE SAID THAT THE MEETING HAD CONDEMNED CAMP DAVID AND HAD AGREED TO A COMPROMISE ON EGYPT TO DELAY ANY DECISION UNTIL 1981. YAZDI SAID THAT CAMBODIA WAS A PARTICULARLY HOT ISSUE AND ONE WHICH WAS NOT YET SETTLED. HE STATED THAT THE NAM CONDEMNED VIETNAMESE INTERVENTION IN THE NAM, AND OBSERVED THAT WHILE THE OUTCOME OF VIETNAMESE INTERVENTIONS WAS GOOD, VIETNAM'S ENDS DO NOT JUSTIFY THE MEANS.

4. YAZDI SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN HAPPY TO BE ABLE TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TOWARD KEEPING THE NAM NON-ALIGNED. HE SAID THAT ONE OF IRAN'S MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS HAD BEEN TO DEMAND THAT THE NAM BE "CULTURALLY" NON-ALIGNED. YAZDI SAID THAT MANY NATIONS AT THE NAM ARE ANTI-IMPERIALIST BUT THINK WITH A WESTERN MIND, ARE ANTI-USSR BUT THINK WITH A RUSSIAN MIND OR ARE ANTI-RACIST BUT HAVE A RACIST MENTALITY. THE MENTALITY AND CULTURE OF THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES MUST BECOME TRULY NON-ALIGNED.
LAINGEN
BT
#0222

NNNN

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1977-225-323

NNNNVV ESBo15BRA858
PP RUQMHR
DE RUEHUB #8582 2632009
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 202004Z SEP 79
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 0028
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2476
RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK 0399
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 8582

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/29/85 (TOWELL, TIMOTHY L.) OR-P
TAGS: PORG,CU
SUBJECT: (C) IRA VC FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI AT HAVANA NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT
REFJI TEHRAN 10049

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. WE HAVE NO TEXT OF IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER YAZDI'S SPEECH AT THE NAM PLEANARY. CUBAN COMMUNIST CARTY DAILY " GRANMA PUBLISHED EXCERPS OF THE YAZDI SPEECH BUT THIS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED BLANCED OR PERHAPS EVEN ACCURATE ACCOUNT. FOR WHAT THEY ARE WORTH, HOWEVER, HIGHLIGTHS OF "GRANMA" ACCOUNT FOLLOW.

3. CALLING THE FINAL VICTORY OF OPPRESSED PEOPLES "INEVITABLE, YAZDI BLASTED" U.S. IJPERIALISM" FOR HAVING SUPPORTED THE " BLOODY REGIME" OF THE SHAH. WHILE THE IMPERIALISTS SPEAK OF HUMAN RIGHTS, HE SAID, THE "TORTURORS OF THE PEOPLE" CONTINUE RECEIVING ARMS AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S.

4. YAZDI EXPRESSED HIS GOVERNMENT'S SUPPORT FOR THE PLO AND THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH AFRICA, AND SAID THAT IRAN'S POLICY IS BASED ON THE "EQUALITARIAN AND HUMANITARIAN CHARACTER OF ISLAM". WITH WHAT MUST HAVE BROUGHT A CHUCKLE FROM THE HOUSE, HE FOLLOWED THAT LINE BY SAYING THAT IN THIS RFAPECT " FIDEL CASTRO IS MUCH CLOSER TO ISLAM THAN MANY MOSLEMS."

5. DESPITE THE APPARENTLY RADICAL TONE OF YAZDI SPEECH OTHER DIPLOMATIC OBSERVERS HERE HAVE OMMENTED THAT IRANIAN DELEGATION WAS BY NO MEANS AMONG "LEADING FIRE-EATERS" AT SUMMIT. ONE MEMBER IRANIAN DELEGATION MADE BEMUSED COMMENT TO USINT OFFIER THAT " THIS WHOLE THING IS SIMPLY A SOCIAL OCCASION; NOTHING WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED HERE, BUT EVERYONE WILL GO AWAY HAPPIER FOR HAVING BLOWN OFF STEAM."

SMITH
BT
#8582

002141

ROL

CHRG
ECON
RF
CHRN

VV ESA928MNA409
PP RUQMHR
DE RUQMAM #1915 2670840
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 240805Z SEP 79
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7912
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1726
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 536
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 324
RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 762
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 616
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 383
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 1129
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 1480
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 99
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1113
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY 3232
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 544
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 1149
RUQMYA/USLO RIYADH 169
RUQMNS/AMEMBASSY SANA 451
RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 1387
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 257
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 174
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 192
RUDOMAA/ADMINSUPU BAHRAIN
RUFRBAA/COMIDEASTFOR
RUSHAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUDOMBA/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA 1915

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/24/85 (PELLETREAU, ROBERT H.) OR-M
TAGS: PORG, MARR, BA, US, XF
SUBJ: BAHRAIN'S FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES NAM SUMMIT: LINKAGE BETWEEN PALESTINIAN ISSUE AND REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE GULF

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN MEETINGS WITH DEP ASSISTANT SECY TWINAM SEPT. 11 AND VISITING PROFESSOR R.K. RAMAZANI SEPT. 15, BAHRAIN'S FOREIGN MINISTER GAVE US HIS IMPRESSIONS OF NAM SUMMIT AS FOLLOWS:

(A) IT WAS A DIFFICULT CONFERENCE FOR MODERATES, ALTHOUGH MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA WERE EFFECTIVE ON SOME ISSUES. THE PALESTINIANS WERE THE BIG WINNERS FOLLOWED BY CASTRO.

(B) CASTRO SUCCESSFULLY USED TACTIC OF SOUNDING MORE PALESTINIAN THAN ARAFAT TO SHIELD HIMSELF FROM CRIICISM. AFTER HIS PRO-PALESTINIAN STATEMENTS, NO ARAB DELGATION WOULD EVEN THINK OF QUESTIONING HIS NON-ALIGNMENT ON OTHER POLICIES.

(C) PERCEPTION OF U.S. AS ENEMY OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS MEANT NO DELEGATION COULD SUPPORT U.S. ON ANY SUBJECT. ON THE OTHER HAND, MOZAMBIQUE'S SAMORA MACHEL COULD PRAISE THE SOVIET UNION AND BE APPLAUDED FOR IT. HE COULD EVEN PRAISE CUBA'S INTERVENTION IN AFRICA AND BE APPLAUDED.

(D) IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO BELIEVE EGYPT WON ANYTHING AT ALL AT THE SUMMIT. BUTROS GHALI WAS TOTALLY ISOLATED AND HUMILIATED. DELEGATE AFTER DELEGATE ABUSED EGYPT, LABELING SADAT A TRAITOR TO THE MOVEMENT NASSER HAD HELPED CREATE.

(E) FONMIN MET AND TALKED WITH IRANIAN FONMIN YAZDI FOR FIRST TIME AT CONFERENCE. YAZDI ASSURED HIM PGOI HAD NO DESIRE OR INTENTION TO INTERVENE IN BAHRAINI AFFAIRS. YAZDI DESCRIBED VICIOUS AND TIME CONSUMING IN-FIGHTING WITHIN IRANIAN RULING CIRCLES. YAZDI WAS VIOLENTLY ANTI-UNITED STATES IN HIS STATEMENTS. YAZDI TOLD FONMIN BAHRAIN SHOULD GIVE MORE SUPPORT TO PALESTINIANS, AT WHICH SHAIKH MOHAMMED TOOK UMBRAGE.

3. COMMENT: OVERALL TONE OF FONMIN'S COMMENTS WAS PESSIMISTIC. HE FELT THAT PERCEPTION OF UNITED STATES AS FOE OF PALESTINIANS WAS COLORING THIRD WORLD'S ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S. IN GENERAL SENSE. COULD THE UNITED STATES, HE POINTEDLY ASKED TWINAM, STATE UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT IT SUPPORTED PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION?

4. FONMIN STRESSED IN BOTH CONVERSATIONS THAT EVEN THOUGH BAHRAIN CONSIDERED ITSELF A LONG STANDING FRIEND OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE WEST, IT COULD NOT IN THE PRESENT POLITICAL CLIMATE SEEK OR ACCEPT DIRECT U.S. INVOLVEMENT OR ASSISTANCE IN REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE GULF. GULF SECURITY AND RESOLUTION OF PALESTINIAN ISSUE WERE INTERLINKED, AND UNTIL U.S. HAD SOLVED OR CHANGED ITS POSITION ON THE LATTER, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR BAHRAIN OR OTHER GULF STATES (OMAN EXCLUDED) TO ACCEPT U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE FORMER. TWINAM EXPLAINED THAT U.S. COMMITMENT TO ACHIEVE JUST SOLUTION TO PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WAS FIRM BUT NOTED THAT IT WOULD TAKE TIME. WHAT, HE ASKED FONMIN, COULD U.S. DO TO HELP BAHRAIN AND ITS NEIGHBORS PRESERVE STABILITY AND STABILITY IN GULF WHILE THESE EFFORTS WERE GOING ON. FONMIN REFUSED TO BE DRAWN OUT, RETURNING TO CENTRALITY OF PALESTINIAN ISSUE TO ENTIRE LONG TERM U.S. POSITION IN THE AREA.

PELLETREAU

BT
#1915

NNNN

002209

NNNNVV ESB032BRA702
PP RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #2499/01 2682346
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 252247Z SEP 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO NONALIGNED MOVEMENT COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L

CHG
CHRON
ECON
RF

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 252499/01

FOLLOWING REPEAT CAIRO 19429 SENT STATE BELGRADE GENEVA HAVANA NEW DELHI TEL AVIV USUN SEPT 21.

QUOTE: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE CAIRO 19429

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT REFERENCE OMITTED)

E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PORG EG
SUBJECT: EGYPT AND THE NAM SUMMIT

REFERENCE: STATE 244474

1. (LOU) AS INDICATED REFTEL, FOLLOWING ARE TEXTS OF LETTERS MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS BOUTROS GHALI HAS SENT TO NAM PRESIDENT CASTRO AND NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS, EXPRESSING EGYPTIAN RESERVATIONS ON NAM SUMMIT DECLARATION AND URGING OTHER MEMBERS TO DO LIKEWISE.

2. (LOU) BEGIN TEXT.

EXCELLENCY:

IN CONNECTION WITH THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED SIXTH CONFERENCE OF THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, I HAVE THE HONOR TO TRANSMIT TO YOU, HEREWITH, A COPY OF THE LETTER I HAVE ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO, PRESIDENT OF THE SAID CONFERENCE, INFORMING HIM OF THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT ON THE PROPOSAL OF THE BUREAU OF THE CONFERENCE AS A RESULT OF CONSULTATIONS CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT NAC/CONF.6/DOC.II, AND THE CONSENSUS DECLARED BY HIM THEREON. THE POSITION OF THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT IS TO REJECT THE CONSENSUS DECLARED ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM AS WELL AS TO OBJECT TO THE USUAL AND UNPRECEDENTED PROCEDURE FOLLOWED IN

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1979 - 281-526

THE FINAL STAGES OF THE CONFERENCE.

I WOULD LIKE TO SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE OUR FEELINGS OF APPRECIATION FOR THE POSITION TAKEN IN THIS RESPECT BY YOUR DELEGATION TO THE CONFERENCE IN DEFENDING THE TRADITIONS, PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES OF NON-ALIGNMENT WITH WHICH THE PROCEDURE, THE "PROPOSAL" AND THE PRESIDENT'S DECLARATION THEREON, WERE TOTALLY INCOMPATIBLE.

IN CONCLUSION, I WOULD APPRECIATE THAT YOUR EXCELLENCY'S GOVERNMENT CONSIDER SENDING A FORMAL RESERVATION IN THIS REGARD TO THE PRESIDENT OR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE.

PLEASE ACCEPT, EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCE OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

BOUTROS BOUTROS GHALI. END TEXT.

3. (U) BEGIN TEXT.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I HAVE THE HONOR TO BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION THE FOLLOWING AS PRESIDENT OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT:

IT IS THE CONSIDERED OPINION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT THAT THE "PROPOSAL OF THE BUREAU OF THE CONFERENCE AS A RESULT OF CONSULTATIONS CONTAINED IN DOCUMENT NAC/CONF.6/DOC. II AND YOUR EXCELLENCY'S DECLARATION CONCERNING ITS ADOPTION BY CONSENSUS IN THE LAST MEETING OF THE SIXTH CONFERENCE OF THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES HELD ON THE 9TH OF SEPTEMBER IS TOTALLY INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES OF NON-ALIGNMENT. I WOULD LIKE, THEREFORE, TO INFORM YOU OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT'S REJECTION OF THE AFOREMENTIONED PROPOSAL.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT WISHES MOREOVER TO REGISTER ITS STRONG OPPOSITION TO THE UNUSUAL AND UNPRECEDENTED PROCEDURE THAT WAS REGRETTABLY FOLLOWED IN THE FINAL STAGES OF THE CONFERENCE. A PROCEDURE WHICH REPRESENTS A BLATANT DISREGARD OF THE UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED NORMS OF INTER-STATE CONDUCT.
A PROCEDURE, IF ALLOWED TO BE A PRECEDENT, WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE THE GRAVEST CONSEQUENCES AND WOULD UNDERMINE THE UNITY OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. NON-ALIGNMENT WAS ORIGINALLY ENVISAGED AND LATER ON FIRMLY

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976 - 201-828

ESTABLISHED TO PROTECT THE SOVEREIGNTY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ITS MEMBERS. MEMBER STATES OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT HAVE ALWAYS STRIVED TO ENSURE THE RESPECT FOR THE INADMISSABILITY OF INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IT WOULD BE A TRAVESTY OF THE LOFTY PRINCIPLES OF NON-ALIGNMENT TO INFRINGE ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF MEMBER STATES AND QUESTION THE RIGHT OF A SOVEREIGN STATE IN CONDUCTING ITS FOREIGN POLICY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WISHES OF ITS PEOPLE, THROUGH DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED INSTITUTIONS.

THE BUREAU OF THE CONFERENCE HAS EMBARKED ON AN UNUSUAL PATH CONTRARY TO THE TRADITIONS FOLLOWED IN THE NON-

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#2499

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1978 - 261-926

NNNNVV ESB033BRA703
PP RUQMHR
DE RUEHC #2499/02 2682348
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 252247Z SEP 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO NONALIGNED MOVEMENT COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE FINAL SECTION OF 02 STATE 252499/02

ALIGNED CONFERENCES SINCE IT HAS ARROGATED TO ITSELF A RIGHT THAT IS OBVIOUSLY BEYOND THE SCOPE OF ITS COMPETENCE BY DEFINITION. THE BUREAU OF THE CONFERENCE IS NOT A POLITICAL ORGAN THEREOF. CONSEQUENTLY, IT HAS NO RIGHT TO CONSIDER ANY SUBJECT WITHOUT THE EXPRESSED AUTHORIZATION OF THE CONFERENCE, PARTICULARLY AS THE SUBJECT WAS FULLY DEBATED AND DECIDED UPON IN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL.

CERTAIN ASPECTS OF EGYPT'S FOREIGN POLICY WERE DISTORTED AND DEPICTED AS A VIOLATION OF NON-ALIGNED PRINCIPLES. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 IS THE RECOGNIZED BASIC DOCUMENT FOR RESOLVING THE ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT. THE PROVISIONS OF THIS RESOLUTION WERE FAITHFULLY APPLIED. IT IS MOREOVER RELEVANT TO RECALL THAT THE APPROACH ADOPTED BY EGYPT IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE AIDE-MEMOIRE PRESENTED BY AMBASSADOR JARRING, THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, ON 8 FEBRUARY, 1971, TO BOTH EGYPT AND ISRAEL. THIS APPROACH WAS ALSO LATER ENDORSED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN RESOLUTIONS 2799 (XXVI) AND 2949 (XXVII) AND BY THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY.

IN CONCLUSION MR. PRESIDENT, I WISH TO REITERATE THAT THE "PROPOSAL" AS ADOPTED REPRESENTS AN INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF EGYPT AND AN INFRINGEMENT ON ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS. IT, THEREFORE, CONSTITUTES A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES OF NON-ALIGNMENT.

FOR ALL THESE REASONS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT EMPHATICALLY REJECTS THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED AND THE CONSENSUS DECLARED IN CONNECTION WITH THE AFOREMENTIONED PROPOSAL.

PLEASE ACCEPT, EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

BOUTROS BOUTROS GHALI. END TEXT.

4. (U) DEPARTMENT REPEAT OTHER POSTS AS DESIRED.
ATHERTON UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER
BT
#2499

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1979 - 301-825

NNNNVV ESB083BRA778
RP RUQMER
DE RUEHC #5471/01 2711534
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281453Z SEP 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
XMT AMEMBASSY CAIRO
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 255471/01

ECON
CHRG
POL
RF
CHRN

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/25/85 (CREEKMORE, MARION V.,JR.)

TAGS: EGEN, UNCTAD, EAID

SUBJECT: THE NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE AFTER THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT AND THE COW - AN UPDATE

REF: A) STATE 203983; B) STATE 212631 (NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: SINCE REF A, THE HAVANA NAM SUMMIT HAS PRODUCED A FORMAL CALL FOR GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS. THE GROUP OF 77 ADOPTED THIS AS AN INITIATIVE AT THE SEPTEMBER 10-15 SESSION OF THE UNGA COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, AND THE PROPOSAL WILL BE ACTED ON BY THE CURRENT 34TH UNGA. GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS APPEAR THEREFORE, AS ANTICIPATED REFTEL B, TO BE EMERGING AS A CENTRAL ELEMENT IN THE G-77 STRATEGY IN THE NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE. THE UNCSTD, AFTER A SHAKY START, ACHIEVED A MODEST SUCCESS WHICH KEPT BOTH LDC'S AND DC'S FEELING THAT THEY HAD BEGUN TO COME TO GRIPS WITH SOME SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENT ISSUES OF HIGH CONCERN TO BOTH SIDES. THIS OUTCOME REINFORCES OUR BELIEF THAT CONCENTRATION ON CONCRETE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS IS THE BEST WAY TO ADVANCE THE NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE. THE WORLD BANK/IMF MEETINGS IN BELGRADE OCTOBER 2-5 WILL DISCUSS THE SIXTH REPLENISHMENT OF

IDA, THE BANK'S GENERAL CAPITAL INCREASE, AND THE ADEQUACY OF FINANCIAL FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. END SUMMARY.

3. AT THE SEPTEMBER 3-7 MEETING OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, THE PARTICIPATING HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ADOPTED BY CONSENSUS A NUMBER OF DECISIONS IN THE ECONOMIC SECTION OF THE HAVANA DECLARATION AND, IN SEPARATE RESOLUTIONS, WHICH MAY INFLUENCE THE FUTURE OF THE NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE. SPECIFICALLY, THE PARTICIPANTS ENDORSED "LAUNCHING OF A ROUND OF GLOBAL AND SUSTAINED

NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT". THEY STATED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE "ACTION ORIENTED, ALLOW FOR AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO THE MAIN ISSUES INVOLVED, PROCEED SIMULTANEOUSLY ON DIFFERENT PLANES, AND BE OPEN TO ALL." IN ADDITION, THEY CONSIDERED THAT: THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE UN FRAMEWORK; BE COMPLETED WITHIN A SPECIFIED TIMEFRAME; COVER ISSUES INCLUDING RAW MATERIALS, ENERGY, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, MONEY AND FINANCE; AND MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (IDS). THE NAM RESOLUTION FURTHER SUGGESTED THAT THE UNGA COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE (COW) ACT AS THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE NEW GLOBAL ROUND, AND SUBMIT RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROCEDURES, TIMEFRAME, AND AGENDA TO THE 1980 UNGA SPECIAL SESSION.

4. MAJOR NAM ACTORS MOVED QUICKLY, GETTING THE G-77 TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL AND INTRODUCE A SIMILAR RESOLUTION AT THE SEPTEMBER 10-15 COW SESSION IN NEW YORK. THE COW DEBATED THE PROPOSAL, WITH MOST INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES POSING QUESTIONS FOR CLARIFICATION ABOUT THE MANDATE, MODALITIES, AND EFFECT ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS OF THE G-77 PROPOSAL; ALL INDICATED THAT THEIR DECISION ON THIS PROPOSAL MUST AWAIT HIGH-LEVEL CONSIDERATIONS BY CAPITALS. THE COW SENT TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY A G-77 RESOLUTION ON GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS, AGREEING THAT IT REPRESENTS "AN IMPORTANT INITIATIVE" AND RECOMMENDING THAT IT BE CONSIDERED "AS A MATTER OF PRIORITY."

5. THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENT IN THE G-77 PROPOSAL IS ITS INCLUSION OF ENERGY AS A SUBJECT FOR INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION. SINCE THE CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION (CIEC) IN MID-1977, THE OPEC MEMBERS OF THE G-77 HAVE PREVENTED THE GROUP FROM PUTTING FORWARD OR RESPONDING TO GLOBAL ENERGY DISCUSSIONS. THE FRUSTRATION OF SOME OIL-IMPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (OIDC'S) OVER THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS WAS RAISED OPENLY FOR THE FIRST TIME AT UNCTAD V. OPEC COUNTRIES WERE APPARENTLY

FORCED TO AGREE WITHIN THE G-77 TO DISCUSS WAYS OF ASSISTING THE OIDC'S TO DEAL WITH THEIR ENERGY PROBLEMS AND TO PERMIT ENERGY DISCUSSIONS IN NORTH/SOUTH FORA. SINCE UNCTAD, ALGERIA AND VENEZUELA HAVE BEEN LINING UP SUPPORT FOR TRYING TO CONTAIN THE REBELLION OF OIDC'S BY PROPOSING GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS THEIR INTENTION IS PRESUMABLY THE SAME AS IN 1975-77 WHEN OPEC COUNTRIES INSISTED ON WRAPPING THE ENERGY ISSUE IN THE ENTIRE FABRIC OF NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES, THEREBY PREVENTING UNIFIED POSITIONS AGAINST THEM BY DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED CONSUMER COUNTRIES.

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6. HOW SUCCESSFUL THIS TACTIC WILL BE THIS TIME REMAINS TO BE SEEN. THE OIDC COUNTRIES HAVE NOT BEEN DECEIVED BY THE MANEUVER. AT HAVANA, THEY ALSO INSISTED ON -- AND APPARENTLY OBTAINED IN THE LAST HOURS OF THE MEETING -- A CONSENSUS RESOLUTION ON SOUTH/SOUTH COLLECTIVE SELF-RELIANCE WHICH COMMITTED THE OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES TO INCREASE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO OIDC COUNTRIES TO GUARANTEE THEM PRIORITY OF SUPPLY IN CASE OF OIL SHORTAGE, AND TO FINANCE JOINT ENERGY PROJECTS, INCLUDING R&D. THE OIDC'S EXPECT TO NAIL DOWN CONCRETE COMMITMENTS FROM THE OIL EXPORTERS AT A G-77 MEETING IN NEW YORK IN JANUARY, PRIOR TO THE COW MEETING THAT WILL BE HELD IN LATE JANUARY-BT
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EARLY FEBRUARY TO INITIATE PLANNING FOR THE GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS IF THE UNGA DECIDES TO LAUNCH THIS EFFORT.

7. THERE ARE APPARENTLY A NUMBER OF ALTERNATIVES BEING PROMOTED BY VARIOUS G-77 MEMBERS BY WHICH OPEC MEMBERS COULD PROVIDE SPECIAL TREATMENT TO OIDC'S. AMONG THESE ARE: (1) THAT OPEC WILL AGREE TO A DUAL PRICING SYSTEM OR SOME PARTIAL REBATE OR AID SCHEME FOR ESPECIALLY THE POOREST; (2) THAT INDIVIDUAL OPEC MEMBERS WILL MAKE BILATERAL DEALS WITH INFLUENTIAL NON-OIL G-77 MEMBERS TO GET THEIR AGREEMENT ON A HARD LINE G-77 ENERGY POLICY, SIMILAR TO THE ONE IN THE NAM SUMMIT DECLARATION (I.E., THAT DEVELOPED COUNTRY CONSUMERS WHO DO NOT CONSERVE ARE TO BLAME FOR THE ENERGY CRISIS); OR (3) THAT OPEC COUNTRIES INCREASE THEIR BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL (OPEC FUND) ASSISTANCE TO OIL IMPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. IN THE PAST OPEC COUNTRIES HAVE ADAMANTLY OPPOSED DUAL PRICING SCHEMES, BUT THEY HAVE WORKED OUT SPECIAL PAYMENT SCHEMES WITH A FEW KEY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. WE DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH INFORMATION NOW TO ASSESS THE STRENGTH OF SUPPORT FOR ANY OF THESE IDEAS WITHIN THE VARIOUS GROUPS IN THE G-77. SOME MAY BE CONTRARY TO THE INTERESTS OF THE US AND OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS.

8. ENERGY IS THE ONLY MAJOR ECONOMIC SUBJECT NOT NOW UNDER DISCUSSION IN NORTH/SOUTH FORUMS, AND IT IS TOO IMPORTANT TO THE WORLD ECONOMY TO BE IGNORED. NEVERTHELESS, WE ARE RESERVING OUR ENTHUSIASM FOR ENERGY DISCUSSIONS UNTIL THERE IS SOME INDICATION THAT THEY CAN BE CONSTRUCTIVE. AN INTERNATIONAL OUTCOME THAT WOULD LEAD TO ADEQUATE SUPPLIES OF OIL AT REASONABLE PRICES WOULD, OF COURSE, BE WELCOME - BUT PROBABLY DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. A MORE PRODUCTIVE APPROACH MIGHT BE TO WORK OUT WAYS TO TAP WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND FINANCING, AND OPEC FINANCING, FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES IN LDC'S.

9. WHAT IS NOT NEW ABOUT THE G-77 PROPOSAL FOR A NEW ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION FOR DEVELOP-

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MENT, IS ITS INTEREST IN LINKING ENERGY TO OTHER ISSUES IN THE FIELDS OF TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, RAW MATERIALS, MONEY AND FINANCE. WHILE WE AGREE (REF B) THAT THESE ISSUES ARE INTERRELATED AND IMPORTANT, WE BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE ALREADY BEING DISCUSSED IN OTHER FORUMS WHERE PARTICIPANTS HAVE SPECIAL EXPERTISE. ADDITIONALLY, THEY ARE BEING DISCUSSED IN AN INTERRELATED CONTEXT IN THE ONGOING INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (IDS) NEGOTIATIONS. WE DO NOT WANT TO DUPLICATE THE WORK OF EXISTING BODIES. WE ALSO NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE EXPENSE, BOTH IN FINANCIAL AND HUMAN TERMS OF ESTABLISHING NEW BODIES, PARTICULARLY SINCE WORK WILL CONTINUE ELSEWHERE.

10. REGARDING THE G-77 PROPOSAL FOR SUCH NEGOTIATIONS, SECRETARY VANCE STATED IN HIS SEPTEMBER 24 SPEECH TO THE UNGA THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE IN CONSULTATIONS TO DECIDE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF CONDUCTING SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THAT PRIORITY MUST BE GIVEN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO ISSUES ON WHICH CONCRETE RESULTS ARE POSSIBLE AND THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST NOT REPEAT WORK ALREADY BEING DONE ELSEWHERE.

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11. THE UNCSTD CONFERENCE AGREED TO THE CREATION OF AN INTERIM UN FUND FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT TO BE MANAGED BY THE UNDP. THE FUND HAS A TARGET OF NOT LESS THAN $250 MILLION IN VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS OVER 2 YEARS. THE CONFERENCE ALSO CREATED AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECENOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT WITH UNIVERSAL MEMBERSHIP WHICH WILL REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THROUGH ECOSOC. WE EXPECT THE FUND AND THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE WILL BE APPROVED BY THE 34TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY NOW IN SESSION. THE CONFERENCE ACHIEVED A FAIRLY WIDE MEASURE OF CONSENSUS ON THE WAYS IN W'ICH SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CAN BE PUT TO WORK IN ACHIEVING

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, BUT FAILED TO RESOLVE ISSUES RELATING TO THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY.

BOTH SIDES REGARD THE UNCSTD RESULTS AS RELATIVELY SUCCESSFUL AND POTENTIALLY USEFUL.

12. THE WORLD BANK, IBRD AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND ANNUAL MEETINGS WILL BE HELD IN BELGRADE OCTOBER 2-5. THE MAJOR WORLD BANK ISSUES WILL BE THE CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS ON THE BANK'S GENERAL CAPITAL INCREASE (GCI) AND THE SIXTH REPLENISHMENT OF ITS SOFT-LOAN WINDOW,

THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION (IDA). DISCUSSIONS ON THE GCI WILL FOCUS ON THE PROPOSAL TO DOUBLE THE BANK'S AUTHORIZED CAPITAL FROM DOLS 40 BILLION TO DOLS 80 BILLION, WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN APPROVED BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND FORWARDED TO THE BANK GOVERNORS FOR FORMAL VOTES. THE US GOVERNOR WILL BE ABLE TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE GCI ONLY WHEN AUTHORIZED TO DO SO BY CONGRESS. ON IDA VI, THE MAJOR ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION IN BELGRADE (AND NEGOTIATION OCTOBER 8-9 IN DUBROVNIC) ARE THE SIZE OF REPLENISHMENT AND THE RELATIVE SHARES OF THE VARIOUS DONORS. A CONSENSUS SEEMS TO BE DEVELOPING ON A FIGURE IN A DOLS 11.5 TO 12.5 BILLION RANGE.

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13. THE IMF IS NOT EXPECTED IN BELGRADE TO DEAL FORMALLY WITH MANY NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES. THE G-24 HAS WRITTEN AN ACTION PROGRAM WHICH MAY BE DISCUSSED AT A SPECIAL G-77 MINISTERIAL MEETING IN BELGRADE ON SEPTEMBER 29. THIS ACTION PROGRAM MAY ALSO BE ADDRESSED IN THE GENERAL STATEMENTS MADE BY LDC GOVERNMENTS TO THE ANNUAL MEETINGS AND TO THE IMF/IBRD DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE (SEE BELOW). THE G-24 ACTION PROGRAM INCLUDES INTER-ALIA DEMANDS FOR A MEDIUM-TERM FINANCING FACILITY, FURTHER LIBERALIZATION OF THE CFF, AND A REDUCTION OF THE CONDITIONALITY OF IMF DRAWINGS. THESE ISSUES HAVE ALREADY BEEN ADDRESSED BY THE IMF EXECUTIVE BOARD OVER THE PAST YEAR. GUIDELINES FOR CONDITIONALITY HAVE BEEN REVISED; THE CFF HAS BEEN LIBERALIZED.AN INTENSIVE IMF EXAMINATION REVEALED NO NEED FOR A MEDIUM-TERM FACILITY. THE IMF/IBRD DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE (CONSISTING OF 20 FINANCE MINISTERS - 10 FROM DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND 10 FROM LDC'S) WILL MEET IN BELGRADE SEPTEMBER 30. ONE OF THE MAJOR ITEMS IS THE ADEQUACY OF FINANCIAL FLOWS TO LDC'S IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS. THREE PROPOSALS RELATING TO THIS AGENDA ITEM HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE BY THE IMF/IBRD MANAGEMENT AND ARE MAINLY THE OUTGROWTH OF THE FUND/BANK STAFF ANALYSIS ON FINANCIAL FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. THEY CORRESPOND TO ELEMENTS OF THE G-24 DEPUTIES' PROGRAM OF IMMEDIATE ACTION ON MONETARY REFORM.

15. THE FIRST OF THESE PROPOSALS IS THAT MATURITIES FOR EXTENDED FUND FACILITY (EFF) DRAWINGS BE EXTENDED FROM 8 TO 10 YEARS. THE SECOND IS TO ESTABLISH A SUBSIDY ACCOUNT TO ALLOW COUNTRIES TO DRAW FROM THE SUPPLEMENTARY FINANCE FACILITY (WITTEVEEN FACILITY) AT LOWER INTEREST RATES. THE SFF DRAWINGS ARE NOW REPAYABLE AT NEAR-MARKET INTEREST RATES. THE US WILL SUPPORT FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THESE BY THE FUND BOARD. THE THIRD PROPOSAL IS TO ENDORSE EXPANDED IMF/IBRD COLLABORATION IN COUNTRIES WHERE SERIOUS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEMS ARE ANTICIPATED, AND TO INVITE THE IBRD AND THE REGIONAL BANKS TO

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REVIEW THEIR PROGRAM AND SECTOR LENDING CRITERIA. THE US IS WILLING TO SEE INCREASED IBRD PROGRAM LENDING IN CLOSE COLLABORATION WITH THE IMF, BUT IS NOT PREPARED TO SUGGEST PROGRAM LENDING BY THE REGIONAL BANKS.

16. THE US IS A STRONG SUPPORTER OF THE DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE. ALTHOUGH WE SHARE THE DISAPPOINTMENT OF OTHER MEMBERS OVER ITS LACK OF PROGRESS ON SEVERAL IMPORTANT ISSUES, WE HOPE IT WILL BE MORE PRODUCTIVE IN THE FUTURE.

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E.O. 12065 RDS-3, 9/27/89 (BREMER, L. PAUL)

TAGS: CU, UR

SUBJECT: CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

REF: (A) STATE 223273; (B) STATE 236643 (NOTAL);
(C) STATE 250392 (ROGER CHANNEL-NOTAL)

1. SECRET (ENTIRE TEXT, EXCEPT PARAS 4-7, WHICH ARE UNCLASSIFIED.)

2. AS WE CONTINUE TO WEIGH VARIOUS OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF THE SOVIET COMBAT BRIGADE IN CUBA, WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT ALL POSTS HAVE A BASIC FAMILIARITY WITH THE DIMENSIONS OF THE CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. THE DATA BELOW IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY AT THIS TIME. IT MAY BE DISTRIBUTED TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE MISSION AT YOUR DISCRETION. WHILE PARAS 4-7 ARE TECHNICALLY UNCLASSIFIED, POSTS SHOULD HANDLE AS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE. WE ARE NOT REPEAT NOT INSTRUCTING YOU TO USE THIS INFORMATION NOW FOR ANY PURPOSE CONTEMPLATED IN REF A.

3. ALL ARA POSTS: WE REALIZE THAT THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BELOW MAY BE ONLY MARGINALLY SUPPLEMENTAL TO THAT YOU RECEIVED IN REF B, AND IN SOME CASES, REF C AND

THROUGH SRF CHANNELS. PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE SHOULD IN NO WAY AFFECT YOUR IMPLEMENTING THE INSTRUCTIONS YOU RECEIVED IN REFS B AND C.

4. BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED. THE CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. CUBAN ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE.

CUBA S ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION HAS GROWN SINCE THE EARLY 1960'S -- BUT MOST RADICALLY IN THE LAST FEW YEARS -- TO THE POINT WHERE IF SOVIET

ECONOMIC SUPPORT WERE NOW WITHDRAWN THERE WOULD BE A SUBSTANTIAL, IMMEDIATE DROP IN CUBA'S DOMESTIC ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, LITTLE CHANCE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH FOR AT LEAST SEVERAL YEARS, A FORCED, SHARP REDUCTION IN IMPORTS, AND PROBABLE DEFAULT ON VARIOUS (WESTERN) LOANS.

-- SOVIET COMMODITY SUBSIDIES TO CUBA HAVE INCREASED THREEFOLD SINCE 1975, TO A CURRENT LEVEL OF ABOUT $2.7 BILLION PER YEAR. BY COMPARISON, SOVIET COMMODITY SUBSIDIES TO CUBA DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD 1960-1970 TOTALED ABOUT 1 BILLION DOLS.

-- THE LARGEST COMPONENTS OF THIS TYPE OF AID ARE THE ARTIFICIALLY HIGH PRICE PAID BY THE USSR FOR CUBAN SUGAR (ABOUT FIVE TIMES THE CURRENT WORLD PRICE) AND THE LOW PRICE PAID BY CUBA FOR SOVIET PETROLEUM -- ROUGHLY TWO-THIRDS THE PRESENT AVERAGE OPEC PRICE.

-- CUBA DEPENDS ALMOST SOLELY ON THE USSR FOR ITS PETROLEUM SUPPLIES; EVEN THE SMALL PORTION SUPPLIED BY VENEZUELA UNDER A FOUR-WAY SWAP ARRANGEMENT IS PURCHASED FROM THE SOVIETS AT THE SUBSIDIZED PRICE.

-- INCLUDING OTHER FORMS OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND DEVELOPMENT AID), TOTAL SOVIET AID LAST YEAR EXCEEDED 3 BILLION DOLS OR ROUGHLY THE EQUIVALENT OF ONE-FOURTH OF CUBA'S GNP. (DURING THE 1960'S, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND DEVELOPMENT AID WAS THE PRINCIPAL FORM OF SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, TOTALLING WELL OVER 2 BILLION DOLS BETWEEN 1961 AND 1970.)

-- THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO PRODDED EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO PROVIDE CUBA WITH TRADE CREDITS AND SUGAR SUBSIDIES -- TO THE POINT WHERE THEY HAVE OFTEN BOUGHT MORE SUGAR FROM CUBA THAN THEY ACTUALLY NEED. SINCE 1960 THE VALUE OF THIS ASSISTANCE HAS AMOUNTED TO WELL OVER 1 BILLION DOLS.

-- NEARLY THREE-FOURTHS OF CUBAN EXPORTS GO TO THE USSR, WHILE 60 PERCENT OF CUBA'S IMPORTS ARE FROM THE USSR, -- INCLUDING MOST FOODSTUFFS AND A LARGE PROPORTION OF CAPITAL GOODS.

-- CUBA IS A FULL MEMBER OF CEMA; THE ONLY OTHER NON-WARSAW PACT NATIONS THAT PARTICIPATE FULLY IN CEMA ARE MONGOLIA AND VIETNAM.

-- MOSCOW HAS USED ITS ECONOMIC INFLUENCE TO ENCOURAGE SOVIET-STYLE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RESTRUCTURING

WITHIN CUBA ITSELF SINCE THE LATE 1960S.

5. MILITARY ASSISTANCE. LARGELY A PASSIVE RECIPIENT OF SOVIET MILITARY LARGESSE PRIOR TO 1975, CUBA HAS IN RECENT YEARS BEEN TRANSFORMED INTO AN ACTIVE SOVIET MILITARY ALLY.

-- DELIVERIES OF SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO CUBA, AVERAGING MORE THAN 10,000 METRIC TONS PER YEAR FROM 1969-1974, BEGAN TO RISE IN LATE 1975 (ROUGHLY COINCIDENT WITH THE CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA) AND ARE NOW AT ABOUT TWICE THE LEVEL OF THE EARLY 1970S.

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-- THE UNIQUE FEATURE OF SOVIET ARMS DELIVERIES TO CUBA IS THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT CUBA PAYS FOR THE WEAPONS IT RECEIVES (UNLIKE, FOR EXAMPLE, OTHER SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE RECIPIENTS SUCH AS ETHIOPIA AND LIBYA, WITH WHICH REPAYMENT ARRANGEMENTS ARE ESTABLISHED, ALBEIT SOMETIMES ON VERY LIBERAL TERMS).

-- THE VALUE OF SOVIET ARMS SENT TO CUBA SINCE 1961 IS ESTIMATED TO BE AT LEAST 1.5 BILLION DOLS.

-- RECENT DELIVERIES HAVE INCLUDED MORE ADVANCED WEAPONRY, E.G., MIG-23S, AN F-CLASS (DIESEL ATTACK) SUBMARINE, MI-8 ASSAULT HELICOPTERS, OSA II GUIDED MISSILE PATROL BOATS, 2 TURYA-CLASS ASW HYDROFOIL PATROL BOATS, 20 AN-26 CARGO-TROOP TRANSPORTS, BMP ARMORED COMBAT VEHICLES, T-62 TANKS, AND ZSU 23/4 ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS, IN ADDITION TO REPLACEMENT FOR CUBAN EQUIPMENT SENT TO AFRICA AND REGULAR RESUPPLY.

6. MILITARY COORDINATION.

-- A SOVIET GROUND FORCES BRIGADE OF 2,000-3,000 MEN AND CONSISTING OF ARMOR, ARTILLERY, MOTORIZED

INFANTRY AS WELL AS ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND VARIOUS SUPPORT ELEMENTS HAS BEEN LOCATED IN CUBA FOR AT LEAST SEVERAL YEARS.

-- SOVIET PILOTS HAVE FLOWN CUBAN AIR FORCE PLANES ON ROUTINE OPERATIONAL MISSIONS AT VARIOUS TIMES DURING THE PAST THREE YEARS.

-- SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS CALL AT CUBAN PORTS AND NAVAL FACILITIES DURING DEPLOYMENTS TO THE CARIBBEAN, AND JOINT EXERCISES WITH CUBAN NAVAL AND AIR FORCES HAVE BEEN A FREQUENT FEATURE OF THESE DEPLOYMENTS.

-- SOVIET TU-95 RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT PERIODICALLY STAGE OUT OF CUBA TO PATROL ATLANTIC WATERS.

-- CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE COOPERATED CLOSELY IN MILITARY OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA, ETHIOPIA, AND ELSEWHERE. IN ANGOLA, A LARGE PORTION OF THE ARMS USED BY CUBAN GROUND FORCES WAS SOVIET-SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT SHIPPED FROM CUBA. IN ETHIOPIA, ALMOST ALL OF THE WEAPONS USED BY CUBAN FORCES WERE SUPPLIED BY THE SOVIETS AND WERE AIRLIFTED OR SEALIFTED DIRECTLY FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

-- SOVIET-PILOTED IL-62S FLEW A LARGE PROPORTION OF THE CUBAN TROOPS AIRLIFTED TO ANGOLA IN 1975. SEVERAL THOUSAND CUBAN TROOPS WERE ALSO TRANSPORTED TO ETHIOPIA ON SOVIET SHIPS; MANY OF THESE TROOPS WERE FIRST FLOWN TO THE USSR AND THEN TRANSFERRED TO SHIPS SAILING FROM BLACK SEA PORTS. MOST OF THE TRANSPORTATION COSTS WERE APPARENTLY PAID BY THE SOVIETS.

-- THOUGH IN ANGOLA THE SOVIETS ASSUMED A SOMEWHAT LESS CONSPICUOUS ROLE IN THE CONDUCT OF THE FIGHTING DURING 1975-1976, IN ETHIOPIA THE SITUATION WAS QUITE DIFFERENT. THERE, FOR THE FIRST TIME, CUBAN AIR AND GROUND FORCES FOUGHT UNDER THE OVERALL COMMAND OF SOVIET MILITARY OFFICERS. THE COMBINED MILITARY OPERATION IN ETHIOPIA WAS COORDINATED IN PART THROUGH FREQUENT HIGH-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN CUBAN AND SOVIET OFFICIALS IN MOSCOW, HAVANA, AND ADDIS ABABA.

-- SINCE 1977, CUBAN AND SOVIET ADVISORS HAVE BEEN COOPERATING IN TRAINING ZAPU (ZIMBABWE AFRICAN PEOPLES UNION) FORCES IN ZAMBIA AND ANGOLA UNDER THE OVERALL SUPERVISION OF THE SOVIETS.

-- FOLLOWING THE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH YEMEN IN FEBRUARY 1979, SOVIET AIRCRAFT TRANSPORTED AT LEAST SEVERAL HUNDRED CUBAN TROOPS TO SOUTH YEMEN FROM ETHIOPIA, SWELLING THE TOTAL CUBAN MILITARY PRESENCE THERE TO ABOUT 1,000. THE CUBANS PROVIDED REAR ECHELON SUPPORT SERVICES AND SECURITY AND ADVISED PDRY GROUND AND AIR FORCES IN THE USE OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT. (WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM REPORTS OF CUBAN CASUALTIES INCURRED DURING THE FIGHTING ALONG THE BORDER.)

7. POLITICAL COORDINATION.

-- CUBA'S CONSTITUTION, ADOPTED IN 1975, INCLUDES A

CLAUSE PRAISING THE USSR -- A FEATURE SHARED WITH THE CONSTITUTIONS OF MOST EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES BUT WITH THAT OF NO OTHER NAM-MEMBER STATE (OF WHICH WE ARE AWARE.)

-- IN RECENT YEARS, CUBAN AND SOVIET OBJECTIVES HAVE INCREASINGLY COINCIDED. CUBAN POLITICAL, AS WELL AS MILITARY, ACTIONS IN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE IN THE THIRD WORLD HAVE IN MANY CASES CLEARLY FURTHERED SOVIET POLICY OBJECTIVES. JOINT ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN HAVE BEEN COORDINATED THROUGH CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN TOP CUBAN AND SOVIET OFFICIALS IN MOSCOW AND, LESS FREQUENTLY, IN HAVANA.
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-- THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO USED THEIR INFLUENCE TO SHAPE CUBAN POLICIES IN OTHER AREAS. DURING THE EARLY 1970S, FOR EXAMPLE, MOSCOW PRESSURED HAVANA TO CHANNEL SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE THROUGH LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTIES RATHER THAN GIVE DIRECT SUPPORT TO OTHER LESS DOCTRINAIRE OR MORE RADICAL REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS. THE CUBANS ARE SUPPORTING SOME 15 INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA AT THIS TIME.

-- CUBA HAS ASSIDUOUSLY GUARDED SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND UNASHAMEDLY CHAMPIONED THE NOTION OF A "NATURAL ALLIANCE" BETWEEN THE SOVIET BLOC AND THE NAM. WHILE THIS WAS MOST EVIDENT IN THE RECENT HAVANA SUMMIT, EVEN AT THE 1973 ALGIERS SUMMIT CASTRO VIGOROUSLY DEFENDED THE SOVIET UNION AGAINST THE "TWO IMPERIALISMS" THESIS ADVANCED BY ALGERIA AND OTHERS.

-- IN THE UNGA, CUBA'S VOTING IS SO ALIGNED WITH SOVIET INTERESTS THAT IN FOUR OF THE LAST FIVE GA'S IT HAS VOTED FAR MORE CONSISTENTLY WITH THE SOVIETS THAN THE EASTERN EUROPEANS AS A WHOLE ON ISSUES GENERALLY REGARDED AS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT. OVER THE PERIOD 1974-1978, ON SIGNIFICANT ISSUES BEFORE THE UNGA, CUBA VOTED WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON 86 PERCENT OF THESE VOTES, WHILE THE EASTERN EUROPEANS AS A WHOLE VOTED WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON ONLY 57 PERCENT OF THESE VOTES. END UNCLASSIFIED.

8. U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONSHIP. IN EARLY 1977, THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION BEGAN AN EFFORT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CUBA. HOSTILITY ON BOTH SIDES GRADUALLY GAVE WAY TO A MORE PRAGMATIC WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS DIVISIVE ISSUES AND TO TAKE MINOR STEPS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS ON A BASIS

OF STRICT RECIPROCITY. THE U.S. AND CUBA ESTABLISHED INTERESTS SECTIONS IN EACH OTHER'S CAPITALS IN SEPTEMBER 1977. THE U.S. LIFTED RESTRICTIONS ON AMERICANS' TRAVELING TO CUBA AND PERMITTED THE RESUMPTION OF CHARTER FLIGHTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. IN NOVEMBER 1978, CASTRO ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION TO RELEASE MOST OF CUBA'S POLITICAL PRISONERS AND PERMIT THEM TO LEAVE CUBA WITH THEIR FAMILIES. SINCE CASTRO'S ANNOUNCEMENT, CUBA HAS FREED MORE THAN 2,400 POLITICAL PRISONERS. OVERSHADOWING SUCH DEVELOPMENTS AS THESE, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN THE CONTINUED CUBAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFRICA -- STILL TOTALING ABOUT 40,000 TROOPS. THE U.S. HAS EMPHASIZED TO CUBA THAT THERE CAN BE NO SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD NORMALIZATION UNTIL THERE ARE CLEAR SIGNS OF A CHANGE IN CUBA'S MILITARY POSTURE IN AFRICA, INCLUDING TROOP REDUCTIONS. THE U.S. CONTINUES TO MONITOR CLOSELY CUBA'S BEHAVIOR IN THE WAKE OF RECENT EVENTS IN GRENADA AND NICARAGUA TO ENSURE THAT CUBA DOES NOT RETURN TO ITS EARLIER, PRE-1970'S POLICY OF "EXPORTING REVOLUTION" IN THIS HEMISPHERE. VANCE
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RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0435
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 2996
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE YYQE
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN IMMEDIATE 2129
RUESSD/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO IMMEDIATE 0268
RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 9938
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 1490
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 8577
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 3525
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 1231
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 4332
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 7880
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE WOWT
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 8063
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5357
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 6778
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 5544
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 9225
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 7165
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8901
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0189
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 2465
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 2997
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 7849
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 3275
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 9989
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9535
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 3395
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4538
RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 8868
RUDISDF/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK IMMEDIATE 8050
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1519
RUDKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 9184
RUDKFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 5583
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 1007
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1388
RUFHDB/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 6124
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 258198/01

ROME FOR THE VATICAN

E.O. 12065 GDS 10/1/:9 (KREISBERG, PAUL H.)

TAGS: US,UR,CU

POL
CHG
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SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA.

1. AMBASSADOR/CHARGE SHOULD DRAW ON FOLLOWING POINTS IN BRIEFING SENIOR APPROPRIATE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS ON THE BACKGROUND OF PRESIDENT'S OCTOBER 1 STATEMENT ON THE SOVIET COMBAT BRIGADE IN CUBA (SEPTEL). WHILE MANNER OF PRESENTATION IS LEFT TO YOUR DISCRETION YOU SHOULD COVER BASIC POINTS INCLUDED BELOW.

BEGIN TEXT

1. THE SOVIET BRIGADE IS ORGANIZED, TRAINED, COMMANDED AND ARMED AS AN INFANTRY BRIGADE. IT UNQUESTIONABLY HAS A COMBAT CAPABILITY. IN ITS PRESENT FORM THIS UNIT HAS BEEN IN CUBA AT LEAST SINCE 1976, AND PERHAPS LONGER.

2. THE BRIGADE DOES NOT POSE A DIRECT MILITARY THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES. WE DO, HOWEVER, REGARD IT AS A SERIOUS MATTER. IT CONTRIBUTES TO TENSION IN THE CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA AND ADDS TO THE FEARS OF SOME COUNTRIES THAT THEY MAY COME UNDER SOVIET OR CUBAN PRESSURE. IT IS PART OF A CLOSER SOVIET-CUBAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIP, WHICH INVOLVES ARMING CUBA WITH MODERN WEAPONS, AND CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM THE LARGER PATTERN OF SOVIET SUPPORT FOR ARMED CUBAN INTERVENTION IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD.

3. OVER THE PAST THREE WEEKS, U.S. OFFICIALS HAVE DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE AT GREAT LENGTH WITH TOP SOVIET OFFICIALS. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT THE PRESENCE OF A SOVIET COMBAT UNIT IN CUBA IS A MATTER OF GREAT CONCERN TO US.

4. THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT ADMIT THAT THE UNIT IN QUESTION IS A COMBAT UNIT. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE CERTAIN STATEMENTS TO US WITH RESPECT TO OUR CONCERN:

-- THE UNIT IN QUESTION IS A TRAINING CENTER, WHICH DOES NOTHING MORE THAN TRAINING AND CAN DO NOTHING MORE;

-- THEY WILL NOT CHANGE ITS FUNCTION OR STATUS AS A TRAINING CENTER; WE UNDERSTAND THIS TO MEAN THAT THEY DO NOT INTEND TO ENLARGE THE UNIT OR GIVE IT ADDITIONAL CAPABILITIES;

-- THE SOVIET PERSONNEL IN CUBA ARE NOT AND WILL NOT BE A THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES OR ANY OTHER NATION;

-- THE SOVIETS HAVE REAFFIRMED THE 1962 UNDERSTANDING AND THE MUTUALLY AGREED CONFIRMATION IN 1970 NOT TO STATION OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN CUBA AND WILL ABIDE BY IT IN THE FUTURE. THE U.S., FOR ITS PART, CONFIRMS THIS UNDERSTANDING.

5. THESE ASSURANCES HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO THE U.S. FROM THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE THAT THE UNIT IS A COMBAT BRIGADE,
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RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 4333
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 7881
RUESBG/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 2926
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 8864
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5358
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 6779
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 5545
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 9226
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 7166
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8982
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0190
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 2466
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 2999
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 7858
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 3276
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 9998
RUFHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9536
RUDKPNQ/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 3396
RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 4539
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RUDISDF/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK IMMEDIATE 8851
RUFHBG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 1528
RUDKSNQ/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 9185
RUDKFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 5584
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 1866
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THE SOVIET STATEMENTS ABOUT THE FUTURE NON-COMBAT STATUS OF THE UNIT ARE SIGNIFICANT. THEY IMPLICITLY RECOGNIZE THAT THE PRESENCE OF A SOVIET COMBAT UNIT IN CUBA WOULD BE A MATTER OF CONCERN TO US AND TO OTHER NATIONS. HOWEVER, THE U.S. CANNOT REST UPON THESE SOVIET STATEMENTS ALONE.

-- WE WILL ASSURE WITH OUR OWN MEANS THAT NO SOVIET UNIT IN CUBA WILL BE USED AS A COMBAT FORCE TO THREATEN THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES OR ANY OTHER NATION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. THE UNITED STATES WILL ACT IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN MEETING ANY SUCH THREAT FROM SOVIET OR CUBAN FORCES. (FOR LATIN AMERICAN ADDRESSEES: THIS POLICY IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR RESPONSIBILITIES AS MEMBERS OF THE OAS AND THE RIO TREATY. IT REAFFIRMS IN NEW CIRCUMSTANCES PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S DECLARATION IN 1963 "THAT WE WOULD NOT PERMIT ANY TROOPS FROM CUBA TO MOVE OFF THE ISLAND OF CUBA IN ANY OFFENSIVE ACTION AGAINST ANY NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.")

-- WE SHALL ESTABLISH A FULL-TIME CARIBBEAN JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERED AT KEY WEST, FLORIDA; THIS WILL SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVE OUR CAPABILITY TO MONITOR AND RESPOND RAPIDLY TO ANY ATTEMPTED MILITARY ENCROACHMENT IN THE REGION;

-- WE WILL EXPAND MILITARY EXERCISES IN THE REGION;

-- WE WILL INCREASE OUR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA TO HELP THEM DEAL WITH UNREST BROUGHT ABOUT BY UNMET SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NEEDS;

-- WE WILL ACCELERATE OUR EFFORTS TO INCREASE OUR CAPACITY TO PROJECT OUR MILITARY FORCES WORLDWIDE IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR HELP FROM OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS;

-- WE SHALL ENHANCE OUR INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES TO MONITOR SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN CUBA AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

6. THESE STEPS REFLECT THE PRESIDENT'S DETERMINATION TO PRESERVE PEACE, TO STRENGTHEN OUR ALLIANCES, TO DEFEND THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PRESIDENT HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE BRIGADE ISSUE IS NO REASON FOR A RETURN TO THE COLD WAR. THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE ITS DETERMINED EFFORT TO ASSURE THAT THE SALT II TREATY IS SPEEDILY RATIFIED.

7. THE PURPOSE OF THE ACTIONS THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED LAST NIGHT AND THE PURPOSE OF SALT II ARE EXACTLY THE SAME. THAT PURPOSE IS A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE WORLD. THE USG HOPES FOR THE SUPPORT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT FOR THESE ACTIONS. END TEXT. VANCE

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E.O. 12065 RDS-3 10/9/99 (NEWSOM, DAVID D.)

TAGS: CU, UR, PORG

SUBJECT: CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

REF: (A) STATE 223273; (B) STATE 236643 (NOTAL);
(C) STATE 250392 (ROGER CHANNEL - NOTAL); NO
(D) STATE 255565.

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES MISSIONS' CAN ID RESPONSES TO REF A. MANY POSTS MADE HELPFUL SUGGESTIONS, POINTED OUT AREAS OF PARTICULAR LOCAL/REGIONAL CONCERN OR SENSITIVITY, AND EXPRESSED USEFUL CAVEATS TO GUIDE OUR EFFORT TO HEIGHTEN INTERNATIONAL AWARENESS OF THE DIMENSIONS OF THE CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.

Refs B & C not received
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3. THE UNDERTAKING OUTLINED HEREIN IS BUT ONE ASPECT OF A BROA ER U.S. INITIATIVE AIMED AT (A) INHIBITING THE SOVIET BUILD-UP OF CUBA'S ARMED FORCES AND (B) COUNTERING CUBA'S SOVIET-BACKED FOREIGN POLITICO-MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND DRIVE FOR DOMINANCE IN THE THIRD WORLD. MANY MISSIONS WILL BE RECEIVING OTHER, ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS RELATED TO THIS INITIATIVE IN THE COMING WEEKS.

4. OUR EFFORT TO "PUBLICIZE" THE EXTENT OF THE CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP WILL HAVE FIVE BASIC ELEMENTS:

-- (1) SELECTIVE AND DISCREET APPROACHES BY POSTS TO HOST-GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL GN MEDIA FIGURES, AND, WHERE POTENTIALLY USEFUL, FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES;

-- (2) ICA SUPPORT, INCLUDING PERIODIC WIRELESS FILE AND OTHER ARTICLES FOR USE AT MISSIONS' DISCRETION, AND INCREASED ATTENTION TO THIS TOPIC. AS APPROPRIATE, IN VOA BROADCASTS;

-- (3) A BACKGROUNDING EFFORT BY USG OFFICIALS EMPHASIZING THE EXTENT AND EFFECTS OF SOVIET/CUBAN COLLUSION AND CUBA'S ALIGNED "NON-ALIGNMENT;"

-- (4) COORDINATION WITH SRF; AND

-- (5) A REQUIREMENT THAT EACH MISSION DEVOTE MORE ATTENTION IN ITS REPORTING EFFORTS TO INFORMATION ON THE CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP.

5. ALL AMERICAN REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS SHOULD CONSIDER THE INSTRUCTIONS IN THIS CABLE SUPPLEMENTAL TO THOSE IN REFS B AND C. DEMARCHES MADE NEED NOT BE REPEATED.

6. GUIDELINES. AS NOTED ABOVE, MOST MISSIONS IN RESPONDING TO REF A POINTED OUT SPECIFIC AREAS OF SENSITIVITY OR CONSIDERATIONS REQUIRING CAUTION IN CARRYING OUT THIS EFFORT IN HOST-COUNTRIES. FOR THESE REASONS, AND BECAUSE OF THE PRACTICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE DEPARTMENT'S EFFECTIVELY STRUCTURING THIS EFFORT ON A COUNTRY-SPECIFIC BASIS, CONSIDERABLE DISCRETION IS LEFT TO INDIVIDUAL MISSIONS. ALL MISSIONS, HOWEVER, WILL FOLLOW THESE GUIDELINES:

-- THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD TAKE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DIRECTING AND MONITORING THIS EFFORT, CLOSELY COORDINATING WITH SRNGM THE NUMBER OF AMERICANS INVOLVED, PARTICULARLY IN PASSING INFORMATION TO HOST-GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND OTHERS, SHOULD BE LIMITED -- AND IN FEW CASES EXCEED ONE OR TWO IN ADDITION TO AMBASSADOR/CHARGE, SRF, AND, WHERE AMBASSADORS DEEM APPROPRIATE, THE PAO.

-- IN COUNTRIES WHERE SRF IS ALREADY ACTIVE IN THIS AREA, AMBASSADOR/CHARGE SHOULD ENSURE, IN DETERMINING SCOPE OF MORE "OPEN" EFFORT OUTLINED HERE, THAT ONE EFFORT DOES NOT UNDERMINE OR DISCREDIT THE OTHER.

-- MISSIONS WHICH ARGUED IN RESPONSE TO REF A THAT NO NEW EFFORT SHOULD BE INITIATED IN HOST-COUNTRIES AT PRESENT TIME, AND ALL US MISSIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, UNLESS DIRECTED OTHERWISE BY SEPTEL, NEED TAKE NO ACTION IN RESPONSE TO THIS CABLE EXCEPT THAT CALLED FOR IN PARA 9 -- ON REPORTING OF LOCAL MEDIA REACTION AND COVERAGE -- IN PARA 12 -- ON MISSION REPORTING IN GENERAL -- AND IN PARA 18.

what did we do?

-- AMONG THE FACTORS MISSIONS OBVIOUSLY WILL NEED TO WEIGH CAREFULLY IN DETERMINING HOW MOST EFFECTIVELY TO CARRY OUT THIS EFFORT IS THE STATE OF HOST-COUNTRY RELATIONS WITH THE CUBANS AND THE SOVIETS. WHERE TIES ARE CLOSE AND PERCEIVED BY BOTH SIDES AS BENEFICIAL, PARTICULAR CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED. SIMILARLY, MISSIONS WILL NEED TO BE CAUTIOUS IN USING INFORMATION ON ASPECTS OF THE CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP WHICH MAY BE SEEN PREJUDICIALLY AS SIMILAR TO U.S. ACTIONS IN OR WITH HOST OR OTHER COUNTRIES.

-- USICA, IN KEEPING WITH ITS PRESIDENTIAL MISSION STATEMENT, WILL NOT ENGAGE IN ANY ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD
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REASONABLY BE DESCRIBED AS COVERT.

7. THE CURRENT BASE OF INFORMATION FOR MISSIONS' USE IN ELEMENT (1) OF THIS EFFORT WAS CONVEYED TO POSTS IN PARAS 4-7 OF REF D. IT WILL BE SUPPLEMENTED AS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BECOMES AVAILABLE. MISSIONS SHOULD TAILOR THIS MATERIAL TO LOCAL OR REGIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONCERNS. (FOR EXAMPLE, CERTAIN OF THE DATA IN PARA 4 OF REF D MIGHT BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE IF USED WITH OFFICIALS OF A DEVELOPING COUNTRY ITSELF DESIROUS OF COMMODITY SUBSIDY FORMS OF ASSISTANCE AND OF OBTAINING PETROLEUM AT SUBSIDIZED PRICES.) IF INFORMATION ON SPECIFIC SUBJECTS INVOLVING CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL TO YOUR MISSION IN CARRYING OUT THIS EFFORT, AND YOU BELIEVE INFORMATION ON THESE SUBJECTS MAY BE AVAILABLE, PLEASE SO INFORM THE DEPARTMENT. INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC REQUESTS ALREADY MADE BY SOME MISSIONS WILL BE PROVIDED IF IT IS OR BECOMES AVAILABLE.

8. ACTION REQUESTED -- ELEMENT (1). WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MISSIONS REFERRED TO IN THIRD TIC OF PARA 6, MISSIONS SHOULD DECIDE TO WHOM TO CONVEY INFORMATION AND AVAIL THEMSELVES OF THE EARLIEST APPROPRIAT OPPORTUNITIES TO DO SO. APPROACHES TO HOST-GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS MAY TAKE WHATEVER FORM YOU BELIEVE WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE.

9. ACTION REQUESTED -- ELEMENT (2). FOR USE AT MISSION'S DISCRETION, ICA WILL PROVIDE WIRELESS FILE COVERAGE OF OFFICIAL STATEMENTS, SPEECHES AND INTERVIEWS WITH USG OFFICIALS RELATING TO THE SUBJECTS ADDRESSED BY THIS EFFORT. ICA'S PRESS AND PUBLICATION SERVICE WILL IDENTIFY SUITABLE MATERIAL APPEARING IN U.S. AND FOREIGN PERIODICALS AND NEWSPAPERS AND TRANSMIT TEXTS OF THESE VIA WIRELESS FILE OR POUCH. IN ADDITION, USICA ARTICLE ALERT SERVICE WILL ROUTINELY NOTE MATERIALS APPEARING IN PERIODICALS SUBSCRIBED TO BY EACH MISSION WHICH CAN BE REPRODUCED AT POST AND DISTRIBUTED AT MISSION'S DISCRETION. WHERE APPROPRIATE, ICA WIRELESS FILE WILL DEVELOP BACKGROUND ARTICLES BASED ON TIMELY AND FACTUAL INFORMATION, TAILORING THESE WHERE POSSIBLE TO SPECIFIC REGIONAL ISSUES AND CONCERNS. MISSIONS WILL NEED TO CONSIDER "THIRD COUNTRY" AND OTHER POSSIBLE HOST-GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS RELATING TO EMBASSIES' PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIALS IN DECIDING HOW AND TO WHOM THESE ARTICLES ARE DISSEMINATED. MISSIONS SHOULD BE PARTICULARLY ALERT FOR ARTICLES IN HOST-COUNTRY PRESS ON CUBAN TACTICS IN THE NAM AND OTHER SUBJECTS RELATED TO CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONS AND FORWARD SUCH ARTICLES ASAP TO DEPARTMENT (FOR S/P AND INR) FOR POSSIBLE DISTRIBUTION TO AND USE OF OTHER INTERESTED MISSIONS. IN ADDITION, ICA SHOULD REPORT ANY SIGNIFICANT EDITORIAL COMMENT OR PRESS COVERAGE THROUGH ITS REGULAR MEDIA REACTION REPORTING CHANNELS FOR POSSIBLE USE IN VOA BROADCASTS AND OTHER AGENCY MEDIA OUTPUT. ICA SHOULD SLUG REPORT FOR PGM/RC, FOR VOA, AND PASS DEPARTMENT (FOR S/P AND INR). VOA BROADCASTS WILL PROVIDE CONTINUING COVERAGE OF NEWS DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO THIS SUBJECT WITH EMPHASIS ON OFFICIAL U.S. STATEMENTS AND WHERE APPROPRIATE DEVELOP COMMENTARIES SUPPORTING OFFICIAL POLICIES.

10. OFFICIAL USG STATEMENTS AND BACKGROUNDING JOURNALISTS. MANY MISSIONS POINTED OUT THAT HOST-COUNTRY MEDIA WOULD BE FAR MORE RECEPTIVE TO REPRINTING ARTICLES FROM WESTERN PRESS OR WIRE SERVICES THAN FROM OTHER SOURCES. WE ANTICIPATE THAT PRESS AND WIRE SERVICES WILL FIND FUTURE OFFICIAL USG STATEMENTS AND DEPARTMENT'S BACKGROUNDING OF JOURNALISTS ON THIS SUBJECT A BASIS FOR SUCH PIECES.

11. SRF ASPECTS OF THE OVERALL EFFORT WILL BE CONVEYED THROUGH ITS OWN CHANNELS.

12. MISSION REPORTING. MISSIONS SHOULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY TOFOCUS INCREASED ATTENTION ON ANY EVIDENCEOFCUBAN-SOVIET COOPERATION, JOINT ACTIVITY, ETC., WHETHER OR

NOT IT BEARS DIRECTLY ON HOST-COUNTRY. OF GREATEST INTEREST IS ANY EVIDENCE OF CUBANS' ACTING AT THE BEHEST OF, WITH THE SUPPORT OF, OR UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF THE SOVIETS. EVIDENCE OF SIMILARITY OF POSITIONS ADOPTED AND TACTICS EMPLOYED IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IS ALSO USEFUL.

13. ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE. IN PASSING INFORMATION IN REF D TO VARIOUS INDIVIDUALS, MISSIONS SHOULD REFER TO THE PRESIDENT'S OCTOBER 1 STATEMENT ON THE SOVIET COMBAT BRIGADE IN CUBA AS A FIRM EXPRESSION OF OUR CONCERN OVER THE GROWING CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AND OUR RESOLVE TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS TO DEFEND U.S. INTERESTS THREATENED THEREBY. FOR MISSIONS' USE, AS NEEDED, PARA 8 OF REF D PROVIDES A SUMMARY OF THE CURRENT STATE OF U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS. IN ADDITION, TALKING POINTS ARE PROVIDED IN PARAS 14-17 BELOW FOR MISSIONS' USE, AS APPROPRIATE AND AS YOU MAY WISH TO TAILOR THEM, IN RESPONDING TO VARIOUS ASSERTIONS YOU MAY ENCOUNTER IN CONVEYING INFORMATION ON THE CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP TO VARIOUS INDIVIDUALS.
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14. ASSERTION: CUBA'S DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION IS LARGELY A RESULT OF "FORCED" ISOLATION BY AND FROM THE U.S. AND A NUMBER OF ITS LATIN AMERICAN NEIGHBORS.

RESPONSE:

-- U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA AFTER 1959 WAS IN FACT SHAPED BY A SERIES OF PROVOCATIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, THE DISMISSAL OR FLIGHT OF MOST PRO-DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPANTS IN THE FIRST CASTRO GOVERNMENT IN 1959, THE SEIZURE WITHOUT COMPENSATION OF TWO BILLION DOLLARS OF U.S. PROPERTY, CASTRO'S STEADY INTENSIFICATION OF CRITICISM OF THE U.S., AND HIS PROMOTION OF VIOLENT REVOLUTION IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFTER 1960.

-- THE U.S. RESPONSE TO CASTRO S ACTIONS WAS NOT AN ISOLATED ONE. OTHER GOVERNMENTS OF LATIN AMERICA WERE, AFTER ALL, THE PRINCIPAL TARGETS OF CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE EFFORTS. THE OAS RESOLUTION ADOPTED IN 1964, MANDATING THAT MEMBER STATES TERMINATE ALL DIPLOMATICAND TRADE RELATIONS WITH CUBA, WAS CARRIED OUT BY ALL MEMBER STATES EXCEPT MEXICO.

-- THE EFFECTS OF EVEN THIS "ISOLATION," HOWEVER, WERE MITIGATED BY CUBA'S ABILITY TO OBTAIN VIRTUALLY ANY PRODUCT FROM WESTERN EUROPE OR JAPAN THAT IT BOUGHT FROM THE U.S. PRIOR TO 1962.

-- CASTRO FOUND AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE U.S. EXTREMELY USEFUL FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL PURPOSES, PORTRAYING THE BREAK WITH THE U.S. AS AN IMPORTANT STEP FOR THE CUBAN "REVOLUTION." AND WHILE THE GENESIS OF CASTRO'S MARXIST COMMITMENT MAY BE VAGUE, HE MADE LITTLE EFFORT TO DISCLOSE HIS RECEPTIVITY TO CLOSE TIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

-- REGARDLESS OF THE CREDENCE ONE MAY, DESPITE THE FACTS, BE INCLINED TO GIVE THE "ISOLATION" ARGUMENT TO EXPLAIN CASTRO'S EARLY DRIFT TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION, IT CANNOT EXPLAIN THE RAPID GROWTH IN THE CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP IN APPROXIMATELY THE LAST FOUR YEARS, OR THE MAJOR INTENSIFICATION OF CUBA'S SOVIET-SUPPORTED FOREIGN MILITARY ACTIVITY DURING THIS TIME. DURING TWO AND A HALF YEARS OF THIS PERIOD, THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION HAS ACTIVELY ENDEAVORED TO IMPROVE U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS.

15. ASSERTION: THE SOVIETS' RELATIONSHIP WITH CUBA (OR AT LEAST VARIOUS ASPECTS OF IT) IS NOT IN ESSENCE DIFFERENT FROM CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS THE U.S. ENJOYS WITH A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES.

RESPONSE:

-- IN ALMOST EVERY SPHERE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY, CUBAN AND SOVIET POLICIES AND POSITIONS ARE PARALLEL, MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE, AND/OR CLOSELY COORDINATED. U.S. RELATIONS WITH NO OTHER COUNTRY, INCLUDING OUR CLOSEST TREATY ALLIES, REFLECT SUCH A DEGREE OF CONVERGENCE.

-- IN THE AREA OF TRADE, WHILE TRADE WITH THE U.S. MAY BE FOR A FEW COUNTRIES A FACTOR, IN PERCENTAGE TERMS, AS GREAT AS TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS FOR CUBA, THE NATURE OF U.S. TRADE WITH THESE COUNTRIES, AND WHAT IT IMPLIES FOR OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THEM, IS FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT FROM SOVIET-CUBAN TRADE. SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE IS CENTRALLY DETERMINED AND IS DIRECTED TOWARD CLEAR POLITICAL OR POLITICO-MILITARY ENDS -- AS IN THE CASE OF CUBA. U.S. TRADE, BY CONTRAST, IS GOVERNED PRIMARILY BY INTERNATIONAL MARKET FORCES.

-- IN THE AREA OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, THE SOVIETS PROVIDE MOST DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (OR WHAT THEY MIGHT ARGUE IS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE) BILATERALLY, TO FURTHER POLITICAL AIMS. THE U.S. CHANNELS MUCH OF ITS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE THROUGH MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS, WHICH DRASTICALLY REDUCES THE EXTENT TO WHICH THIS AID COULD BE "POLITICALLY" DIRECTED.

-- MUCH OF THE INCREASE IN SOVIET ECONOMIC AID TO CUBA IN RECENT YEARS, I.E., MASSIVE COMMODITIES SUBSIDIES, HAS HAD THE EFFECT OF STUNTING THE DIVERSIFICATION OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY AND FURTHER DEEPENING THE DEPENDENCY RELATIONSHIP. INDEED, DESPITE MOSCOW'S AID, CUBA TODAY REMAINS AS DEPENDENT ON A SINGLE CROP ECONOMY -- SUGAR -- AS IT WAS BEFORE THE REVOLUTION.

-- IN THE AREA OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE, THE U.S. PROVIDES SUCH AID WITH AN EXPLICIT CONGRESSIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST ITS USE FOR OFFENSIVE PURPOSES. NOT ONLY IS SOVIET MILITARY AID GRANTED WITHOUT SUCH A PROHIBITION, IT MORE OFTEN THAN NOT IS GRANTED TO COUNTRIES WHERE ITS POTENTIAL USE FOR OFFENSIVE PURPOSES IS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION.

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-- IN SUM, THE EXTENT AND DEPTH OF THE CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, COMBINED WITH THE CLOSE COORDINATION OF EXTREMELY ACTIVIST FOREIGN POLITICAL AND MILITARY POLICIES, RENDER IT UNIQUE.

16. ASSERTION: UNDER U.S. INFLUENCE, OTHER NATIONS HAVE SERVED U.S- GLOBAL INTERESTS IN MILITARY OR QUASI-MILITARY SITUATIONS IN THIRD AREAS.

RESPONSE:

-- WITH SOVIET SUPPORT, THE CUBANS HAVE ENGAGED A SIGNIFICANT PROPORTION OF THEIR BETTER FORCES IN

NUMEROUS DISPUTES WHICH BY NO STRETCH OF THE IMAGINATION INVOLVE CUBA'S SECURITY INTERESTS. SOVIET-BACKED CUBAN FORCES HAVE IN A NUMBER OF INSTANCES NOT BEEN WITHDRAWN OR DRAWN DOWN IN NUMBER EVEN AFTER THE "VICTORY" OF THE REGIME OR POLITICAL FACTION THEY SUPPORTED AND A REASONABLE PERIOD FOR STABILIZATION. IN EACH OF THESE RESPECTS, SOVIET-CUBAN COLLUSION IN FOREIGN MILITARY ACTIVITIES HAS DIFFERED RADICALLY FROM ANY MILITARY COOPERATION OF THE U.S. OR ITS ALLIES WITH OTHER NATIONS IN THIRD AREAS.

-- CUBAN-SOVIET MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN REGIONAL OR LOCAL CONFLICTS HAS FAR MORE OFTEN THAN NOT SERVED TO (A) EXACERBATE THE SITUATION, (B) HINDER IF NOT PREEMPT EFFORTS OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OR OTHERS TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION BY PEACEFUL MEANS, AND (C) HEIGHTEN THE GENERAL LEVEL OF APPREHENSION AND CONCERN IN THE REGION, PARTICULARLY THAT OUTSIDE WEAPONS AND TROOPS COULD AND WOULD BE USED TO DETERMINE THE OUTCOME OF OTHER REGIONAL DISPUTES.

-- CUBA'S DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION IS NOW SO GREAT THAT ITS ABILITY TO LOWER SIGNIFICANTLY ITS SOVIET-SUPPORTED FOREIGN MILITARY PROFILE MAY BE QUESTIONABLE.

(FYI: WHILE THE U.S. DID AIRLIFT MOROCCAN FORCES INTO ZAIRE IN 1978 TO HELP THAT COUNTRY REPEL AN ARMED ATTACK ORIGINATING IN ANGOLA, THESE TROOPS WERE QUICKLY INTEGRATED INTO A MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE ORGANIZED AT ZAIRE'S REQUEST; AND THEY WERE WITHDRAWN IN A RELATIVELY SHORT TIME.)

17. ASSERTION: WHILE THERE MAY BE SOVIET COMBAT TROOPS IN CUBA, THE U.S. ITSELF MAINTAINS TROOPS NEAR SOVIET BORDERS.

RESPONSE:

-- WHILE THE U.S. MAINTAINS NO ORGANIZED COMBAT FORCES IN ANY NATION PHYSICALLY BORDERING ON THE SOVIET UNION, THERE ARE U.S. AIR AND GROUND FORCES IN SOUTHERN JAPAN. THE U.S. ALSO HAS ADVISORS/TECHNICIANS IN TURKEY, FOR EXAMPLE, BUT NEITHER JAPAN NOR TURKEY PRETENDS TO BE NON-ALIGNED, LET ALONE DESERVING OF LEADERSHIP OF THE NAM -- AS DOES CUBA.

18. ALL MISSIONS SHOULD REPORT TO DEPARTMENT (FOR S/P AND INR) BY NOVEMBER 15 ON WHAT THEY HAVE DONE IN RESPONSE TO THESE INSTRUCTIONS AND ON INITIAL REACTIONS TO AND RESULTS, IF ANY PERCEPTIBLE, OF THIS EFFORT. "NEGATIVE" REPLIES FROM MISSIONS MENTIONED IN THIRD TIC OF PARA 6 ARE ALSO REQUESTED.

FOR AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE
GENEVA FOR USMISSION TO EUROPEAN OFFICE OF UN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
VIENNA FOR US MISSION TO IAEA AND US MISSION TO UNIDO
MONTREAL ONLY FOR US MISSION TO ICAO
PARIS FOR US MISSION TO UNESCO
ROME FOR OFFICE OF THE US REPRESENTATIVE TO FAO
NAIROBI FOR OFFICE OF THE US REPRESENTATIVE TO UNEP

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RUESKN/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 1441
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 04333

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/12/85 (JONES, F.J.) OR-P

TAGS: PORG, UNGA, XF, CU
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST PORTION OF CASTRO'S ADDRESS TO THE
-- 34TH UNGA, OCTOBER 12, 1979

1. (U) SUMMARY: -MOST OF CASTRO'S REMARKS IN THE MIDDLE EAST SECTION OF HIS PLENARY ADDRESS TO THE 34TH UNGA ON OCTOBER 12 FOLLOWED NON-ALIGNED POSITIONS CRITICAL OF ISRAEL, THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TERATY. CASTRO'S COMMENTS ON EGYPT WERE MILDER THAN THOSE EMPLOYED AT HAVANA, HOWEVER , NOTING THAT THE NON-ALIGNED WERE NOT CRITICIZING THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE AND THAT NO ONE WILL EVER FORGET EGYPT'S ROLE AS FOUNDING NATION OF THE NAM. ISRAELI PERMREP BLUM ISSUED A STINGING REPLY TO THE PRESS CORPS SHORTLY AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF CASTRO'S SPEECH, CHARGING HIM WITH BEING A SOVIET PUPPET OPERATING A " TROPICAL GULAG" END SUMMARY

2. (U) FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE MIDDLE EAST PORTION OF CASTRO'S SPEECH.

-- MR. CHAIRMAN, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE PROBLEM OF THE MIDDLE EAST HAS BECOME ONE OF THE SITUATIONS THAT PROVIDES MOST CAUSE FOR WORRY IN THE WORLD TODAY. THE SIXTH SUMMIT CONFERENCE EXAMINED IT IN ITS DOUBLE DIMENSION.

-- ON THE ONE HAND, THE CONFERENCE REAFFIRMED THAT ISRAEL'S DETERMINATION TO PURSUE ITS POLICY OF AGGRESSION, EXPANSIONISM AND COLONIAL SETTLEMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS THREAT TO WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY.

-- THE CONFERENCE ALSO EXAMINED THE PROBLEM FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE RIGHTS OF THE ARAB PEOPLES AND OF THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION.

-- FOR THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION IS THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM OF THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY ARE AN INTEGRAL WHOLE, AND NEITHER CAN BE SETTLED IN ISOLATION FROM THE OTHER.

-- NO JUST PEACE CAN BE ESTABLISHED IN THE REGION UNLESS IT IS BASED ON TOTAL AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL BY

ISRAEL FROM ALL THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES AND THE RECOVERY BY THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE OF ALL THEIR INALIENABLE NATIONAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING THEIR RIGHT TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND. TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND TO THE ESTABLISHEMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE IN PALESTINE , IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3236. THIS IMPLIES THAT ALL MEASURES TAKEN BY ISRAEL IN THE PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES SINCE THEIR OCCUPATION.
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RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 1117
RUESKN/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 1442
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2135
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RUQMDI/AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU 0591
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0734
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0166
RUFHOK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 0593
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INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COLONIES OR SETTLEMENTS IN PALESTINIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES -- WHOSE IMMEDIATE DISMANTLEMENT IS A PREREQUISITE FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBELM --ARE ILLEGAL AND NULL AND VOID.

-- AS I SAID IN MY ADDRESS TO THE SIXTH SUMMIT CONFERENCE, " ... WE ARE NOT FANATICS. THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT HAS ALWAYS LEARNED TO HATE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND POGROMS OF ANY KIND. FROM THE BOTTOM OF OUR HEART, WE REPUDIATED THE MERCILESS PERSECUTION AND GENOCIDE THAT THE NAZIS ONEC VISITED ON THE JEWS, BUT THERE'S NOTHING IN RECENT HISTORY THAT PARALLELS IT MORE THAN THE DISPOSSESSION, PERSECUTION AND GENOCIDE THAT IMPERIALISM AND ZIONISM ARE CURRENTLY PRACTICING AGAINST THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, PUSHED OFF THEIR LAND, EXPELLED FROM THEIR COUNTRY, SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, PERSECUTED AND MURDERED, THE HEROIC PALESTINIANS ARE A VIVID EXAMPLE OF SACRIPICE AND PATRIOTISM, LIVING SYMBOLS OF THE MOST TERRIBLE CRIME OF OUR ERA."

-- HOW COULD ANYONE BE SURPRISED THAT THE CONFERENCE -- FOR REASONS THAT STEMMED NOT FROM ANY POLITICAL PREJUDICE BUT RATHER FROM AN OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS --FELT CALLED UPON TO NOTE THAT THE UNITED STATES' POLICY IS ALIGNING ITSELF WITH ISRAEL AND IN SUPPORTING IT AND WORKING TO OBTAIN PARTIAL SOLUTIONS THAT ARE FAVOURABLE TO ZIONIST AIMS AND TO GUARANTEE THE FRUITS OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PALESTINIAN ARAB PEOPLE AND THE ENTIRE ARAB NATION PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN PREVENTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE REGION?

-- THE FACTS--AND ONLY THE FACTS--LED THE CONFERENCE TO CONDEMN THE UNITED STATES' POLICIES AND MANEUVERS IN THE REGION.

-- WHEN THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT ARRIVED AT THE

CONSENSUS WHICH CONDEMNED THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS AND THE MARCH 1979 EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TREATY, THEIR FORMULATIONS HAD BEEN PRECEDED BY LONG HOURS OF DETAILED STUDY AND FRUITFUL EXCHANGES WHICH ENABLED THE CONFERENCE TO CONSIDER THESE TREATIES NOT ONLY AS A COMPLETE DEFECTION FROM THE ARAB COUNTRIES' CAUSE BUT ALSO AS AN ACT OF COMPLICITY WITH THE CONTINUING OCCUPATION OF ARAB TERRITORIES. THE TERMS ARE HARD, BUT THEY ARE TRUE AND JUST. IT IS NOT THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO THE JUDGMENT OF THE MOVEMENT'S BODIES. THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE COMMAND THE RESPECT OF EACH AND EVERY ONE OF OUR COUNTRIES AND HAVE THE SOLIDARITY OF ALL OUR PEOPLES . THE SAME VOICES THAT WERE RAISED TO DENOUNCE THE CAMP DAVID AGREMENTS AND THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TREATY EULOGIZED GAMAL ABDEL NASSER, A FOUNDER OF THE MOVEMENT AND SUSTAINER OF THE FIGHTING TRADITIONS OF THE ARAB NATION. NO ONE IS OR EVER WILL BE
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UNAWARE OF EGYPT'S HISTORIC ROLE IN ARAB CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT OR ITS MERITS AS A FOUNDING NATION OF AND DRIVING FORCE IN THE MOVEMENT OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES.
END TEXT

3. (C) EGYPTIAN POLCOUNSELLOR TOLD US THAT EGYPTIAN DELEGATION WAS STRUCK BY RELATIVELY MILD TONE OF CASTRO'S REMARKS ON EGYPT, PARTICULARLY COMPARED TO RHETORIC HE EMPLOYED AT HAVANA. HE ATTRIBUTES THIS IN PART TO CUBA'S INTEREST IN GETTING BROAD SUPPORT FOR ITS CANDIDACY FOR LATIN AMERICAN SECUTITY COUNCIL SEAT.

4. (U) ISRAELI PERMREP BLUM,ON OTHER HAND, ISSUED STRONGLY WORDED PRESS RELEASE,CHARGING CASTRO WITH BEING THE MERCENARY AND WILLING PROXY OF THE SOVIET UNION IN ITS PERSISTENT ATTEMPTS TO DESTABILIZE VARIOUS REGIONS INCLUDING THE MIDDLE EAST. BEFORE CASTRO SOLD OUT COMPLETELY TO HIS SOVIET MASTERS, BLUM SAID, HE SPOKE WITH AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT VOICE ABOUT ISRAEL. TODAY HE HAS JOINED THE SHRILL HUE AND CRY ALREADY RAISED IN THE GENERAL DEBATE BY THE ENEMIES OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
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E.O. 12065: RDS-3 10/15/99 (KREISBERG, PAUL)

TAGS: CU, UR, PORG

SUBJECT: CUBAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

REF: STATE 256695

PLEASE CORRECT PARAGRAPH 14, FOURTH TIC, LINES 5 THRU 7, REFTEL, TO READ: "...HE MADE LITTLE EFFORT TO DISGUISE HIS RECEPTIVITY TO CLOSE TIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION." VANCE
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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center

The Nonaligned Movement at the Havana Summit (U)

An Intelligence Assessment

Research for this report was completed on 17 August 1979.

This paper was prepared by analysts in the Office of Political Analysis. The principal author is Sharon McGuire Foster, with contributions from Kathy Summers (economic portion), Dan Lynch (annex A), and David Cariens (annex B). Comments and queries are welcome and should be directed to Ms. Foster, telephone 351-6449. (U)

This study was coordinated within the originating office and with the Office of Economic Research. It was reviewed by the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. (U)

The Nonaligned Movement at the Havana Summit (U)

Overview

Cuba, the chairman of the Nonaligned Summit at Havana, hopes the meeting will signal the start of a new era for the Movement,[1] one in which the Movement would be more active in international affairs and ideologically would be distinctly more pro-Soviet. Over the term of its leadership, Havana can expect to make only small advances toward those goals, since the membership of the Nonaligned Movement is too broad and disparate for Cuba or any other state to effect dramatic changes in the organization's role and direction. Added to that is the inherent constraint of Castro's other goal of using the NAM as a forum to pursue its interests apart from those of the Soviet Union.

The majority of NAM members genuinely espouse independence from the superpowers, and will resist Cuban efforts to give the Movement a pro-Soviet bias. The widespread desire among the members to avoid involvement in superpower controversy also limits the NAM's potential impact on international affairs, as do the broad differences in ideological, political, and economic interests among the members and the lack of a strong institutional structure that would allow the Movement to resolve or override internal dissension.

Despite its internal weakness and diversity, the NAM has been a significant force on those international issues where it could develop a forceful consensus—mainly anticolonial and New International Economic Order questions. Cuba's chairmanship of the NAM could therefore contribute importantly to Havana's drive to enhance its prestige and to play a more active international role as a spokesman for the less developed countries. Any effort on its part to force its desired changes on the NAM, however, would work against that broader aim because it might result in splintering the Movement.

The NAM Summit in Havana will be characterized more than its predecessors by controversy over the basic orientation and structure of the Movement. But Cuba is not likely to risk a deep split in the NAM by pressing its ideological wishes against the majority's opposition.

[1] For a discussion of the organization and structure of the Nonaligned Movement, see *The Nonaligned Movement: Dynamics and Prospects* PA 79-10177 April 1979, Confidential. (U)

The other major contentious issues at the summit involve more immediate political and economic concerns of the members: regional conflicts such as the Middle East and Vietnam-Kampuchea and LDC international economic demands. Bilateral disputes between members—such as Ethiopia-Somalia, and Algeria-Morocco over the Western Sahara—add to the tension and make it difficult for members to deal with the more important questions. Although the radical-moderate split within the NAM will have some influence in determining alignments on these questions, individual geopolitical and economic interests will probably prove more important in shaping attitudes. The rest of the agenda covers issues like southern Africa and disarmament, on which the members broadly agree, and will probably generate little controversy at the meeting.

The above information is unclassified.

Preface

This assessment is divided into two sections. The main text discusses the forthcoming Nonaligned Summit, emphasizing the ideological/leadership struggle between so-called "moderates" and "radicals," and describing issues that are most likely to be considered by NAM members. It suggests some ways that the final NAM declaration will be affected by the interplay of internal political forces.

The second part of the assessment consists of two annexes: one on Cuba, and the other on Yugoslavia. These countries represent the two main philosophical tracks of the Movement. The annexes describe in some detail the orientations and motivations of each country with respect to the NAM, and they speculate on the ways in which these countries will conduct themselves at the summit in pursuit of their goals.

The above information is unclassified.

The Nonaligned Movement at the Havana Summit (U)

Issues at the Nonaligned Summit

The Basis of Nonalignment

On 3-7 September, the Nonaligned Summit will, for the first time in the Movement's history, be chaired by a country whose economic viability depends largely on the Soviet Union. Cuba's chairmanship for the next three years guarantees that controversy at the summit will focus on the basic principles and structure of the NAM. (U)

Philosophy. Cuba does not accept the philosophy of the founders of the NAM, who saw it as an independent force, dissociated from the two superpower blocs. Instead, Havana postulates a natural alliance between the NAM and the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia, the main defender of the NAM's founding principles, is leading the effort to prevent Cuba from imprinting its brand of nonalignment on the Movement. (U)

The disagreement over the basic orientation of the NAM is now focused on the 75-page summit declaration recently drafted by Cuba. Havana's view of an alliance between the NAM and the "socialist" states against the "imperialist" West is not directly stated in the draft, but it is clearly implied. (C)

Many NAM members were surprised by the draft's obvious pro-Soviet bias and general indictment of the entire range of US and Western foreign policy. The low-key approach that Cuba adopted at last year's Belgrade Foreign Ministers meeting and the June Coordinating Bureau meeting in Colombo lulled members into thinking that Cuba had moderated its tactics. That complacency has now been severely shaken. (C)

Cuba's aim in producing such a harsh draft was probably to provide room for "give" in negotiations, to placate the Soviets, and to gain political backing from NAM radicals. At the same time, it hoped to limit moderate opposition by pointing to its behavior at Belgrade and Colombo and by its declared willingness to accept revisions in the draft. It does not appear to have succeeded in the latter goal. The Havana draft has so aroused the suspicions of the moderates that they are now approaching the summit in an aggressive mood. (C)

Yugoslavia and India, in close contact with almost half the membership, are preparing significant revisions to the draft. The ASEAN and African members may rewrite the relevant regional sections. Yugoslavia, in keeping with its previous negotiating behavior at meetings, will devote its primary attention to the philosophical aspects of the draft, avoiding as much as possible the more concrete political issues such as the Middle East. Most of the anti-Western rhetoric that is associated with specific issues in the draft will, therefore, probably survive. The Yugoslav faction will concentrate more on eliminating the draft's endorsement of Soviet philosophy than on erasing its anti-Western elements. (C)

The concerted reaction against the overall tone of the draft by a large majority of NAM members strongly suggests that they believe the draft does not represent the Nonaligned Movement's principles or their interests, and that they are willing to challenge any Cuban effort to dominate and reorient the Movement. Cuba will, therefore, probably not press its NAM philosophy, since it does not appear willing to risk a splintering of the Movement. (C)

Structure. Yugoslavia will probably be less successful in its effort to alter the NAM structure than it was in its campaign to preserve the basic principles of the Movement. The loose institutional machinery of the NAM vests a great deal of power in the Movement's chairman, who heads the Coordinating Bureau, initiates most drafts, and prepares agendas. In 1978, Yugoslavia proposed several institutional changes, aimed specifically at curbing the power of Cuba: clearer definition of the functions of the Bureau chairman; enlargement of the Bureau to allow more

regional representation; annual full ministerial conferences, which would lessen the role of the Bureau; and full participation of all NAM members in decision-making. (C)

The NAM decides by consensus, but the ambiguous definition of that concept has over the years allowed strong chairmen to declare the existence of consensus despite the reservations of some members. Yugoslavia wants a clearer definition of the concept, so that Cuba will not be able to act without majority agreement. (C)

Although the majority of members agree that some changes are necessary, they are opposed to institutionalizing NAM procedures. Most NAM members fear that clearly defined, restrictive procedures would paralyze an organization that includes such a wide variety of countries and viewpoints. More important, members do not want to institute procedures that might bind them in any way to NAM directives. Some structural alterations will probably be accepted, but no drastic reforms are likely. Thus far, the working group tasked to recommend procedural changes has been unable to reconcile conflicting suggestions for change, other than to increase the size of the Bureau from 25 to 35 seats. (C)

Regional Problems

Bilateral disputes between NAM members, added together, heighten the tension within the NAM but debated individually do not generally threaten to split the Movement. Another set of issues that do have that potential and will probably generate controversy at the summit involves several regional political-military conflicts. Although the radical-moderate split within the NAM will influence members' positions on regional issues, immediate geopolitical interests will probably prove more important in shaping attitudes. (U)

The Middle East. Egypt's conclusion of a peace agreement with Israel has posed a special problem for the NAM. As one of the four founding states, Egypt has always enjoyed a privileged position in the Movement—one that was fully congruent with the members' solid support for the Arab states in their conflict with Israel. Now that congruence no longer exists. (U)

Shortly after the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement, the Arab states opened a campaign to expel Egypt from the NAM. Thus far they have not met with a great deal of success. At a recent meeting of the Organization of African Unity, the Africans refused to censure Egypt's Middle East initiative or to call for Cairo's expulsion from either the OAU or the NAM. Many other NAM members, including Cuba, are more sympathetic to the Arab position, but are concerned that expelling Egypt would create a dangerous precedent for the Movement. (U)

It is unclear whether the Arab states will continue to press their claim for Egypt's expulsion at the Havana Summit. Several factors suggest that they will not. The first is the opposition that the proposal has encountered thus far. Second, Iraq, distracted by internal political turmoil, may not be able to revive the anti-Sadat momentum begun at Baghdad in May. (C)

The apparent unwillingness of the NAM members to expel Egypt does not mean that they have altered their strongly pro-Arab position on the Middle East conflict. They generally disapprove of Egypt's conclusion of a peace agreement with Israel. And they continue to advocate strongly the right of the Palestinians to their own state and recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians. The outcome of the UN Security Council session to consider a revision of Resolution 242[2] will largely determine the tone of the Middle East debates at Havana. If the outcome is unfavorable to the Arabs, they may seek outright condemnation of the peace treaty. And the PLO will likely ask the NAM Summit to call for a UN special session on Palestine. (C)

Southeast Asia. The conflict between Kampuchea and Vietnam, besides involving two NAM members, unavoidably brings the Sino-Soviet rivalry into the Movement and further threatens the principles of nonalignment. Many of the Nonaligned see Vietnam's invasion and establishment of a pro-Vietnamese government in Kampuchea as a Soviet attempt to exert its influence by proxy in the region. More generally, they

[2] Resolution 242, adopted in the Security Council following the 1967 Middle East war, recognizes the right of Israel to exist. The proposed amendment would recognize the Palestinians' right to self-determination. (U)

view those actions as violating the NAM members' principles of noninterference and respect for international borders. (U)

China and the Soviet Union have been lobbying their friends in the NAM on behalf of the Pol Pot and Heng Samrin governments, respectively. Although most NAM members would prefer to stay out of the fray, Singapore may try to open debate on the issue at the summit. Singapore was not permitted at Colombo to express its view that a solution to the Kampuchean problem must consist of a full and total Vietnamese withdrawal, followed by free, unsupervised elections. The other ASEAN members share Singapore's disapproval of the Vietnamese actions in Kampuchea, and although unwilling to challenge Vietnam directly at Colombo, recent reports suggest they may be more willing to deal with the problem head on at Havana. The debates on the situation in Southeast Asia will probably be quite heated. But the NAM members may sidestep the Kampuchean credentials issue for a third time at Havana by either employing the "Maputo formula,"[1] which allows the Pol Pot faction to sit without the right to speak, or by not seating either government until a clearer picture of the situation in Kampuchea emerges. (U)

Settlement of Regional Disputes. A compromise on the Kampuchea representation question would not address the underlying issue of the divisive effect that bilateral disputes have on NAM unity. Sri Lanka has, therefore, proposed that the NAM establish a border dispute commission, and Yugoslavia has revived its idea of creating a mechanism within the NAM to mediate disputes between members. Neither proposal seems likely to win acceptance at Havana. Few NAM members want to see the establishment of an institution that would allow nonregional states to arbitrate their regional disputes. (U)

Other Regional Issues. The summit will probably take a generally hard line on other political issues of interest to the United States, which are all colored in anticolonial shades: Puerto Rico, the Panama Canal, foreign military bases (in particular, Diego Garcia, Puerto Rico, and Guantanamo) and the US economic blockade against Cuba. Although the NAM will endorse anticolonial positions on all of these issues, they are of major concern to only a few members—most notably, Cuba. (U)

Economic Issues

The developing countries are currently disappointed with the results of the fifth UN Conference on Trade and Development, disunited over the energy issue, and confused over the future course of economic negotiations with the developed countries. Several members, therefore, hope that the NAM Summit will focus on economic issues in order to redefine LDC economic demands, restore LDC solidarity on economic issues, and/or reassert the primacy of the NAM over the Group of 77 as the leading developing country spokesman on economic questions. (U)

The Cuban draft summit declaration attempts to respond to these concerns by more stridently demanding LDC economic assistance and by singling out the developed market (that is, Western) economies as the cause of LDC economic problems. It thus exempts the Soviet bloc and the oil-exporting countries from responsibility for LDC economic difficulties. (C)

Because of their disappointment with UNCTAD V, NAM members are inclined to favor a sharply worded economic declaration, but the blatant anti-Western tone of the Cuban draft is offensive to many. We, therefore, expect that the economic section will be substantially rewritten and that Cuba will be prepared to go along with a softer line. (C)

Although the Cuban draft ignores the conflict of interest over energy that divides the LDC importers and exporters of energy, other NAM members are trying to deal with the issue directly. Feeling some pressure from the oil importers, Algeria proposed at Colombo a new round of negotiations similar to the Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), which would discuss energy within the broader frame-work of other economic negotiations. Unlike CIEC, however, the forum proposed by Algeria would be part of the UN system and open to all member countries. (C)

[1] So named from the agreement reached at the Coordinating Bureau meeting held in Maputo, Mozambique, in February 1979. (U)

The Algerian proposal will probably be discussed by a consultative group of experts from about a dozen Nonaligned countries at a presummit meeting in Guyana on 22-23 August. The experts will also consider various suggestions for having OPEC implement procedures to ameliorate the balance-of-payments problems of oil-importing LDCs. (U)

Any proposals agreed to at Guyana will be formally presented at the Havana Summit. If adopted by the NAM, they would probably be forwarded to the Group of 77 for approval and ultimately introduced as a resolution in the UN General Assembly. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the Cuban draft describes the NAM as the "central forum for the elaboration and adoption of policy decisions of the developing countries" and the Group of 77 as a "highly valuable instrument for the coordination and implementation of such policy decisions." (U)

Conclusions

The outcome of the Havana Summit should give a fairly clear idea of the direction of the Nonaligned Movement during the three-year Cuban chairmanship. Cuba clearly would like to lead the NAM, starting at the summit, to more activism in international affairs and to identify more openly and frequently with Soviet policy. But the members' initial response to the draft declaration circulated by Cuba indicates that Havana can at best expect only limited advances toward those goals. (U)

Although Cuba's position as chairman of the NAM does give it an advantage in fostering its goals for the Movement, the advantage is not great enough to overcome the constraints generated by the genuinely nonaligned posture of most of the members and by their differences on specific questions. Moreover, Cuba's own conflicting goals of advancing Soviet interests in the NAM, while using the movement as a forum for pursuit of its own goals, is an additional constraint. (U)

The anticolonial stance of the NAM means that many of its declarations inevitably have an anti-Western tone. But few members are willing to allow the Movement to become an exclusively anti-Western, or even anti-US, forum. Still less are they prepared to make it a pro-Soviet organization. (U)

The nonalignment in world affairs espoused by the majority of NAM members has a negative as well as positive dimension. Instead of attempting to mediate conflicts that involve the superpowers, such as Vietnam-Kampuchea, the NAM tries to avoid involvement. That tendency makes it difficult for the NAM to be an important force in international political and military affairs, even under an activist leader such as Cuba. (U)

The NAM's ability to act on the world scene is further lessened by the great diversity of interests among its members. Conscious of their conflicting interests, the NAM members continually resist any institutional strengthening that might allow the Movement to transcend those differences. The NAM is therefore not likely to be any more successful now than it has been in the past in taking positions on regional political conflicts involving its members. Nor is it likely to be able to reassert its primacy over the Group of 77 as spokesman for LDC interests in multilateral negotiations. (U)

As chairman, Cuba will probably be able to increase pressure on the United States on three major issues that it has previously pushed in the NAM and on which most other members do not have strong views: termination of the economic blockade; the return of Guantanamo Naval Base; and independence for Puerto Rico. Cuba will also use the NAM to increase its role generally in international organizations, including an effort to win a UN Security Council seat this fall and a bid to be host to the next meeting of UNCTAD in 1982 or 1983. But Cuba will probably not be able to lead the NAM substantially further toward an anti-US, pro-Soviet stance. Any such effort would risk splitting the Movement, and Cuba wants to lead the NAM much more than it wants the NAM to reflect its ideological predispositions. (C)

ANNEX A

Cuba and the NAM Summit

Background

Few issues have captured Fidel Castro's attention so completely as has Cuba's role among the less developed countries of the world. Since as early as 1959, while casting about for support to escape domination by either superpower, Castro has had an avid interest in uniting the "have not" countries so they could more effectively press their demands on the "haves." Cuba leaped at the chance to become a founding member of the Nonaligned Movement, but Castro did not personally assume the task of enhancing Cuba's Nonaligned role until 1973 when, at the last minute, he decided to head the Cuban delegation to the Algiers Summit. His decision to broaden Cuban activities in the Third World at that particular time stemmed in part from a desire to increase his options in dealing with the Soviets, who the previous year had significantly expanded their influence in Cuban domestic affairs. (U)

At Algiers, Castro sought to overcome Soviet doubts about Cuba's new tack by publicly heaping praise on the USSR, identifying it along with other Communist countries as the natural allies of the Third World. Castro's accolades were so overdone, however, that Libya's Qadhafi walked out during his speech, and Prince Sihanouk heatedly interrupted him in midsentence. A temporary pause in his address, occasioned by a power failure that darkened the meeting hall, enabled cooler heads to restore order, but Castro had to spend the rest of his stay in Algiers making amends. To mollify offended Arab delegations, he broke relations with Israel so abruptly that his Foreign Ministry did not learn of the decision until informed of it by the Israeli Ambassador in Havana. That, plus the efforts of President Boumediene to assuage bruised egos, barely kept Castro's performance from ending in complete disaster. (S NF)

Profiting from the Algiers experience and concerned that his presence might provoke criticism of Cuba's new military role in Africa, Castro in 1976 chose not to attend the fifth summit in Colombo. Instead, top foreign policy official Carlos Rafael Rodriguez led the Cuban delegation, managed to spike any formal condemnation of Cuban militarism, and gained confirmation of Havana as the site of the sixth summit. (U)

Summit Preparations

Castro has placed such a high priority on a successful sixth summit that Cuban officialdom has gone to extremes in preparing for it. The cost of building a Palace of Congresses especially for the summit was so high—23 million pesos—that it caused popular grumbling within Cuba about extravagance in the face of acute domestic austerity. Successive waves of emissaries—first Foreign Ministry functionaries, then ambassadors, later ministers, and finally vice presidents—visited virtually all Nonaligned capitals beginning in 1978 to sound out views, explain Cuba's policies and actions, present formal invitations, deliver draft documents, and keep lines of communication open even with those countries expected to be hostile to Cuban positions. (S NF)

The flow of information back to Havana has thus been so great that the Cuban leadership cannot fail to have a detailed grasp of all the issues that might cause problems in September as well as the positions and priorities of all the delegations regarding each issue. A number of governments have taken pains to make clear to Havana's envoys their deep concern over Cuban intentions, and, in particular, Cuba's willingness to serve as an agent of Soviet penetration of the Movement. Many have voiced plainly their fears that Cuban leadership will have a divisive impact on the Movement. Perhaps no host's chairmanship, in the 18-year history of the Movement, has been anticipated with such alarm and skepticism by so many members, and

this message has come through to the Cuban leadership. If Castro makes any diplomatic blunders as he did in 1973, he cannot lay claim to being ill informed; on the other hand, if he presses a line vigorously against the prevailing sentiment, it can be assumed that he is taking a calculated risk and not acting through ignorance. (S NF)

Cuba's Position

Castro knows that the radical Arab's challenge to Egypt's continued membership is a potential bombshell for Cuba. He realizes that the Nonaligned majority will not approve Egypt's ouster, but he pledged months ago to back the radicals, because Cuba needs their bilateral financial support (which has jumped sharply in the past two years). He no doubt expects that by the time the summit opens he will have amassed enough evidence to convince the radicals of the futility of pressing for a vote and to get them, instead, to substitute a condemnation of Egypt, Israel, and the Camp David accords. If the Arabs accede, he will have preserved his bilateral relationships and avoided becoming embroiled in an issue that has little relevance for Cuba. He would also gain prestige for having acted responsibly to arrange a compromise when faced with a dangerously divisive matter. If, however, the Arab radicals insist on Egypt's expulsion, Cuba would find itself embarrassingly caught in the middle of a serious challenge to Nonaligned unity; if forced to choose, Castro would probably decide to back the radicals against the majority. (S NF)

Castro probably also expects to finesse the Kampuchean representation issue through some form of procedural maneuvering—if he cannot get a definitive decision in favor of the Vietnamese-backed regime—with the expectation that external events will eventually render the matter a nonissue. He strongly backs the Vietnamese-imposed regime and presumably is confident that time will undercut the Pol Pot group's claim to legitimacy. Similarly Castro is likely to move very warily through the Western Sahara minefield lest he alienate Algeria and other Arab radicals or, conversely, damage his already bruised ties with Morocco—and, indirectly, Morocco's ties with Moscow—by choosing sides for or against the Polisario Front. His revolutionary convictions will compel him to support the Front if he is forced to make a choice, but he is likely to use diplomatic means to prevent the issue from reaching that point. (U)

Castro will probably hail Soviet beneficence and claim that the USSR is the world's main bulwark against "imperialism"; unlike 1973, he will not fight the majority to have the summit put its imprimatur on this line. This does not mean that Havana has abandoned the "natural ally" concept; only that it has set its priorities. The first is to gain the confidence of the majority of NAM members. He will have ample opportunities after the summit to seek support for his views. (U)

Maintaining Cuban Influence

The Castro regime is proud of the nonmilitary aid it is providing to some two dozen Third World countries, but its aid programs have a rationale based more on practicality than on national pride or moral factors. The Cubans use aid missions in many cases to ingratiate themselves with friendly governments and to expand Cuban influence in the recipient countries. By sending thousands of Cubans overseas in response to requests for aid, the Castro regime also expects to build up a vast reservoir of political debts, and these could prove useful in deliberations at the summit. (U)

There are signs that Havana is, in fact, planning to remind its aid recipients of this indebtedness. Since early this year, film crews from the commission that manages Cuba's foreign assistance programs have visited many countries filming the labors of Cuban medical brigades, construction teams, fishing and agricultural advisers, teachers, and other civilian specialists. If the films were for general propaganda, they most likely would have been collected by teams from other government entities. Numerous articles lauding the efforts of Cuban "internationalist cooperants" have already appeared in Cuban journals circulated abroad underscoring Havana's conviction that the "humanitarian" aspect of the work done by some 11,000 Cuban civilians serving in foreign countries can be used effectively to offset the negative impact of the 35,000 or more Cuban military personnel stationed abroad. Moreover, a monthly Third World

journal, which is published in three languages in Mexico City by what almost certainly is a Cuban front organization, devoted half of its March issue to a series of very favorable articles on Cuban aid programs and civilian personnel in Africa and the Middle East. (S NF)

Signs also suggest that Castro is taking special care to ensure the broadest media coverage of any summit to date. Cuban communications officials have been sent abroad to arrange coverage, and new facilities are being built at home to guarantee international radio, television, telephone, and press transmissions. No doubt aware that—with the right communications facilities—the summit could give him his largest audience ever and thus his most significant opportunity to promote Cuban foreign policy goals. Castro may try to time his speeches for morning hours, thus permitting live coverage in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East during local afternoon and evening listening time. Attempting to capitalize on such an audience means that in his addresses he would avoid taking sides on sensitive Nonaligned issues and would press "safe" topics such as denunciations of Israel, South Africa, and the United States, believing that the anticolonialist bent of most of his listeners would make them particularly receptive to his arguments against the US economic "blockade," the Guantanamo naval base, and Puerto Rico's present status. (S NF)

Confirmation of Cuban intentions to play safe, in general, at the summit and not risk polarizing the Movement is likely to appear first in the presummit negotiations on the draft declaration. Havana recently circulated a harsh draft almost certainly recognizing that it would undergo revision. By willingly negotiating softer language on sensitive issues, Havana hopes to create an image of reasonableness and responsibility, and to disarm critics. Castro can then insist on stern language on less sensitive issues—imperialism, Colonialism, and the United States. It then would have a document—one that ostensibly has the backing of much of the world's population—that it could use in other international forums to undercut US influence. (U)

After Havana

Fidel Castro does not view a successful summit as an end in itself. Instead, he sees it primarily as a means of exerting leverage on the United States to resolve certain basic issues considered vital to Cuban interests. He has seen the United States negotiate with Peru for nationalized property and with Panama for a return of the Canal Zone to Panamanian control. These events lead him to believe that Washington, if subjected to the pressure of world public opinion, will choose to negotiate where once, from Castro's point of view, it reacted almost automatically with military force. He is optimistic that if he can exploit this tendency appropriately, he will see in time the termination of the economic "blockade" and the return of the Guantanamo naval base to Cuba; he may even believe he can eventually force Puerto Rican independence, and this justifies in his own mind his investment of scarce Cuban resources in such organizations as the Nonaligned Movement and the United Nations. A strong, unified Nonaligned Movement, therefore, is to Castro's advantage, and he will avoid actions that might polarize it. He will not be in full control of events, however, and if some influential delegations are uncompromising on extreme positions, he may see Nonaligned unity threatened despite his best efforts to sidestep confrontation. A successful summit, on the other hand, would nourish his conviction that considerable capital is to be made in the international arena, and this rather than domestic matters, would get the lion's share of his attention indefinitely. (U)

ANNEX B

Yugoslavia and the NAM Summit

Confidence and Concern

Belgrade is approaching the Nonaligned Summit in Havana with a degree of confidence that its immediate aim of thwarting Cuban efforts to draw the NAM closer to the Soviet Union is meeting with some success. Over the long run, however, the Yugoslavs are not sanguine that the NAM, under Cuba's titular leadership until 1982, will remain an independent, nonbloc force. President Tito, the sole surviving NAM founder, has repeatedly warned—both publicly and privately—against efforts to manipulate and divide the Movement. (s)

In preparing for the Havana meeting during the last 18 months, the Yugoslavs have become more conscious of the risks of Soviet-inspired efforts to bring the more radical NAM members into closer collaboration and to push the Movement toward a closer identification with Moscow's policies. Moreover, Cuba's activities in Africa and the Soviet-supported invasion of Kampuchea by Vietnam have increased Yugoslav nervousness about the USSR's intentions toward the Third World. (s)

In looking toward the summit and, more important, to the period after when Cuban Premier Castro will be the NAM's chairman, Belgrade is worried that the pro-Soviet tendency in the Movement could grow stronger and force a split that would cut Yugoslavia off from the bulk of the NAM members. Specifically, Belgrade is concerned that Castro, as spokesman for the Movement, could, unless checked at the summit, adopt policies on behalf of the NAM that would undercut the Movement's independence and be in direct contradiction to Yugoslav foreign policy. (s)

Belgrade also sees the ever-tenuous NAM unity threatened by regional conflicts. For example, efforts by the more radical Arabs to expel Egypt because it signed the peace treaty with Israel will be, at minimum, a divisive force at the summit. The lack of any single, clear-cut international issue on which the summit can focus could aid the fragmentation of the Movement along regional lines. (s)

The Soviet Connection

Yugoslavia's role in the NAM has long been an irritant in Yugoslav-Soviet relations. Yugoslavia's Nonaligned policy enabled Belgrade to emerge from virtual diplomatic isolation in the early 1950s following the Tito-Stalin break. Since then, Tito's stature as a major Nonaligned leader has steadily grown, and Yugoslavia's international prestige and influence has been enhanced. Its NAM credentials have been an important factor in thwarting Moscow's efforts to pressure Yugoslavia to return to the Soviet orbit. (s)

The Soviets are well aware that Yugoslavia—as a medium-size state that has successfully defied a superpower—holds a special attraction for the developing nations. Moreover, they recognize that the Yugoslav variant of socialism is a more popular concept in much of the Third World than the Soviet model. Little wonder, then, that the Kremlin believes Belgrade's Nonaligned activity is undercutting Soviet influence in the Third World. (s)

Tactics and Strategy

With the Yugoslav leadership approaching a transition period, Belgrade views the continuation of a truly independent NAM as vital to its interests and goals, indeed critical to its survival as an independent state. Tito has led the fight to retain the fundamental principles and role of nonalignment. There are reports he intends to arrive in Havana several days before the summit in order to try to influence Castro personally and to work for basic changes in the summit declaration. (s)

Yugoslav diplomats have also embarked on an intense campaign in many Nonaligned capitals and at the United Nations to ensure that the summit will endorse policies to Belgrade's liking. In support of this effort, all diplomatic leaves have been canceled, and Yugoslav diplomatic personnel have been instructed to press their views in countries of the Nonaligned Movement. (C NF NC)

Belgrade has also assumed the lead in efforts to circumscribe Cuba's power as NAM president. They propose to do this through changes in the Movement's decisionmaking process and by lobbying for other institutional changes within the NAM. Belgrade's tactics include:

- A proposal to create regional NAM vice presidents.
- A strong reassertion of the main NAM principles at the summit, including peaceful coexistence, the political and economic independence of NAM members, and the prohibition on membership by nonaligned states in military blocs.
- The assertion of the need for the peaceful settlement of disputes among NAM members. (C)

Belgrade will probably garner enough support to see at least a strong reaffirmation of NAM principles reasserted in Havana. There are even indications of growing support for regional vice presidents. As for divisive issues such as Arab efforts to oust Egypt, the Yugoslavs are on record as opposing any move to expel members, but may—as they did at the NAM ministerial meeting in Colombo—leave it to the black Africans to take the lead in defending Egypt's Nonaligned credentials. (S)

Beyond the Summit

While the Hanava NAM Summit probably will end on a relatively complacent note, the final results could be a series of compromises representing the lowest common denominator upon which the participants can agree. The Yugoslavs can live with bland results, but Belgrade will carefully watch the way the Cubans conduct their postsummit stewardship. So long as Tito is alive, the sheer force of his presence and prestige will probably be sufficient to thwart Cuban efforts to push the Movement close to Moscow. (S)

Once the 87-year-old Yugoslav leader is dead, however, Belgrade's influence within the Movement is likely to diminish. Although a new generation of Yugoslav leaders will continue to cultivate Belgrade's political and economic ties in the Third World, nonalignment may no longer be a powerful ingredient in Yugoslav foreign policy, and the task of leading the opposition to realign the NAM could then pass to another influential country, perhaps India, Iraq, or Algeria. (S)







S E C R E T 272212Z JUL 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 484235, SECTION 1 OF 2.

TO: IMMEDIATE NESB (AMT BEIRUT).

WNINTEL EYVINE ORRUM.

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 480049
B. STATE 193073, 25 JUL 79

1. SECRETARY OF STATE STATED PUBLICLY 23 JUL 79 [illegible] NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES WILL HAVE HIGH PRIORITY FOREIGN POLICY [illegible] THESIS TRACES 1980. IN THIS CONTEXT SENIOR POLICYMAKERS HAVE BECOME CONCERNED WITH CUBAN EFFORTS TO ASSUME LEADERSHIP OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM) WHICH IS THE PRINCIPAL POLITICAL FORUM FOR THE THIRD WORLD. THE SPECIFIC NAM CONFRONTATION POINT IS THE CUBAN NAM SUMMIT COMMINIQUE DESCRIBED IN REF A AND DESIGNED TO RALLY A [illegible] AND RADICAL ANTI-U.S. STANCE BY THE THIRD WORLD ON NEARLY EVERY IMPORTANT NORTH/SOUTH ISSUE. IN REF B (SENT TO MOST A[illegible] POSTS), STATE DEPARTMENT HAS [illegible] A MAJOR AND UNUSUAL [illegible] OF MAKING STRONG DEMARCHES TO NEARLY ALL NAM MEMBER COUNTRIES AS WELL AS OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH CAN INFLUENCE NAM MEMBERS. [illegible] SEEKS BASIS RELATING TO THE REACTIONS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND [illegible] OF THE VARIOUS NAM COUNTRIES, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN INFORMAL GROUPS, REGARDING CHANGES IN THE CUBAN DRAFT AS WELL AS [illegible] NAM POSITIONS IN HAVANA AND THEREAFTER, DETAILED STATE REQUIREMENTS, IF PROVIDED BELOW. (NOTE: STATE CAUTIONED THAT IT IS [illegible] THAT MOST GOVERNMENTS NOT BECOME AWARE OF WOMACS ACTIVITIES-A-VIS NAM ISSUES AND THEREFORE NO INFORMATION SHOULD BE SOLICITED FROM LIAISON.) WHILE SOME ADDRESSEES HAVE ADVISED THEY HAVE [illegible] FOR CURRENT ACCESS, REQUIREMENTS ARE SENT TO ALL REF A ADDRESSEES FOR INFORMATION AND REFERENCE IN CASE ACCESS SHOULD DEVELOP. ADDRESSEES BEING ASKED TO USE EXISTING ASSETS TO SATISFY THESE REQUIREMENTS.

2. REQUIREMENTS FOR REPORTING ON THE NAM SUMMIT MEETING IN HAVANA 3-7 SEPTEMBER FIT INTO THE GENERAL CATEGORIES LISTED IN PARA 3 BELOW. THEY ARE GENERALLY APPLICABLE FOR ASSETS MENTIONED IN YOUR [illegible] TO REPORT BUT SHOULD BE REFINED BY STATIONS TO COINCIDE WITH

ACCESS TO EACH ASSET. IN APPROPRIATE CASES, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS
FOR ONE OR A SMALL GROUP OF ASSETS WILL BE ADDRESSED BY SEPARATE
CABLE. WHILE POST-NAM SUMMIT REPORTING ALSO WILL BE ESSENTIAL,
THERE IS AN URGENT REQUIREMENT FOR PROMPT REPORTING OF DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE PRE-NAM SUMMIT PERIOD. PRE-SUMMIT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
SHOULD BE ASSIGNED SUITABLE PRECEDENCE TO ASSURE DISTRIBUTION AND
AVAILABILITY FOR POLICY TACTICAL USE IN THE WEEKS AND DAYS BEFORE THE
SUMMIT. THIS IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT AS WORLDWIDE OPPORTUNITIES TO
PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE REPORTING WILL BE SHARPLY LIMITED DURING THE
COURSE OF THE SUMMIT ITSELF.

CURRENTLY WE ARE AWARE OF A SPECIAL NAGB MEETING ON 1
AUGUST IN NEW YORK AND A SCHEDULED MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETING IN
HAVANA PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT. WE EXPECT MOST DEVELOPMENTS TO TAKE
PLACE AT NUMEROUS INFORMAL MEETINGS IN MANY WORLD CAPITALS OF CORE
GROUPS OR MEETINGS FOCUSING ON SPECIAL COMMON INTERESTS OR
NUMEROUS ROVING DELEGATIONS FROM ALL SIDES WORKING FOR THEIR SPECIAL
INTERESTS. WE NEED TO IDENTIFY THESE FACTIONALIZED ACTIONS IN
TIME FOR POLICYMAKERS TO MAKE USE OF THIS INTELLIGENCE.

5. THE GENERAL REQUIREMENTS ARE LISTED BELOW IN THESE
CATEGORIES, (A) TACTICS APPLIED BY NAM MEMBERS AND OUTSIDERS TO
INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF EVENTS; (B) KEY ISSUES IN NAM RESOLUTIONS
AND "CONCENSUS", AND (C) SPECIAL CATEGORIES INVOLVING BOTH
TACTICS AND ISSUES. REF B WILL PROVIDE BACKGROUND FOR
YOU UNABLE TO OBTAIN COPY OF REF B, EMBASSY HAVANA WILL PROVIDE.

A. TACTICS:

-STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF PRO-CUBAN GROUP AND VARIOUS
CERTAIN OF REAL FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES OF CUBA IN THE ISSUANCE
OF STRONGLY ANTI-U.S. DRAFT COMMUNIQUE. ANY SPECIFICS ON WHAT
THESE WOULD BE MOST USEFUL.)

-WHAT EFFORTS AND PLANS ARE UNDERWAY TO LIMIT CUBAN
HOLDING THE SUMMIT. (THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS REQUIREMENT AS
EMPHASIZED BY STATE.)

PAGE 5 DIRECTOR 4R423H S E C R E T

(E) ROLE OF ARAB BLOC.

4. RABAT: PLEASE REVIEW POTENTIAL OF QUALLUDE/1 A/1) FOR PRE-SUMMIT REPORTING EITHER IN MOROCCO OR BY TRAVEL TO LOCATIONS OF STRONG ACCESS. HIS PRESENCE AT OAU MONROVIA MEETING SHOULD GIVE A/1 UNIQUE HEAD START. WE NEED WIDER COVERAGE FROM LEFT AND RADICAL GROUPS BEFORE AND DURING SUMMIT. PLEASE ADVISE.

5. ALGIERS: SAME AS RABAT PARA ABOVE FOR GLOLANG/1.

6. IN ADDITION TO OPS TRAFFIC, PLEASE INCLUDE LAVIS IN SLUG LINE OF ALL NAM INTEL REPORTS.

7. FILE: 202-300-112. RVW 27 JUL 99 DRV D90411 ALL SECRET

S E C R E T

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- DYNAMICS OF NAM FACTIONALISM.

- IDENTIFY THE VARIOUS NAM SUBGROUPS, COMPS, MEETINGS AND ROVING DELEGATIONS, AND THEIR PURPOSE. ARE CERTAIN MEMBERS WHO SHOULD NORMALLY RELATE TO A GROUP BEING EXCLUDED?

- IDENTIFY THE DELEGATIONS, DELEGATES, ANY CUBAN SIDERS WHO APPEAR TO HAVE UNIQUE INFLUENCE WITHIN NAM (THE SEATTAS AND MOVERS) AND THEIR POSITIONS.

- IDENTIFY CUBAN VULNERABILITIES IN NAM ISSUES AND CUBAN ACTIONS TO THWART U.S. EFFORTS TO ALTER CUBAN NAM DRAFT.

TO PLACATE? HOW?

- WHAT PARTICULAR NAM MEMBERS ARE THE CUBANS TRYING

- SOVIET INVOLVEMENT AND PROCESSES USED TO SUPPORT CUBAN ROLE.

- IDENTIFY THE SUBSTANCE AND MECHANICS OF SPECIFIC CONFLICT SITUATIONS.

B. KEY NAM ISSUES:

- POSITIONS TAKEN ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE TREATY CAMP DAVID ACCORDS).

- EFFORTS TO EXPEL EGYPT FROM NAM AND NATURE OF SUPPORT FOR EGYPT

- CUBAN INVOLVEMENT (INTERFERENCE) IN AFRICA AND CENTRAL AMERICA.

- THE ISSUE OF KAMPUCHEAN REPRESENTATION IN NAM

- INDIAN OCEAN

- NICARAGUA; INCLUDING EVIDENCE AND TALK OR POSITIONS IN MEETINGS ABOUT CUBAN TIES TO SANDINISTAS INCLUDING FINANCIAL

SUPPORT.

- THE REFUGEE ISSUE IN INDOCHINA

- NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES

- UNCTAD/G-77 -- HOW WILL ECONOMIC ISSUES IN NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE BE TREATED AT NAM? THERE IS AN INDICATION THAT COSTA RICA WITH OTHER LDC SUPPORT INTENDS TO RAISE ISSUE OF EFFECT OF OPEC PRICE USES ON LDC'S. ALSO INTEREST IN NAM SUMMIT CONCLUSIONS RE UNCTAD V HELD IN MANILA DURING MAY/JUNE 1979.

C. SPECIAL CATEGORIES:

- NEED DRAFT TEXTS OF CHANGES PROPOSED TO CUBA'S VERSION OF SUMMIT FINAL COMMUNIQUE.

- IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC ISSUES ON WHICH NAM IS WID DIVISIVE.

- THE FOLLOWING ITEMS CONCERNING SPECIFIC COUNTRIES ALSO OF INTEREST:

(A) "THE NORTH KOREAN ROLE" RELATING THE NAM S THEY SLIDE WIDELY BETWEEN MODERATES AND RADICALS ON DIFFERENT ISSUES, WHILE GENERALLY APPEARING LESS THAN FRIENDLY TO THE BANS?

(B) "SOMALIAN ROLE?" SOMALI IS ANTI-CUBAN, TARAB BUT RECEIVES MILITARY SUPPORT FROM EGYPT;

(C) "PRC ROLE?" THERE ARE STRONG INDICATIONS PRC HAS ACTIVELY SOLICITING SUPPORT FOR ITS ANTI-SOVIET, ANTI- N POSITIONS. WHAT ACTIONS DO CHINESE PLAN TO COUNTERACT CUBAN T COMMUNIQUE?

(D) "YUGOSLAVIAN ROLE." YUGOSLAVIA IS THE LEADER IN OPPOSITION TO CUBA'S EFFORTS TO TURN NAM TOWARD SOVIET UNION. BOTH INDIA AND EGYPT, HISTORIC FOUNDERS AND RS OF NAM, ARE DISTRACTED BY OTHER PROBLEMS. EVIDENCE OF INDIA G MORE AGGRESSIVE ROLE IS OF INTEREST (INDIA, INDONESIA, ANIA AND NIGERIA CONSIDERED IN YUGOSLAV CAMP).

S E C R E T 01133232 AUG 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 53823

TO: DIRECTOR

WINTEL WWINE XMSTONE

REF: DIRECTOR 480049

1. TEHRAN STATION HAS NO AGENT [illegible] IN THE [illegible] AM
SDTRAMP/1 HAS BEEN TASKED TO PROVIDE INFO ON PARA ONE REF
REQUIREMENT AND TO OBTAIN ACCESS TO ONE OR MORE MEMBERS
OF THE PRESUMPTIVE IRANIAN DELEGATION. T/I ALSO SEEKING INFO
ON CUBAN DELEGATION REPORTED TO BE SCHEDULED VISIT TEHRAN
BEFORE HAVANA SUMMIT.

2. WILL ADVISE RESULTS.

3. FILE: 200-300-112. RVW 1 AUG 99 ERV 99C.

SECRET
S E C R E T



4 AUG

R E C R E T 030007Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 488425.

TO PRIORITY ALGIERS, AMMAN, BAGHDAD, COLOMBO, DACCA, KABUL,
NEW DELHI, TEHRAN, TRIPOLI, TUNIS.

NINTEL LUSTRE KMSTONE QPRUM INTEL

REFS: A. STATE 195073
B. STATE 187420
C. STATE 199145
D. DIRECTOR 484255

SUBJ: SUMMIT REQUIREMENTS UPDATE

1. CURRENT INFORMATION INDICATES THAT THERE WILL BE AT LEAST
E MEETING IN HAVANA PRIOR TO THE NAM SUMMIT ITSELF, AN EARLY
ST MEETING BETWEEN IRAQ, SRI LANKA, INDIA, YUGOSLAVIA AND CUBA:
28 TO 30 AUGUST AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL; AND 31 AUGUST - 1
EMBER MINISTERIAL LEVEL MEETING. IN ADDITION, THERE IS A
NG (NO DATE SPECIFIED) PLANNED AT UN/NI AND ANOTHER INFORMATION
NG IN GEORGETOWN, GUYANA ON 22-23 AUGUST. THERE ALSO ARE IN-
IONS THAT THE ASEAN AND ANDEAN PACT COUNTRIES MIGHT HOLD SEPA-
MEETINGS OF NAM CUBAN DRAFT COMMUNIQUE; THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS
E MEETING (CURRENTLY IN SESSION) WILL IN ALL PROBABILITY ALSO
S NAM AGENDA ITEMS AND CUBAN DRAFT DOCUMENT.

U.S. EMBASSIES RECEIVED GENERALLY FAVORABLE RESPONSES
A DEMARCHE'S. HOWEVER, STATE DEPARTMENT URGENTLY NEEDS
REPORTING TO DETERMINE EXTENT THESE SUPPORTING COMMENTS
CERE AND WILL BE FOLLOWED BY INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY ACTION
TENDS TO PURSUE CONTINUING DEMARCHES TO SELECT COUNTRIES
TIONS WHERE IT FEELS U.S. POSITIONS CAN BE BOLSTERED.
NEAT, INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY AND REGIONAL GROUP PROPOSALS FOR
EXTS OF CUBAN DRAFT COMMUNIQUE AND POSITIONS ON INDIVIDUAL
ES ARE OF HIGH INTEREST. REVISED DATES, ATTENDEES, PUR-
ABOVE MEETINGS OR OTHER PERTINENT MEETINGS, RESULTS, ETC.
D. INDICATIONS OF PRESSURE POINTS OR LEVERAGES WHICH MIGHT
O INFLUENCE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES WOULD BE EXTREMELY VALUABLE



6 SEP 79 [illegible] 5062

C R E T 0520252 SEP 79 STAFF

DIRECTOR 508054.

PRIORITY AFSBOL, EASB (XMT PEKING), EUSB, LASB
T SAN JOSE, PANAMA CITY, PORT AU PRINCE, NESB.

NTEL E SBELL ORRUM

OM DD

F: STATE DEPARTMENT 223278

1. REF REPRESENTS STATE DEPT RESPONSE TO PRESIDENTIAL TASKING OF
ATE, CIA, AND RTACTION TO PUBLICIZE CUBAN DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET
ION. RTACTION, OF COURSE, HAS BEEN PLAYING THIS THEME WORLDWIDE
R SOME TIME, UNDER AUTHORIZATION OF SEVERAL PRESIDENTIAL FINDINGS
D PERSPECTIVES, AND WE HAVE ADVISED WHITE HOUSE OF EXTENT AND IMPACT
OUR EFFORTS. FIELD REPORTING HAS BEEN MOST HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD.

2. SUDDEN INVOLVEMENT OF OVERT SIDE OF MISSION IN THIS CAMPAIGN
M RAISE SECURITY PROBLEMS FOR OUR COVERT ACTION ASSETS, AS A NUMBER
STATION AND EMBASSY CABLES HAVE SUGGESTED. CHIEFS OF STATION
OULD MONITOR CLOSELY STATE AND ICA ACTIVITIES TO ENSURE THAT THEY
NOT DUPLICATE AND HENCE COMPROMISE YOUR EFFORTS. IF, AS HAS HAPPENE
IASSY CHIEFS REQUEST ASSISTANCE OF COVERT ACTION ASSETS IN MEETING THEIR
JECTIVES, YOU SHOULD DIPLOMATICALLY INDICATE THAT YOU ARE BEING
PERATIONALLY TASKED, ARE REPORTING THROUGH YOUR OWN CHANNELS, AND
AT INVOLVEMENT OF YOUR ASSETS IN OVERT CAMPAIGN CAN LEAD TO
CURITY PROBLEMS. YOU SHOULD ALSO RESIST ANY REQUESTS FOR
[illegible] LINE SUPPORT, FIRST AS THIS WOULD TAX OUR LIMITED FACILITIES
[illegible] PORTING CLANDESTINE PROPAGANDA, AND SECONDLY BECAUSE
[illegible] CIA IS PREPARING SUBSTANTIVE MATERIALS.

F

3. AS LONG AS SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS NOT AFFECTED, HOWEVER,
[illegible] OF STATE AND ICA SHOULD NOT DIMINISH YOUR OWN EFFORTS
[illegible] DISSEMINATE PROPAGANDA ON CUBAN-SOVIET CONNECTION. AS INDICATED,
[illegible] CAMPAIGN IS OF DIRECT INTEREST TO THE PRESIDENT.

[illegible] DRV 5 SEPT 79, DRV DOD.6.

[illegible] T

13 SEP 79

C O N F I D E N T I A L 122316Z SEP 79 STATE

FM DIRECTOR USIA

TO: IMMEDIATE PR/WASHINGTON, PR/NEW YORK, JAKARTA, KUALA LUMPUR, MANILA, RANGOON, SINGAPORE, TOKYO, ABIDJAN, ACCRA, ADDIS ABABA, BAMAKO, CONAKRY, DAR ES SALAAM, DAKAR, KHARTOUM, KINSHASA, LAGOS, LUSAKA, MOGADISHU, MONROVIA, NAIROBI, KAMPALA, NOUAKCHOTT, PRETORIA, YAOUNDE, ALGIERS, AMMAN, COLOMBO, DACCA, KABUL, NEW DELHI, RABAT, TEHRAN, TRIPOLI, TUNIS, CAIRO, BERLIN, BONN, GERMANY, BRUSSELS, GENEVA, HELSINKI, LONDON, NICOSIA, OSLO, PARIS, ROME, MADRID, LISBON, BOGOTA, BUENOS AIRES, CARACAS, GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON, LIMA, MEXICO CITY, PANAMA CITY, MONTEVIDEO, QUITO, RIO DE JANEIRO, SAN JOSE, LA/MIAMI

EXDOK CABLE

SUBJ: WINTER WWINE KMSTONE QBRUM - NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT SUMMIT REQUIREMENTS UPDATE

1. STATE DEPARTMENT URGENTLY NEEDS AS COMPLETE A PICTURE AS POSSIBLE OF NAM SUMMIT DINAMICS AND PROJECTED ACTION. DUE CUBAN CONTROLS IN HAVANA, STATE UNABLE OBTAIN ANY INFO CONCERNING VARIOUS COMMITTEE DRAFTING SESSIONS WHERE PRINCIPAL ACTION TOOK PLACE. FINAL DOCUMENTATION ON OFFICIAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DECLARATIONS WERE OBTAINED BY STATE U.S. INTERESTS SECTION IN HAVANA. FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS STILL CRITICALLY NEEDED:

A. THERE IS A COMPLETE LACK OF DETAIL ON WHAT HAPPENED IN THE OFFICIAL FUNCTIONAL COMMITTEE AND REGIONAL AD HOC COMMITTEE SESSIONS. HOW DID INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY ACTIVITY IN COMMITTEE SESSIONS COMPARE WITH THEIR PRESENTATIONS IN OPEN SESSIONS? WHAT TRADE OFFS WERE MADE BY WHOM AND HOW WERE THEY WORKED OUT? COUNTRIES OF SPECIAL INTEREST IN THIS REGARD ARE KUWAIT, NIGERIA, SOMALIA, IRAQ, TANZANIA, MOZAMBIQUE, JAMAICA, PERU, GUYANA AND PANAMA. (ONE NIGHT WAS DESCRIBED BY DELEGATES AS "NIGHT OF HELL." WHAT HAPPENED THAT NIGHT?)

B. WHAT DO INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES FEEL IS FUTURE OF NAM IN LIGHT OF CUBAN ATTEMPTS TO ORIENT NAM CLOSER TO SOVIET BLOC?

C. HOW DO VARIOUS CAPITALS VIEW SUMMIT? CUBA'S ROLE IN MANEUVERING ACTIVITY? HARASSMENT OF SOME DELEGATIONS FOR SPEAKING WITH W. EUROPEAN, CANADIAN AND U.S. OBSERVERS? WILL THEY RETURN TO THEIR PREVIOUS POSITIONS ON NAM ISSUES OR START NEW PATH IN RESPONSE TO HAVANA CONFERENCES?

D. TO WHAT EXTENT WILL CUBA (INCLUDING CASTRO PERSONALLY) USE NAM RESULTS AT UNGA? WILL PUERTO RICAN ISSUE BE RAISED AT UNGA?

E. ZAMBIA: DID ZAMBIAN WORKING GROUPS TAKE ANY MODERATING ACTIONS OR DID THEIR ACTIONS COMPLETELY SUPPORT CUBA?

F. WHAT WAS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CUBAN, IRAQI DELEGATIONS (IRAQ CHAIRED POLITICAL COMMITTEE)?

G. WHAT, IF ANYTHING, DID LATIN AMERICANS DO IN CLOSED SESSIONS TO MODERATE WORDING OF FINAL DECLARATIONS IN FAVOR OF U.S. INTERESTS, OR IN SUPPORT OF THEIR OWN POSITIONS, ESPECIALLY PANAMANIANS AND VENEZUELANS?

H. DID ANY ARABS DO ANYTHING TO BASE CONDEMNATION OF U.S.? ON WHICH ISSUES?

I. WHAT POSITIONS DID INDIA TAKE ON EACH ISSUE IN THE COMMITTEE SESSIONS?

J. HAVE ANY DELEGATIONS EXPRESSED CRITICISM OR OUTRAGE AT ANY OF THE CUBAN MANIPULATION OF THE SUMMIT MEETING? WAS ANY CHINESE OR SOVIET BEHIND SCENES ROLE NOTED?

K. WHICH DELEGATIONS CONSIDER THE SUMMIT A SUCCESS OR FAILURE AND FOR WHAT REASONS?

L. WHAT DO INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES PLAN TO DO ON CREDENTIALS OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA AT UNGA?

M. TO WHAT EXTENT DID OPEC GET ITS WAY? ON WHICH ISSUES? HOW WILL OPEC PRICE RESTRAINT BE PLAYED IN FUTURE?



PAGE 3 DIRECTOR 517360 S E C R E T

N. HOW HAVE NON-NAM LATIN AMERICA COUNTRIES REACTE
THE SUMMIT AND DO ANY OF THEM PLAN TO ASK FOR MEMBERSHIP IN NA

O. WHAT ARE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY POSITIONS REGARDING
HOLDING OF UNCTAD VI IN HAVANA? DO ANY COUNTRIES PLAN TO OPPO
CUBAN SITE?

P. WHICH COUNTRIES WILL SUBMIT RESERVATIONS TO FINAL
COMMUNIQUE, ON WHICH ISSUES?

Q. REPLIES SHOULD BE IN INTEL FORMAT AND PRIORITY USING
LEWINE SLUG.

3. FILE: 100-30-112. RVW 12 SEP 90 DRV DEC.1. ALL SEC
S E C R E T
BT
#1557

27 SEP 79 21 16Z

S E C R E T 262122Z SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 521500.

TO: NESB.

FROM: NE/COPS

SUBJ: WNINTEL - MATERIALS FOR LIAISON

1. A RECENT INCIDENT AT AN NE STATION HAS AGAIN IMPRESSED ON US THE NEED FOR CAREFUL SCREENING OF MATERIALS TO BE PASSED TO LIAISON. IN THIS INCIDENT A CRITIQUE OF THE FIRST CUBAN DRAFT FINAL COMMUNIQUE WAS PASSED TO A LIAISON SERVICE WHOSE CHIEF RESPONDED WITH AN IMMEDIATE REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF SEVERAL PASSAGES. THE SERVICE HEAD POLITELY ASKED FOR BACKGROUND ON HOW THE CRITIQUE HAD BEEN CLEARED, AND AT WHAT LEVEL, AND COMMENTED THAT THE CRITIQUE SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN COMPOSED IN HASTE.

2. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THE CRITIQUE WAS NOT A RESTATEMENT OF USG POLICY, BUT RATHER A PROPAGANDA SALVO HASTILY AIMED AT THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE. HOWEVER, WE HAD PLACED OURSELVES, THROUGH PASSAGE OF THE UNEDITED COMMUNIQUE, IN A POSITION WHERE OUR LIAISON CONTACTS WERE MILDLY DISTRUBED AND WE WERE FORCED TO DEFEND OURSELVES.

3. A REVIEW OF THIS PARTICULAR INCIDENT AT HQS ENCOURAGED US TO TRY TO TIGHTEN UP COORDINATION ON SUCH MESSAGES BEFORE THEY LEAVE HQS, BUT STILL ULTIMATELY WE MUST DEPEND UPON THE COS AND STATION FOR A FINAL REVIEW WITH PARTICULAR REGARD FOR THE SENSIBILITIES OF THE HOST LIAISON SERVICES.

4. WE MIGHT ADD THAT WHILE THE ABOVE INCIDENT INVOLVED PROPAGANDA MATERIAL, PREVIOUS INCIDENTS HAVE INVOLVED THE UNFORTUNATE PASSAGE OF MATERIALS TO WHICH LIAISON SHOULD NEVER HAVE HAD ACCESS. THE ONLY SURE METHOD WE CAN RECOMMEND TO PREVENT SUCH "ACCIDENTS" IS A THOROUGH REVIEW OF EACH PIECE OF PAPER PRIOR TO PASSAGE BY AT LEAST TWO MEMBERS OF THE STATION. (ANOTHER INCIDENT TAUGET THE LESSON THAT YOU MUST CHECK THE

PAGE 2 WASHINGTON 521500 S E C R E T
"EMPTY" ENVELOPE ALSO TO PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED MATERIALS REACHING LIAISON.)

5. NO FILE. RVW 24SEPT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#0043

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977—225-323

محل تهیه وفروش کتب اسنادلانه حاسوسی
بشرح زیر می‌باشد
۱ـ چادروحدت جنب درب اصلی‌دانشگاه تهران
۲ـ انتشارات پیام آزادی خیابان جمهوری
اسلامی قسمت (الف)کوچه سیدهاشم‌پلاک ۱۱
۳ـ خانه‌کتاب (وابسته به انتشارات اسلامی
حوزه علمیه قم)خیابان فردوسی‌جنب تقاطع
کوشک